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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I examine what mobilized the simultaneous discourses of
charm and anti-charm rhetoric in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British
and American modernist literature. Charm moves through texts as a trojan horse of
sorts, ostensibly supporting normative ideologies of the social order while its use
actually imagines sociopolitical transformation. I look to Oscar Wilde’s works to
assess how charm possesses an aesthetic magic that bonds persons across normative
time and social stratification. Charm becomes an experimental force of social form in
the early decades of the twentieth-century. In the works of Gertrude Stein and Sylvia
Townsend Warner, charm’s play with concealment and revelation renders new
understandings of the female body in modernist culture, and presents radical feminist
revolutionary potential. By the 1930s, however, charm’s rebellious force of form
becomes subsumed by global capitalism, and re-latches to normativity; namely, to
white masculinity, which repossesses and subsumes the rebellious powers of charm to
become a powerful capitalist slickness in works by F. Scott Fitzgerald and Edith
Wharton. Charm’s presence in the era, I argue, not only formulates a compelling
narrative of modernism that deserves critical attention, but also exists as a force that
wounds accepted paradigms of contemporary modernist studies. As modernist studies
attempts to move toward questions of theoretical approach as well as scale (historical,
geographic, and even planetary), charm serves as example of what new approaches to
modernism based in mechanisms of feminization, marginalization, and difference can
do.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The little charms, the little charms, the little charms, the little charms,
the little charms, the little charms, the little charms, the little charms…
THE LITTLE CHARMS PRICK.
The partridge’s eye is red.
Little things, little things, little things, little things, little things, little things,
little things, little things, little things, little things, little things, little things… 1
– Salvador Dalí, “Poem of Little Things” [Poema de les cosetes] (1928)
It is only a question of finding the right words and putting them in the right order. But we cannot do it
because they do not live in dictionaries; they live in the mind. And how do they live in the mind?
Variously and strangely, much as human beings live, by ranging hither and thither, by falling in love,
and mating together. 2
– Virginia Woolf, “Craftsmanship” (1937)

During the modernist era—which, according to many, existed in the rough
timeframe from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century—the antiquated platitude
charm enjoyed odd ubiquity in Britain and America, peaking in usage in the middle of
modernism in 1925.3 Charm is a bizarre affective-aesthetic notion that, by all
accounts, does not appear to belong in literary modernism. The term is dated,
outmoded, and irrational. It is feminized and trivial. Charm’s presence in the era
therefore wounds our accepted narratives of modernism—namely, the dominance of
post-Enlightenment projects of futurity, individualism, and the separation of aesthetics
from capital, politics, and science or technology. To focus on charm in literary
modernism is to refocus our gaze on the era, its objects, and its politics. When we turn
our critical interests toward charm’s emergence in modernism, other engines of
accepted narratives in modernist studies begin to turn in response—to put pressure on
which writers we find to be prominent in modernism, for instance, means that
emergent or marginalized voices begin to appear as central. Accepted approaches to
studying modernist literature, such as formalist close reading, slip in favor of
1

affectively motivated attentions. And the presumed relationship of the aesthetic to the
sociopolitical begins to blur into an altered dynamism that renders an estranged
aesthetic autonomy. Bodies and identities as a result are themselves altered through
shifting mechanisms of minoritization, sociality, and relationships to language and the
literary.
To paraphrase Salvador Dalí’s “Poem of Little Things,” charm’s ubiquity
pricks me. Like Roland Barthes’s punctum, it is a literally touching—tactile—detail to
modernism. Both a physical object (such as a lucky token) and the state of a subject
(to be charming, to be charmed), it typically denotes a pleasant interest or delight in
something. Often, “charming” is used to refer to female attractiveness, a blank
descriptor of a woman who presents as enticing or alluring in a generally non-erotic
way.4 But more than a noun referencing an object or adjective referencing a person,
“charm” also references language itself—it is a word or phrase with magical
properties for healing, protection, or otherwise controlling one’s surroundings, dating
from Medieval incantations and healing verses. It shifts uneasily through a range of
grammatical contortions—one can “be charming” oneself and charm someone else,
and one can also “be charmed” by someone or something else—the ability to
manipulate, to make one’s surrounds malleable.
Charm points to proximity—the closeness between persons through allure or
attraction, or the wider social position of influence, the potential for control and
manipulation. Charm brings relationality into being by making the transparent tenets
of such relationalities apparent. It is because charm plays with closeness that it is
perceived as a desirable danger in modernism, a corrosive magnetism. Various

2

formations of social cohesion emerged during the mass upheavals of the twentieth
century, including war, the increased disparities between upper and lower
socioeconomic classes, and changes to the social and legal status of women.
Definitions of social groups were iterated through collectivities of nationhood or
patriotism, as well as through differences in identity categories of gender, race, class,
and so on. In the throes of such evolving and confounding formations, charm promises
proximity—social cohesion or closeness among individuals in a sociopolitical or
national group with those outside of that group—as a false hope or fleeting potential,
never to actually be held, grasped, or fully enjoyed. The modernist moment of charm
is a site in which to deduce how modernism allows charm to occupy a paradoxical
space of attraction and revulsion, an allure toward closeness while maintaining
wariness of what such closeness may do. To activate charm in modernist projects,
then, is to activate a logic-less logic of individuality and sociality, desire and
discomfort, power and disempowerment.
To ask what charm is doing in modernism means to ask quite literally what
charm is doing: performing, enforcing, supplanting, shattering. In an era presumably
focused on Ezra Pound’s dictum toward “the new” of experimental aesthetic projects,
that endured a sociopolitical upheaval that included two devastating world wars, and
that pushed toward a future of scientific and technological innovation, charm seems
useless, a mere anachronism. But, as I argue here and throughout this study, charm
becomes a rupture to modernist rupture. It interrupts a modernism already envisioning
itself as an interruption. Modernism as rupture has been theorized almost since its
alleged end, after WWII. This is one of the many narratives that modernism has
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generated for itself (many of which have become “academic folk wisdom,” as Tyrus
Miller puts it), yet, is the most pervasive.
As early as 1967, critics determined the central narrative of modernism to be
synonymous with revolt, negation, and other forms of “rupture.” Irving Howe, in The
Idea of the Modern, declared that modernism “must be defined in terms of what it is
not, the embodiment of a tacit polemic, an inclusive negative.” 5 It is a “revolt
against… prevalent style, an unyielding rage against the official order” that somehow
still “does not establish a prevalent style of its own.”6 David Harvey characterizes
modernism as embedded in discourses of ephemerality and change, insecurity and
fragmentation.7 Jurgen Habermas calls modernity a “project” that stems from
intellectual efforts in the eighteenth century “to develop objective science, universal
morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic.” 8 In other words,
“the idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals
working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the
enrichment of daily life,” including science’s dominion over nature, and rationalized
forms of social organization that would lead to freedom from “the irrationalities of
myth, religion, superstition” and “the dark side of our own human natures.” 9 The
“project” of modernity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then, is
likewise a secular movement that “sought demystification and desacralization of
knowledge and social organization in order to liberate human beings from their
chains.”10 Yet, twentieth-century modernists began to suspect that such a project was
doomed to turn against itself, rendering the “quest for human emancipation into a
system of universal oppression in the name of human liberation.” 11 In The Dialectic of
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Enlightenment, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer propose that Enlightenment
rationality held the logic of domination within it, rendering the domination of nature
as akin to “the oppressive power of purely instrumental reason over culture and
personality.”12 The project’s emphasis on technology, for instance, obscures “the
exploitation of others’ work, and capital.” 13 Effectively, “what men want to learn from
nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men. That is the only
aim… Power and knowledge are synonymous.” 14
Charm appears to have no place here. If the modernist project works in
responsivity or dialectic to the Enlightenment’s own project, charm’s insistence on
production (that a thing can emerge from nothing, that incantation creates from mere
words, sound, or look) opposes modernism’s obsessions with negation including
Vorticist vacuity and the appropriation of “make it new” as destruction, or
Nietzschean nihilism. Charm as itself emblematic of the continuity from the
nineteenth century, as carryover from earlier eras that insisted on the primacy of the
social institutions including religion, moral education, and the elevation of the
domestic which included women’s docile roles as “angel in the house” as the heart of
the nation. Charm’s roots in religion and spirituality confound the idea of modernism
as secular, and its applicability to women and minorities fractures modernism as
primarily masculinist.
Charm as rupture within modernism is thereby a meta-rupture, as it is equally a
wound to modernism as much as it is a wound to our critical faculties in examining the
era within the field of modernist studies. It is itself able to expose a modernist system
of valuation, one that carries into our present attempts at knowing modernism,
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dictating that which we find and that which we miss in our scholarly inquiry. We
cannot see what we are not equipped to see—seemingly invisible tenets emerge when
we look at the era askance. To view charm as “alluring blank” opens a space in
modernist projects to newly apprehend a range of fantasies on the nature of
modernism’s ideas about itself—particularly, its construction of systems of
minoritization. What results is renewed ability to interrogate modernist aesthetic
values, concerns of sociality and individuality, and the requisite categories of gender,
race, and nationhood as linked to capitalist economic and social practices.

A History of Charm and Charm as Method
My central claim in Charmed Modernisms requires groundwork to be laid on
charm’s emergence and usage. While this work is the first to examine the term as
explicit force in the modernist era, I also seek to acknowledge those philosophers and
writers who have engaged with charm to sketch its shape-shifting history. Therefore,
what follows is two-fold: first, I will track charm’s emergence in Western literary and
intellectual history, dating from the Middle Ages. Major ideas within this include
charm’s mystic roots, its vocality, and its emphasis on the aesthetically felt, or in other
words, its affective dimension. This includes charm’s etymological roots in Latin and
Old French, which Chaucer references in his Canterbury Tales (c.1300), and aesthetic
philosophy from Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. It also includes the clearest
engagement with charm in modernism from Walter Benjamin, who spent much of his
work theorizing an elusive, mystical grasp through art–the fleeting “thereness” of
charm. Secondly, I bring charm’s history into conversation with contemporary work in
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affect and aesthetics, which I find is still embedded in charm’s attractions, and its
ability to drive our experiences with literature, with others, and with the world writ
large, yet still be able to defy categorization, consequent to the “trauma” of social
contact and categorization (femininity, sexuality, racialization).
That charm tends toward the multifold, slippery, and mercurial is no surprise
given the bends in its etymological history. Dating from the twelfth to thirteenth
centuries, charm touts multiple roots, including the Latin carmen (n.) or “song” and
the Old French charme (n.) and charmer (v.) or “to enchant.” Charms tended to refer
to pagan and Christian incantations alleged to work magic, or refer to a small object
meant to bring healing or luck. Charms both verbal and physical addressed a range of
bodily and environmental concerns, and were aimed at resituating the body and its
substances with a physical and spiritual environment – from toothaches to childbirth to
marriages. Geoffrey Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale (c. 1385) makes mention of such healing
properties: “To oothere woundes and to broken armes / Some hadden salues and some
hadden charmes.”15 Only in the seventeenth century did charm begin to lose its
religious or mythic significance and become an ostensibly positive, secular, and
quotidian term of praise. These aspects once associated with the religious or mythic
were transformed in subsequent centuries to become forcibly secularized, though
uncertainty as to its power remained.
Charm in the modern era supplanted religiosity with aesthetic perception, its
own secular form of “magic” – frequent concern of modernist artists and writers,
aesthetic perception could influence, delight, or otherwise elicit spontaneous feeling.
As such, it recalls what Walter Benjamin deems an artwork’s “aura.” Writing in 1936,
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Benjamin explains a “unique apparition of a distance,” or, that which solidifies the
singularity of an original artwork, is always attached to our encounters with art. It is
“the here and now of the work of art—its unique existence in a particular place.” 16
Aura is a kind of presence, a temporal distance with a simultaneous closeness, that has
been lost as contemporary perception has changed with the advent of photography and
cinema. Benjamin finds aura “identical to its embeddedness in the context of
tradition,” or, art as it was used in its origin, “in the service of rituals—first magical,
then religious.” Its “original use value” was that of authenticity. In the twentieth
century, “for the first time in world history, technological reproducibility emancipates
the work of art from its parasitic subservience to ritual,” founding it instead “on a
different practice: politics.”17 I reference Benjamin’s outline of the trajectory of
artistic perception through modernity to draw parallel to the rough outline of charm’s
position through history. Charm, like “aura,” retains a lost referent, replaced in the
modernist era with capitalist consumption and politics. These forces, in other words,
become the driving aspects of charm’s manipulations and allures, and too are subject
to capitalism and politics’ assumptions of value and primacy.
The term seems an ideal example of secularized aesthetic concept within
modernism, confirming modernism’s own interest in the secular and rational. Indeed,
charm had already appeared long before within aesthetic theory. Immanuel Kant, of
course, was one of the first aestheticians to incorporate charm in a study of aesthetics,
albeit to negate its purity for proper assessment of the beautiful. Kant not only names
charm (Reiz) as such in his account of aesthetic experience in the Critique of
Judgment, but does so because he is sure to place it outside the realm of the
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beautiful.18 Kant finds design to be that which is essential in art, not emotion or
“sensation”: “it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form,
that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste.” Beauty, he notes, “which ought properly
to be a question merely of the form,” is often confused with the lesser “charm and
emotion.” Beauty is conceived as distinct from charm as the “intrinsic” over mere
“ornamentation.” This duality is essential to what Kant finds to be pure, rather than
empirical, thinking. Pure perception is thus pitted against the ornamental and
emotional. “A judgement of taste,” Kant concludes, “which is uninfluenced by charm
or emotion… and whose determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form, is a
pure judgement of taste.”19 Kant colludes emotionalism with charm, implicitly
indicating that he finds emotional or affective response may affect the quality of our
perception, and thus, that the object of our gaze may not be indeed objective. The
legacy of such thought in Western aesthetics exists in perpetuity. Any impure or
otherwise “not pure” judgments of beauty are encounters in which “every interest
corrupts the judgment of taste and deprives it of its impartiality.”20 Those judgements
deemed not pure for reasons of interest are “charms” (Reize). Such impure judgements
seem to be already embroiled in modernist caution toward emotionality, aesthetic
investment, and the dangers of interest over “disinterestedness.” Despite colloquial
interpretations that note otherwise, charm is therefore theorized as on the fringes of the
beautiful, but not a degree or modality of the beautiful in itself.
Rosalind Galt underscores the link between social inequity and aesthetic
categories, including the beautiful, in Pretty: Film and the Decorative Image (2011).
As with charm, “pretty” has become denigrated or “lesser” value (often, perceived to
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be feminine and non-Western) to the more significant “beautiful” throughout Western
aesthetics and philosophy. “The rhetoric of cinema,” Galt argues, “has consistently
denigrated surface decoration, finding the attractive skin of the screen to be false,
shallow, feminine, or apolitical.”21 The “resilience” of the idea that cinema is “empty
spectacle” is proof positive for Galt that the critical terms used to assess and evaluate
art are themselves embedded in modes of reading learned from “a transhistorical
Kantian schema of beauty.” 22 Galt aims, as I do here, to trouble such a history, yet I
find charm’s viability as not cinematic but literary quality rendering texts and textual
experience as incantatory necessarily also caught in particular kinds of questions about
form. Charm is both aesthetically formal and affectively of form. It is a structure that
is, paradoxically, a mysterious force difficult to precisely identify but that occupies
some dependency or asymmetry of aesthetic feeling and form.
To examine charm in the purely aesthetic sense as aspect of aesthetic
perception, literature, and art is to place charm into the often-theorized tangle of
aesthetic response. Sianne Ngai, who tracks minor negative aesthetic emotions in Ugly
Feelings (2005), defines aesthetic response simply: aesthetic emotions are those
“feelings unique to our encounters with artworks.” 23 These feelings’ “objective or
subjective status,” however, poses continual problem in aesthetics: one of the oldest
theories of aesthetic experience, Aristotle’s Poetics, failed to clearly distinguish
whether particular emotion (catharsis) occurs within an audience in response to drama
or is located in the dramatic object itself. 24 She refers to Gérard Genette’s attempts to
get around the very question of subjective or objective emotion by emphasizing the
relativism (meaning, that what elicits positive feeling in me may not elicit positive
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feeling in you) that Kant and other philosophers have tried to outwit. Genette’s
“unapologetically subjectivist theory of aesthetic judgment as a mode of illusory
projection,” Ngai writes, is “what amounts to a fundamentally subjective appraisal
[…] treated ‘as if’ it were one of the object’s own intrinsic properties.” 25 Aesthetic
judgment, then, “is this illusory objectification,” something that Genette deems
“aesthetic predicates” such as precious, momentous, or imperious, either created from
or stemming from our initial perception of the aesthetic object. 26 Eve Sedgwick offers
an alternative affective-aesthetic framework as she turns to Proust’s In Search of Lost
Time (A la recherche du temps perdu). Proustian “modes of being, of relation to self
and the world,” she writes, becomes contemplation as a search to understand “his
continuing access to a psychology of surprise and refreshment, as well as his
nourishing relation to work.”27 Sedgwick’s idea of such capacity for “surprise and
refreshment” became unofficial groundwork for contemporary affect studies. Feeling
or affect functions as political and social currency, yet, remains an unknown variable
that in most cases is not reliably predicated, manufactured, or exerted, and thereby is
independent of power, while it may work within and beside it.
Such aesthetic-emotional responses encounter particular problems in the realm
of not only aesthetics, but also affect. This is largely due to the significance of form or
structure, which tends to be avoided in contemporary affect theory. For example,
Brian Massumi finds affect not a language or form but an “intensity” involving
movement and sensation which “holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after
ideology.”28 Defined as the Spinozan “capability to affect and be affected,” affect is
significant in that it departs from an understanding of the body as a “positionality” in a
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social matrix of power and domination in Foucault’s formulation. Massumi argues that
such a positional matrix concretizes an ideological fixity of the subject, rendering both
accordance to power and subversion to power already “scripted” in the social matrix.
Massumi finds affect theoretically necessary to abandon such fixity in favor of a mode
that explores the dynamic subject’s potential for non-predeterminate change. Affects
are both virtual (“the autonomy of relation”) and actual (“functional limitation”) in
that they “virtual synesthetic perspectives anchored in (functionally limited by) the
actually existing, particular things that embody them.”29 This is why emotions and
feeling tend to be seen as disorienting, he notes, or described as outside of oneself.
From that point, we may then imagine an ethics composed on the basis of such
change, he argues. This change is enacted by “the perception of one’s own vitality,
one’s sense of aliveness, of changeability (often signified as ‘freedom’).”30 Emotion,
such as that which is elicited by artworks (or, in most of Massumi’s examples, media,
art, and popular culture) contrasts with affect, then, because emotion is a formalized
naming or the “socio-linguistic fixing” of affect which reduces it to signification. 31
Lawrence Grossberg adds, “affective states are neither structured narratively nor
organized in response to our interpretations of situations.”32 To examine an artwork
and experience aesthetic emotion, then, fails to occupy either realm of aesthetics or
affect/emotion on the basis of form.
However, it is here that I offer charm as remedial and necessary force in this
perceived split. Charm occupies positions as affect and aesthetic emotion uniquely
because it is equally referent to subjective state and physical object. In other words,
charm recognizes that specific language and form gives rise to specific affective-
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aesthetic experience. Eugenie Brinkema summarizes: “the turn to affect has
corresponded with a disciplinary turn away from detail, from specificity and the
local.”33 This is because affect is seen as “the place where something immediate and
automatic and resistant takes place outside of language,” 34 as Massumi’s “force” and
pre-linguistic intensity suggests. However, the turn to affect “does not obliterate the
problem of form and representation. Affect is not where reading is no longer
needed.”35 Affect as critical apparatus alone fails to allow affect to press back against
theory, she cautions. Instead, we ought to be asking, “What… would happen to the
study of both affectivity and form if we were to reintroduce close reading to the study
of sensation, not as felt by moved bodies, but as wildly composed in specific
cinematic, literary, and critical texts?” 36 Consider that charm can be an experience
between persons (in which case, who holds the experience of charm – the charmed,
the charmer, or both, and to what degree?), and the difficulty of reading such
interactions. How we formally may account for the feeling that one person is “putting
on the charm” artificially, a gimmickry that we are coded to detest, or determine
whether charm is present at all, must rely upon form. This drives my focus on charm
as a modernist literary and cultural phenomenon. Moreover, this approach follows
Raymond Williams’s notion of structures of feeling, structures which named those felt
social experiences which “do not have to await definition, classification, or
rationalization before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on
experience and action.” Instead, they lie “at the very edge of semantic availability,” 37
always flirting on the border of the discursive and that which escapes discourse.
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As Brinkema indicates, a return to form and to close reading is critical for
affect to “do” anything for the Humanities. In doing so, I find we may better approach
the work of social judgement, power, and politics. If I am “being charming” to you,
for example, I am putting on a relation, and therefore, I am showcasing the “charm
and charisma” that Pierre Bourdieu calls “the power,” or cultural capital, “which
certain people have, to impose their own self-image as the objective and collective
image of their body and being.”38 In saying you are charming, or in “being charming,”
I have established an asymmetry of power between us that thereby constructs each of
us. In both scenarios, I have power over you, in some form, because “I” am the one
who judges. “You” become the object to my subjecthood. And yet, you retain some
kind of magnetic, manipulative influence in your charm, under the guise of
innocuousness or inertness. Desire and pleasure from this asymmetry challenges what
the “beautiful” would have established. This new, strange asymmetry occurs through
language, judgement, and aesthetic feeling. Furthermore, following Bourdieu, this
aesthetic feeling is a social one. Charm under this theorization—as a placeholder of
judgement or legible structuring apparatus, arising from formal engagement, and
necessarily indicating a lost or absent object—becomes a modernist fantasy. As
fantasy, this fantasy's “magic” of “bringing into being” is already at odds with
modernism's notions of itself as secular, rational, and future-focused, a modernism that
is accepting of paradox, rupture, and revolt against objectivity and closure. It shows
the modernism still sought the possibility of meaning, the ability to envision futures
that were very like the present rather than "new" or progressive, still believed in
magical possibility of intersubjectivity at the rise of the unknowable individual
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consciousness, or the ability for individuals to retain power to manipulate their social
status amidst the rise of twentieth century global capitalism. That modernism knew
these things to be false or untrue was not deterrent. This provides hope for us in the
present to see what formal affective engagement with literary and cultural
representations of fantasies can offer for us as we live through our own time of
rupture, revision, and uncertainty.
To call attention to “charm,” then, instead of the beautiful, the “interesting,” or
the negative “shock” or “disgust,” is to newly apprehend the details of form as a social
placeholder—a form of judgement—that has the unique ability to bring things and
relations between things into being (or, in other words, “magicking” things into being)
while laying bare the means of the production of this relation. It is because of this
asymmetry that I argue for charm to be considered an important point of interrogation.
Furthermore, charm is particularly of import in modernism as it becomes signal of
multiple antimodernist notions. It is an antagonism to modernism, a catch in its
narrative of itself, that was magnetically alluring to modernists. Our attentiveness to
this phenomenon finds charm as a formal affective relationality, a force of evacuated
form that moves our critical apparatuses into an otherwise that recognizes the
foundations of our apparatuses in systems of power and difference.
Many recent studies in modernism have approached early twentieth-century
literature and culture with a single controlling principle, as I am doing with charm.
Other controlling principles have included glamour, boredom, melancholia, and
ambiguous thermality, studies of which include Judith Brown’s Glamour in Six
Dimensions: Modernism and the Radiance of Form (2009), Allison Pease’s
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Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom (2012), Jonathan Flatley’s
Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism, Jessica Burstein’s
Cold Modernism: Literature, Fashion, Art (2012). Such works have surged as part of
literary study’s so-called “humanistic” or social turn, motivated in part by the
impasses left by poststructuralism through the last decades of the twentieth century.
Like these studies, this project, too, ultimately seeks to worry accepted boundaries of
modernist literary studies via a singular, evocative concept in order to “retain
modernism’s unique resources for thinking […] in a noninstrumental fashion.” 39 Yet, I
push my project away from generalized “feeling” in modernism, since this tends to
occlude the other components of modernism, particularly the problems of form. In this
way, I develop the approaches and commitments of Eugenie Brinkema in The Forms
of the Affects (2014). As I’ve indicated, much of what I work with here is purposefully
at odds with traditional definitions of modernism, including its allegedly dominant
masculine aesthetics, its emphasis on rationality and the secular, and its concern with
individuation and subjectivity over the social or collective. To discuss glamour or
boredom in modernism, for example, is to address accepted notions of modernist
aesthetic and political project – glamour’s aesthetic smoothness or hollowness, and
boredom’s demonstration of modernist difficulties with individuation, agency, or
subjectivity. Charm, on the other hand, does not participate in any of modernism’s
common narratives; instead, charm ruptures these narratives to propose a kind of
modernism on the margins that helps us locate the structures of modernists’ values,
desires, and fantasies. This marginality is not to be confused with the notion of a
minor literature. In the words of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their well-known
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essay on the subject, minor literature is characterized by its composition by a minority
“within a major language,” with the common characteristics of “deterritorialization,” a
political domain, and a collective value. 40 What I look at instead is a modernism that
premises itself on the mechanisms of such minoritization, that does not deterritorialize
through minorization but actually reterritorializes the same ground for itself.
My study of charm is important to modernist studies because, I find, as we
examine lesser-studied or dismissed forms circulating in modernist thought and
literature, we may better come to know modernism. Urmila Seshagiri finds that
despite an immensity of contemporary work in alternative modernisms, including
cosmopolitan modernity, comparative modernities, and postcolonial modernisms,
modernist studies writ large has largely accepted modernism as I described it above –
striving for the masculinist, secular, and rational. Syllabi across English departments
continue to list expected, dominant authors as foundational: D.H. Lawrence, James
Joyce, Wyndham Lewis, T.S. Eliot, and so on, for fear that teaching modernism
without these figures decenters what modernism allegedly is. Other authors including
Virginia Woolf or Dorothy Richardson, Jean Rhys, Jean Toomer, May Sinclair, or
H.D. are of interest because they engage directly with such dominances, such as
H.D.’s turn to Sigmund Freud or Woolf’s frequent address of masculinity in literature
and politics throughout her career. Despite the current field’s alleged acceptance of
“the relationship between modernism and modernity was elementally shaped by
women, feminists, and feminist women,”41 then, Seshagiri finds that there remains the
continued “gap” or “aporia between feminism’s vitality for modernism, on one hand,
and the scholarly neglect of that vitality, on the other.”42 This is not a project as
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Stephen Ross characterizes it, as he reminds us of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the
“minor” to “signify an overlooked but perfectly symptomatic literature, one that
illuminates its context and the ‘major’ works, figures and traditions around it, as the
canon cannot.”43 Rather, I find charm’s ability to loop us in uncertain delight as itself a
hopeful act of this sort of critical revitalization to examine modernism’s mechanisms
of minoritization. (I use “delight” deliberately – etymologically, “delight” is of mixed
origin, in part out of Latin delectare or to allure, charm, or please, thereby is itself a
loop back to charm.) Hope, like “happiness’s promise,” for Sara Ahmed, is a “hopeful
performative,” something that is “container of diverse objects” actually “might also
contain the forms in which desire can be realized.”44 Such a suggested tautology,
Ahmed observes, “may tell us something by not telling us anything. Without the word
happiness, we would perhaps not have a word that desire could point to.”45 In slow
study of the difficult-to-pinpoint category of “charm”– in all of its middling quotidiana
and its reliance upon both a feminist modernism and othered modernism – I hope that
we may also begin to realize what it points to. Reading charm is a way of reading
modernism’s own conflicting desires, judgements, and fantasies.

Charm in Literary Modernism
Despite its oddities, charm did not solely exist in what the field today may
consider modernism’s margins. Rather, canonical modernists were highly interested in
charm. In the case of F. Scott Fitzgerald, the classic novel The Great Gatsby (1925)
came about via Fitzgerald’s self-proclaimed “idea” about “a woman’s charm.” 46
Virginia Woolf was “wounded” by charm when it was used as critique of her work, a
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nonresponse. After the publication of her feminist essay on women’s creativity, A
Room of One’s Own, in 1929, Woolf predicted: “I shall get no criticism, except of the
evasive jocular kind… that the press will be kind & talk of its charm, & sprightliness.”
In other words, she says, “I am afraid it will not be taken seriously. Mrs Woolf is so
accomplished a writer that all she says makes easy reading…this very feminine
logic…”47 Tristan Tzara bitterly noted his own “charm” in an ironic Dada manifesto.
The work was composed after Tzara allegedly took insult at being deemed “charming”
at a social event in 1920:
A few days ago I was at a meeting of imbeciles. There were a lot of people
there. Everyone was charming. Tristan Tzara, a small, absurd and insignificant
individual was giving a lecture on the art of becoming charming. He was
charming, at that. Everyone is charming. And witty. It’s delightful, isn’t it?
Everyone is delightful, at that. 9 degrees below zero. It’s charming, isn’t it?
No, it isn’t charming. God isn’t up to it. He isn’t even in the directory. But
even so he’s charming.

Ambassadors, poets, counts, princes, musicians, journalists, actors, writers,
diplomats, directors, dressmakers, socialists, princesses and baronesses are
charming.

You’re all of you charming, very subtle, witty and delightful. Tristan Tzara
says to you: he’s quite willing to do something else, but he prefers to remain an
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idiot, a practical joker and a hoaxer. Be sincere for a moment: what I’ve just
said to you – is it charming or idiotic?48

Charm in each of these literary moments appears as de facto response to
literary incomprehensibility—Fitzgerald’s notion of women as mysteries or
inscrutable femme fatales, Woolf’s writing glossed as unserious, and destabilizing
Tzara’s sense of control over his own expression. Modernism is of course no stranger
to such opacity. James Joyce’s Ulysses, for example, was deemed so difficult as to be
unreadable – a reviewer in 1922 noted that the novel put so many barriers in front of
readers’ attempts at understanding that “it appear[s] Mr. Joyce ha[s] taken some half
million assorted words […], shaken them up in a colossal hat, and laid them end to
end.”49 But charm’s incomprehensibility relies on particular presumptions. In any
formulation, charm inescapably plays upon the incomprehensibility encountered when
one hits against the particular paradoxes of what charm blankly polices—the abutting
social categories of gender, sexuality, or racialization. These categories, while
complicit in the engendering of difference in modernity, are further complicated when
modernist projects use charm to critique the limitations of such categories, and
furthermore, to propose aesthetically driven transformations of the social fabric
through forms of feeling rather than normative structures.
As I have established, charm takes up the position of paradox in modernism. It
is an alluring blank, a space of trauma, of incomprehension, in which a logic-less logic
emerges. This is the sort of logic modernists use to think through the changes to social
categorizations of gender, sexuality, class, and race. It also suggests on an aesthetic
level a space of aesthetic evaluation that names something that falls short of grandeur,
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a fallen promise of social cohesion or an attempt at navigating the shifts in what is
considered social cohesion. Charm seems to indicate a near nostalgia for the
aesthetically autonomous beautiful.50 The term assumes a superficiality, a stylistic
gimmickry, or a degraded falseness. It becomes, in other words, a polite indication of
emptiness, uselessness, or extraneousness, and thus, an indication of the “feminine,” a
“feminine” that is embedded in modernist aesthetic practice. 51
I use charm’s central operation as gloss on degradation and devaluation as
arbiters and upholders of difference (gender, race, and sexuality), and the fantasies of
how to navigate (and indeed, what responsibility exists to even begin to navigate) such
difference to explain charm’s perceived normativity in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, then rebelliousness in the early decades of the twentieth century,
and finally, after the boom period of the 1920s, its fatalism in 1930s modernism. This
fatalism is iterated acutely by white male modernists, such as D.H. Lawrence. While it
was in the nineteenth century a desirable, genteel quality acceptable for women, charm
shifted to become an engine of revolution for women writers who harnessed charm’s
force of form while it became emasculating and melancholic for men. It indicated
some failure of expression and nostalgia for a fantastic, imagined past. Instead of itself
holding meaning, charm ended up as an evacuated placeholder for the search for a
language and vocabulary to express the crisis of man (and I do mean man) in
modernity.
As this shifting valuative marker, “charm” in modernist literature and culture
names the formulation of a constrictive, then revolutionary, then lost object. I propose
that charm functions as both a mourning and a melancholia in the Freudian definition
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of these two terms as responses to loss either real (such as the death of a close friend)
or imagined (in the case of a lost romantic partner at the end of a relationship). I aim to
retain the capability of both terms’ emphases on loss as alternately conscious or
unconscious, and with result in a “poor emptiness” belonging either to the world or
one’s own ego. This subject/object relation is akin to Ngai’s assessment of the trouble
between subject and object in the affective-aesthetic relation. Freud writes in his essay
on the subject: “the obvious thing is for us somehow to relate melancholia to the loss
of an object that is withdrawn from consciousness, unlike mourning, in which no
aspect of the loss is unconscious.”52 The “melancholic inhibition seems puzzling to us
because we are unable to see what it is that so completely absorbs the patient,”53 and
the loss of the love-object “is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence of love
relationships to come to the fore.”54 When mourning becomes pathological, it becomes
melancholy, and “the conflict of ambivalence… forces it to manifest itself in the form
of self-reproaches for having been oneself responsible for the loss of the love-object,”
particularly, “for having wanted that loss.”55
Charm construed as loss, however, is slippery, as it expresses the violent,
colonialist, racist, and misogynist machinery that social, national, and economic
structures depend on. From the early twentieth century, charm was already read as a
loss—particularly, as a mourning for a lost, masculine pastoral, in Britain. D.H.
Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920) is critical example. After the sudden death of her
lover, Gudrun muses on her uncertain future, a future that she is pleased to find is
unexpectedly now “perfectly vague.”56 “All possibility,” she thinks, “that was the
charm to her, the lovely, iridescent, indefinite charm,—pure illusion. All possibility—
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because death was inevitable, and nothing was possible but death.”57 The precipice of
uncertainty itself holds charm for her as she “did not want things to materialize, to
take any definite shape”58 In this deathly hope for stillness, for the not-yet, the hopeful
expectance of the start of the novel is wholly overturned: in its early pages, Ursula
thinks her sister Gudrun “so charming, so infinitely charming, in her softness and her
fine, exquisite richness of texture and delicacy of line. There was a certain playfulness
about her too, such a piquancy or ironic suggestion, such an untouched reserve.”59 In
his introduction to the novel, Lawrence explains: “Man struggles with his unborn
needs and fulfillment. New unfoldings struggle up in torment in him… Any man of
real individuality tries to know and understand what is happening, even in himself, as
he goes along.”60 Lawrence deems this struggle “the struggle for verbal
consciousness,” the “passionate struggle into conscious being.”61 As Lawrence
indicates here, charm seems to be an evacuation of language’s ability to express;
resultantly, to express anything is to express loss. From the “charming Jersey cattle…
breathing hoarsely from their velvet muzzles at the human beings”62 to the Criches’
family home at the Shortlands, described by Ursula as “Very peaceful and
charming,”63 charm seeps into the landscape of Lawrence’s English countryside to
mark a nostalgia for quintessential Englishness, the Englishness of manor houses
made possible by the financial boons of empire. The “thing” that charm suggests but
cannot express, then, is the unspoken reliance of white English masculine identity
upon the back of the British empire’s gendered and racialized exploitation.
Charm as masculinist fantasy has remained so pervasive that, as recently as
2013, contemporary male writers forthrightly mourned a lost “classic” masculinity.
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“The Rise and Fall of Charm in American Men,” an article appearing in The Atlantic
by its former editor, Benjamin Schwarz, commits this same egregious fantasybuilding. “[W]e live in a culture all but devoid of male charm,” Schwarz laments. He
names George Clooney as the last of the male charmers, a final holdover from lost
Cary Grants and James Garners. “Only the self-aware can have charm,” he points out,
and “what used to be called good breeding is necessary (but not sufficient) for charm:
no one can be charming who doesn’t draw out the overlooked, who doesn’t shift the
spotlight onto others—who doesn’t, that is, possess those long-forgotten qualities of
politesse and civilité.” By calling charm’s key components both “politesse” or
“civilité” and an indication of “good breeding,” Schwarz makes apparent the
assumptions of charm as its own “eugenics” of sorts, an indicator of socioeconomic
status, gender, and undoubtedly, race. The supposed purity of white male sociality as
embodied by Cary Grant is held as fantastical ideal. And the stakes for such a loss are
high, for Schwarz. Not only does the loss of charm as quality for socializing lead to a
degraded society, he argues, but it also leads to a bevy of dissatisfied women who
“commonly complain about the difficulty in gaining any conversational purchase
when, say, trying to engage the fathers of their children’s classmates or the husbands
of their tennis partners.” Men, unfortunately, “don’t indulge in the easy shared
confidences and nonsexual flirtations that lubricate social exchange among women,”
and thereby “consistently fail to meet the sort of obvious standards set by guides to
etiquette and to the art of conversation common 50 years ago.” 64
Schwarz’s comments clearly demonstrate the ease with which charm slips into
the reinforcement of social and identity categories—the boundaries that maintain
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value systems that place heteronormativity, whiteness, and masculinity as objects
worthy of preservation and attention. Schwarz is excellent example of the way in
which these notions align with an American conservatism, including the current
political view trotted out in defense of supporting “blue-collar America” that places
capitalist concern squarely in the realm of white men (chapter four furthers this
argument). These are the stakes of inquiring into charm at the turn of the twentieth
century. Charm’s status as space allows us critical inquiry, an inquiry that holds
significance beyond mere historical description of social codes at the turn of the
century.
Charm, in other words, has real consequences as it entertains a blank space of
impossible logics. By “impossible logics,” I mean the space of paradox, where overly
complex logical machinations occur. As Lawrence and Schwarz show, charm is a
conservative notion that seems to reinforce normative ideologies and the mechanisms
of a society bell hooks would later recognize as white supremacist capitalist
patriarchy. But what charm also does is become itself a force of form, evacuated and
alterable. While charm in the conservative context is marker of preexisting social
boundaries that divide labor classes, gender categories, and whiteness from other
races, modernists such as Gertrude Stein, Oscar Wilde, Virginia Woolf, and others
find that charm does not mark the preexisting, but points to the open blackness, the
transformability, of these notions of social cohesion or division. Charm becomes a
transformative mechanism because it points out that social divisions are not concrete
or unchanging, but made. Therefore, these divisions are radically alterable. As writers
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addressed in this project will show, charm thereby can render new social bonds, ones
predicated on aesthetic grounds.
A casualty of early twentieth century political, technological, and social
upheaval, charm as indicator of the “death” of particularly British (male, and
nationalist) potentiality in the face of modernization is itself a consequence of
modernity. It is a bizarre consequence of modernity’s push toward human and social
progress, a push that was actually not itself a rupture but a continuation. Specifically,
it was a continuation of the Enlightenment’s utopian project that emphasized the
promise of endless human perfectibility, equality, and improved living conditions
made possible by advances in science, technology, and medicine. More than “an
experience of temporality and a set of social transformations,” modernization for the
sake of modernization was a goal in itself. 65 These moments of “modernization”
evidence the ambiguous relation and curious agential and non-agential turns
modernists had in the move toward modernity. Modernism or modernity is therefore
not necessarily a specific aesthetic project in response to or product of historical
factors (industrialization, urbanization, the rise of mass culture). Jonathan Flatley
instead describes modernity as itself a “symbolic space in which what counts as
modernity, what modernity is or should be, and for whom, is contested, debated,
reevaluated, or otherwise articulated.” 66 In other words, looking to charm as indicator
of masculinity’s melancholia in modernism is to look to one barometer of the gap
between what modernity is and what it should be, what promises could be made or
should be made, and what promises have failed to be kept.
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This loss is, I argue throughout this project, embedded in aesthetic practice in
modernism, where it becomes entwined with varied confrontations of otherness. This
is, as I’ve described above, an encounter with heteronormative masculinity’s binaristic
opposite, the feminine. Yet, to be sure, it is also non-whiteness, a non-whiteness that is
compositional of that whiteness. As Frantz Fanon describes in “The Fact of
Blackness” (1952), the experience of a raced subject is a Hegelian “being for
others.”67 “[N]ot only must the black man be black;” he writes, “he must be black in
relation to the white man,” leaving a black body to be returned to one “sprawled out,
distorted, recolored, clad in mourning.” 68 When “all that is solid melts into air” 69 in
modernity (a phrase that itself conveys the diffuseness of the modern, as well as the
urgency of the “now”70), charm becomes synonymous with what Anthony Blanche
decries in Brideshead Revisited (1945) as that “simple, creamy English charm.” 71 The
“creaminess” of English charm conveys a milky rurality, an agricultural past that
Lawrence mourns in Women in Love, but moreover, a racialized whiteness.
In Women in Love, this coded melancholy for whiteness is echoed in the
emphasis Gerald places on coal mining’s laboring “blackness.” While “hideous and
sordid” during his childhood, in adulthood, he “saw them with pride,” the “stream of
miners flowing along the causeways from the mines at the end of the afternoon,
thousands of blackened, slightly distorted human beings with red mouths, all moving
subjugate to his will… They were ugly and uncouth, but they were his instruments.” 72
The same blackness plagued his father, manifest in “internal pains” he suffered:
The pain seemed to absorb his activity. He knew it was there, he knew it would
come again. It was like something lurking in the darkness within him. And he
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had not the power, or the will, to seek it out and to know it. There it remained
in the darkness, the great pain, tearing him at times, and then being silent. And
when it tore him he crouched in silent subjection under it, and when it left him
alone again, he refused to know of it. It was within the darkness, let it remain
unknown. So he never admitted it, except in a secret corner of himself, where
all his never-revealed fears and secrets were accumulated. 73
The unnamed darkness that lurks is the confrontation with otherness that the senior
Crich is unable to contend with. It would radically alter his subjecthood to the point of
annihilation—precisely Gerald’s fate on the snowy mountaintop in the final chapters
of the novel. The darkness, moreover, operates in uncanny connection with the plight
of the senior Crich’s wife:
By some strange association, the darkness that contained the pain and the
darkness that contained his wife were identical. All his thoughts and
understandings became blurred and fused, and now his wife and the consuming
pain were the same dark secret power against him, that he never faced […] He
had rather ignore its existence. Only, in his vague way, the dread was his wife,
the destroyer, and it was the pain, the destruction, a darkness which was one
and both.74
Crich’s assessment of what forces are acting upon what entities within him meanders.
First, the pain exists as darkness within him, and his wife is contained within this
darkness. Then, these forces begin to blur, even as he refuses to face them and to see
what lies within him. He instead projects this inner darkness outward, locating the
dread and pain of confronting his own subjecthood in his wife. In her own minoritized
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status as woman and property, his wife herself bears the reminder of the reach of
English nationalism’s colonization—it “contains” not only other nations, but its own
subjects.
Racial difference and femininity expressed through English “charm” are finally
also in conversation with sexual orientation. Anthony’s warning to Charles in
Brideshead extends beyond racialization and gentility. Cautioning him against the
Flyte family’s alluring siren song to him, Anthony declares to Charles that charm is a
suffocation, “the great English blight.” 75 Indeed, charm seems to snuff Charles’s
artistic talents – when out with Charles after Charles’s exhibition late in the novel,
Anthony insists:
I was right years ago – more years, I am happy to say, than either of us shows
– when I warned you. I took you out to dinner to warn you of charm. I warned
you expressly and in great detail of the Flyte family. Charm is the great
English blight. It does not exist outside of these damp islands. It spots and kills
everything it touches. It kills love; it kills art; I greatly fear, my dear Charles, it
has killed you.76
Even Charles’s supposedly successful, feral paintings showcased just prior to this
moment are not true art, but “English charm, playing tigers,”77 says Anthony. This is,
of course, not a mere statement of aesthetic critique, but a statement of concern over
the coded threat of charm. In this brief phrase, Anthony identifies charm’s reliance on
racialized colonial power – “playing tigers” recalls England’s imperial hold on where
tigers may exist (namely, South Asia) and moreover, suggests the “game” of power
involved in empire. Again, charm’s reliance upon closeness, its seeming achievability
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or contagiousness, is critical component of its very allure. Its ability to not only set
new relations into motion, but to spread such new relations through influential
proximity. If “others—defined through gender, sexual orientation, or race—remain
quite close, the melancholic loss of white, nationalist masculinity becomes all the
more bizarre. The threat of charm is a revelation of difference’s falsity, its “too
closeness” that signals the shift from relation to influence and social transformation.

Charming Effects
On the subject of Parisian actresses, critic Alan Dale once mused in
Cosmopolitan Magazine in 1908:
What is charm? It is something that you cannot see. It is something that an
actress in repose never possesses. It is something that the photographer cannot
catch. It is something that eludes the pen of the artist, and is but fleetingly
guessed at by the caricaturist. Sometimes it lurks in a shrug or an unsuspected,
graceful gesture; it is to be found in the method of addressing the audience; it
exists in an unconventional way of wearing conventional clothes; it may hide
itself in facial expression—in a smile, a pout, a frown, a laugh. I have seen it in
a toss of the head, a sudden movement of the arms, even in the manipulation of
draperies or a swish of the dress. 78
Others from the era assigned charm not to French women, but to American women.
French fashion designer Jean Patou’s 1925 fall-winter show was a sensation for his
Taylorist management of staging and production, keen manipulation of the press, and
distinctly Fordist styling.79 In a November 1924 edition of The New York Times (an
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issue that also featured Patou’s advertisement for the show, “MANNEQUINS
WANTED FOR PARIS”), Patou declares, “The American woman is a charming
creature… Women here have so many varied interests and activities that it keeps them
young. They go in for sports and that causes them to retain their splendid figures. And
their feet and ankles are the most perfect in the world.”80 While, as Dale notes, charm
in the early twentieth century cultural imagination is “elusive,” and never “possessed”;
it is something that “lurks,” “hides,” and “manipulates,” it is also, as Patou
emphasizes, external, seemingly objectively located in (or on) female bodies,
rendering charm highly visible (and enforceable) markers of social class, gender, and
race. Yet, at the same time, these highly visible markers are—in the works of Oscar
Wilde, Gertrude Stein, and more discussed in these pages—opportunities for
subversion, and thereby, for transformation. Protagonist Miriam Henderson, a working
class British woman who seeks an independent life for herself and a place for her
writing in Dorothy Richardson’s novel series, Pilgrimage, is keenly aware of charm’s
duplicity in this way. In the second volume of the series, Miriam evaluates the figure
of Dr. Hancock, her employer, whom she believes holds romantic interest in her. As
she considers him, the narration offers a slowly sharpening critique of the “charming
effects” Miriam believes would be necessary for his attentions. Miriam then doubts the
entire system of courtship that these effects manifest, knowing that she herself
possessed none of these charms:
[H]e... was one of those men who do not know that an effect like that was just
an effect, a deliberate ‘charming’ feminine effect. But if he did not know that,
did not know that it was a trick and the whole advertising manner, the delicate,

31

plunging fall of the feet down the steps-‘I am late; look how nicely and quietly
I am doing it; look at me being late and apologetic and interested’-out of place
in the circumstances, then what was he doing here at all? Did he want science,
or would he really rather be in a drawing-room with ‘pretty ladies’ advertising
effects and being ‘arch’ in a polite, dignified, lady-like manner? How dingy
and dull and unromantic and unfeminine he must find her. 81
What Dale finds innate to Parisian actresses (the profession of whom is, of course, to
elide the boundaries of the “real” and the “put-on”), is for Miriam a deliberately
curated “effect,” one that she may see through while many men cannot. Finding
women’s “charms” admittedly vapid or false – like “advertising” – Miriam still
recognizes charm as alluring and desirable, becoming insecure as she determines she
has none. Much like Miriam, British and American modernism writ large was both
fascinated by, yet intensely wary of, what charm may do. Likewise, charm as a term to
police women’s bodies and social behaviors turns on its head in the hands of the
writers I discuss in this project. To attend to charm in all of its variations, in a return to
the “scene of the modern” (to borrow Michael North’s subtitle from Reading 1922
[1999]), is to allow a deepened grasp on modernist value systems, the working through
of loss, and the hopeful potentiality of social transformation.
In my initial chapters, I set out the workings of charm in modernist literature
and culture. I find charm reveals modernist urgings toward the social and the
communal, or toward a futurity, while also anxiously cautioning against these urgings’
ills. In chapter one, I find Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) as case
study in charm’s links to dangerous aestheticism and antisociality at the fin-de-siècle.
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More broadly, too, I find the trace of charm left in works that turned the feeling into a
highly linguistic, textual aesthetic that begs engagement and transformation as it
applies language to the body in chapter two. I argue there that modernism offers an
alternative take on gendered embodiment through charm operating within the poetry
of Gertrude Stein and the rise of a mass-marketed women’s culture. Charm for women
was something to be “schooled” on, inhabited, and embodied, establishing an
economic and social register of female or feminized bodies through repetition that,
unlike theories of gendered embodiment from Judith Butler or bodily biopower from
Michel Foucault, presents the woman’s body as a uniquely styled set of desires.
Then, in my later chapters, I take up questions of how charm allows us to
critically read texts, politics, and ultimately, the contagiousness of epistemology in
interwar Britain. Charm becomes literary tonal atmosphere by curating magical
thinking, a kind of feminist cognitive dissonance, in Sylvia Townsend Warner’s
interwar fantasy novel, Lolly Willowes (1926), while charm as atmosphere ties itself to
feminist rebellion. Charm as arm of American capitalism emerges in the final
chapter’s study of short fiction from F. Scott Fitzgerald and Edith Wharton. Both
seeking charm and enforcing its denigration, Fitzgerald’s and Wharton’s
representations of charm’s work present it as a force bound within twentieth-century
American capitalism’s value systems that prioritize white masculinity. Ultimately,
charm uniquely recasts modernism’s preoccupations with feeling and responsivity,
individual and community, art and politics. My conclusion explores what may emerge
if we in contemporary criticism take modernist charm to task. Would we more
pervasively insist on a modernism that is illogical, mystical, and feminine as much as
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it is rational, secular, masculinist? If we read the former modernism into the latter, we
find that modernism’s projects occur under a new set of possibles or conditions –
cognitive or perceptual concerns, problems of pleasure and desire, or social and
aesthetic divides. What results is a modernism seen anew by fully making apparent
our critical apparatuses to apprehend modernist projects—particularly those projects
that exist outside of accepted literary histories within modernist studies. As a result,
we see a modernism that foregrounds rupture’s own ruptures: the compositionality and
embeddedness of feeling that cannot stand apart from form in what we now consider
“modernist.”
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CHAPTER 2

THIS CHARMING MAN: OSCAR WILDE, AESTHETICS, AND INFLUENCE AT
THE FIN-DE-SIÈCLE
Punctured bicycle
On a hillside desolate
Will nature make a man of me yet?
When in this charming car,
This charming man
Why pamper life’s complexity
When the leather runs smooth
On the passenger seat?
– The Smiths, “This Charming Man” (1983)
Those who find ugly meanings in beautiful things
are corrupt without being charming. This is a fault.
– Oscar Wilde, Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890)

Famously, Oscar Wilde was convicted of gross indecency after a highly
publicized trial in 1895, and received the harshest possible sentence—two years’ hard
labor in solitary confinement. Wilde spent the initial months of his prison term at
Newgate and then Pentonville Prison, before finally serving the majority of his
sentence at Reading Gaol. Throughout, Wilde remained in solitary imprisonment. This
isolating sentence was designed specifically to allay the fear that his hypnotic persona
would “infect” other prisoners, as many perceived Wilde’s alleged conduct with Lord
Alfred Douglas and other men served as clear evidence of aestheticism’s aim to spread
throughout Victorian society morally dubious notions that would undermine the very
grounds of that society.1
A critique in the Daily Telegraph summarizes the pervasive sentiment against
Wilde and “his school”:
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We have had enough, and more than enough of Mr. OSCAR WILDE, who has
been the means of inflicting upon the public patience during the recent episode
as much moral damage of the most offensive and repulsive kind as any single
individual could well cause. [The] general concern… [is] with the man
himself—his spurious brilliancy, inflated egotism, diseased vanity, cultivated
affectation, and shameless disavowal of all morality—the best thing would be
to dismiss him and his deeds without another word to the penalty of universal
condemnation…2
The language of this criticism is suggestive: Wilde’s faults as a man are described as
“spurious,” “diseased,” and “cultivated.” Or, in other words, his is a put-on and
practiced mien, which has been carefully crafted with attention to form—an attention
to form that has been theorized as the very hallmark of the aesthetic. 3 His ability to
exist in society without punishment has reached its limit, the critique claims, as the
public has allegedly had “enough,” even an excess of enough—his content exceeds his
form, and his very personality is itself an indulgence, a decadence, for society. The
description of Wilde’s “infliction” of “damage” to the social realm presents him as a
violence against social cohesion, a scourge or disease of falsity, inflation, and affected
amorality. This critique effectively confirms Wilde’s persona as itself part of his
aesthetic practice.
If persona (and thereby, social relations) is cultivated or formed as a specific
positional relationship to the social in the way Wilde’s persona seems to suggest, then
charm enters as a unique affective-aesthetic that makes apparent the relation of the
aesthetic and the social. Charm is particularly able to draw upon aesthetics to place
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individuals into social relations. When we fall under one another’s spell, in other
words, by being charmed by another, or being charming to another, we knit ourselves
together in aesthetically and affectively-driven relation. Yet this knitting is not without
its snags—aesthetics and the social are two realms notoriously at odds with one
another during modernism. I link charm with Wilde through this criticism in order to
explore how charm sinks to this denigrated status by the early years of modernism.
After functioning as indicative shorthand for social etiquette, unthreateningly pleasant
delight, and proper behavior for both men and women in the earlier decades of the
nineteenth century, charm’s place as respectable manner slips by the fin-de-siècle. It
becomes increasingly untrustworthy as marker of good character. Namely, its link
with Wilde and his highly publicized trial begins charm’s clear descent, as it becomes
synonymous with Wilde’s perceived aesthetic asociality. In other words, only in
Wilde’s era does charm begin to appear in spaces of exclusion. Yet, charm also makes
clear—as Wilde does—the central paradox of this movement. As the nineteenth
century’s implicit trust of the social’s value moves to the twentieth century’s distrust
of all things social, the role of the aesthetic as either social or individualist grows
unclear. Charm’s valuation as desirable or undesirable follows this movement.
I seek to track how charm moves from marker of a valuable sociality to marker
of asociality. Crafting one’s persona loses its place as a social activity, leading to the
integration of a self into society, as it was in the nineteenth century. Instead, it became
an indicator of an asocial tendency. The aesthetic and the social, then, are resultantly
in direct contention with one another. We will find that charm is a force that renders
clear the emerging notion of society itself as threat to the newly valued individual. I
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find that this movement occurs just as modernism launches toward fulfilling the
Enlightenment’s promise of the individual, as a creeping anxiety over the social as in
itself an intrinsic good. The structure of criticisms against Wilde are precisely the
structures of charm—a catching, contagious influence, aesthetically-crafted and
affectively-driven, and a destabilizing force evincing the era’s nascent belief in
individualism. I will first examine the theoretical underpinnings of this movement
before turning to Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) to track charm’s role in
early modernity.

Charm’s Anxious Modernism
Far from an extraneous force separate from the political realm, art was still
anxiously perceived as holding significant sway in social formation in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.4 In Degeneration (1895), Max Nordau attacks art and
aesthetic, bohemian or unusual types (including criminals) for their role in the
degeneration of society at the turn of the century. Naming Oscar Wilde, Henrik Ibsen,
and Richard Wagner, among others, Nordau finds aesthetic types a common “illness”:
“In the fin-de-siècle disposition,” he writes, including “the tendencies of contemporary
art and poetry” and “the life and conduct of men who write mystic, symbolic and
‘decadent’ works and the attitude taken by their admirers,” there exists “two welldefined conditions of disease […], degeneration and hysteria.” 5 Effectively, Nordau’s
main argument is that contemporary degenerate aesthetes’ egomania threatens the
social order. Not only does his finger-pointing at the perennial scapegoat, art, signal a
return to an Enlightenment view that social progress lies in the cultivation of forward-
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thinking science and technology, Nordau inverts what forces control the circumstances
of his criticism. While among the first to point out the very phenomenon of the fin-desiècle, Nordau paradoxically fails to recognize what characterizes the era—the
tumultuous lumbering toward a new social order that will characterize modernity, one
that (like Nordau’s accusation of art) focuses primarily on the individual and breeds
distrust of sociality and its institutions. And, as Wilde demonstrates in The Picture of
Dorian Gray as well as in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” it is actually art that
lays the foundation for society, not the inverse. Anxiety like Nordau’s over art’s
degenerate potential is relieved, Nordau would surely have been happy to know, when
the notion of aesthetic autonomy later meets its alleged demise under late capitalism.
As Fredric Jameson writes in his landmark essay on postmodernism, “aesthetic
production today has become integrated into commodity production generally,” 6
making it near impossible to consider art to be separable from economic or
commercial interests. Likewise, Jameson argues, art retains a “political unconscious”
that keeps art tethered to those influences of the sociopolitical realm—however hidden
or ambiguous these “unconscious” ties may be—that aesthetic autonomy alleges to
excise.7 (Aesthetics and capitalism in the context of charm will be discussed in chapter
four.)
As Nordau portends, growing fervor over occultism, spiritualism, mesmerism,
and forms of theosophy emerged in both Britain and America at the fin-de-siècle.
Aestheticist, decadent, and consumerist materialism morphed back and forth from and
into fantasy and spiritualism. Because phantasmatic spaces – whether occultist or
aestheticist – “redefin[ed] intimate, sexual, familial, and relational ties between people
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against the usual patriarchal models of inheritance and community via marriage and
the nuclear family,”8 the “dark arts” posed a threat to normalized social order. 9 Leigh
Wilson writes in Modernism and Magic that public interest in magic actually “made
possible the privileged status of that crucial institution of modernity, science. While
different theorists proposed sometimes opposing views of magic’s relation to social
order... Making magic anathema to contemporary ‘civilization’ works to justify not
just the systems of anthropology [and moreover, of patriarchal systemic order], but
also the instrumental rationality necessary to carry out capitalism’s domination of the
natural world.”10 The danger of occultism, spiritualism, and theosophy seemed
multifold, then – such orientations of thought moved outside of scientific rationality, a
rationality necessary for both patriarchal and capitalist rule; it placed power (of capital
and of influence) in the hands of women and many times, racialized or ethnic “others”
including many of Eastern European or “gypsy” heritage; and finally, made possible
non-normative forms of transmission, or, the ability to send and receive missives in
new modes across time and place. In other words, like occultism, Wilde’s aestheticism
was seen as threat to traditional social forms because it introduced new modes of
occupying spaces of kinship and relation. Influence, then, became an associated
transmitter of these new modes, rendering them “doubly transgressive, disrupting both
sense boundaries and traditional codes of behavior and alliance.”11
The Telegraph’s critique of Wilde in this context is not precisely a critique of
his falseness and excess but rather, the uncertain, anxious roil of formless influence.
This is the language of spiritualism and occultism, as it is the language of aesthetic
and affective formation. What is threatened by Wilde’s aestheticism in other words,
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according to those who condemn him, is the accepted relation of art to the social order.
That the Telegraph article links a “real sense of beauty” as under threat by Wilde’s
“profligate taste and profane mockery” suggests a policing of artistic morality. Such
policing is emblematic of the notion that socially acceptable ethical values are in
contest with aesthetic ones. This is an essential assumption of this chapter’s theory—
that while social order and organization is perceived as separate from the aesthetic
realm, it is, in fact, reliant upon it. The threat of the aesthetic is not the absence of
ethics, but is an innovated ethics. Søren Kierkegaard argues in Either/Or (1843) for
the binary that the aesthete is opposed to the ethical (though Wilde is not known to
have read Kierkegaard’s work). While both the aesthete’s view and the ethical stance
“considers the personality in relation to the surrounding world,” and “the expression
for this in its recurrence in the personality is enjoyment,” there is a difference. The
“esthetic expression for enjoyment in its relation to the personality is mood. That is,
the personality is present in the mood, but it is dimly present. The person who lives
esthetically tries as far as possible to be engrossed completely in mood. He tries to
bury himself completely in it so that nothing remains in him that cannot be modulated
into it, because a remainder like that always has a disturbing effect.” 12 Mood,
intriguingly, becomes the critical sentiment of the aesthete. As Wilde’s critics have
also noted, it is mood and its closely related terms—affect, tone, bearing—that are
themselves the crime Wilde commits, and the central threat Wilde poses to society.
Later, Kierkegaard theorizes a particular mood, the mood of anxiety, with anxiety’s
movements and forms. In describing Antigone’s tragic negative affect, Kierkegaard
explains: “anxiety is the vehicle by which the subject appropriates sorrow and
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assimilates it. Anxiety is the motive power by which sorrow penetrates a person’s
heart. But the movement is not swift like that of an arrow; it is consecutive; it is not
once and for all, but it is continually becoming.”13 While Kierkegaard refers
specifically to sorrow, I find that this anxious, aesthetic “becoming” is like his notion
of “mood.” This mood is the structural, formal movement of charm. Charm is an
alluring blank within the social relation – a catching, transformative energy, and an
orientation toward the social, or to otherness. Charm catches an individual and an
other in a relation, one that transforms the matter of the other, that reforms the other
through often non-conscious affective-aesthetic manipulation.
Wilde’s work allows us to see the way in which charm may be read as socially
motivated force. The Telegraph found it abhorrent, and Wilde himself believed it
potentially dangerous (he compared himself in his prison writing De Profundis to
pederasts and child-murderers, including the Marquis de Sade and Gilles de Rais).
Yet, charm as social force becomes an intoxicating, alluring “blank” of new social
potential, a partial and impossible fulfillment of social progress in entirely alternate,
aesthetic terms, previewing what would obsess later modernists—the idea of aesthetic
autonomy.

Dorian and the Magic of Affective-Aesthetic Influence
Wilde’s engagement with “charm” as an aesthetically-driven social theory of
relation is most apparent in The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), in conjunction with
his theoretical essay, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism” (1891). These works
explicitly link aesthetic representation with a meta-awareness of aesthetic processes,
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and in doing so, are invested in the phenomenon of aesthetic transmission of emotion.
Both texts’ engagements with charm not only attest to charm’s function as marker of
difference as I have elaborated in this project’s introduction, but more significantly,
use aesthetics to postulate alternative bonds of sociality and social identity through the
transmission of emotion, or, the catching of affect, through form.
Charm drives The Picture of Dorian Gray. The term appears eighty-five times
over the novel’s pages, beginning with the novel’s epigraph on charm, already
knotted: “Those who find ugly meanings in beautiful things are corrupt without being
charming. This is a fault.”14 This twist on the aesthete as intrinsically good
immediately introduces the novel’s work with form, sociality, and morality. Dorian
Gray’s entrance into the novel comes via Basil Hallward’s mention of meeting him as
an encounter with a personality that has irrevocably changed him. And, just as charm
does, the notion of who influences whom slips from figure to figure. Dorian is first,
influencing Basil Hallward upon their first meeting, which Basil retells to Lord Henry
Wotton. “When our eyes met,” Hallward tells Lord Henry Wotton:
‘I felt that I was growing pale. A curious sensation of terror came over me. I
knew that I had come face to face with some one whose mere personality was
so fascinating that, if I allowed it to do so, it would absorb my whole nature,
my whole soul, my very art itself. I did not want any external influence in my
life. […] I have always been my own master; had at least always been so, till I
met Dorian Gray.’15
He was decidedly a “[c]harming boy,” 16 as Basil’s friend Lady Brandon says of
Dorian. Before Dorian makes an actual appearance, then, Wilde makes us aware that
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transmission and influence are forces of terrifying intensity, and are linked with
artistic experience, and “terror” or danger as early as the first chapter. Then, influence
slips into anxiety, as Basil worries that Henry’s presence may mar Dorian’s perfection.
Just before Basil introduces Lord Henry to Dorian, Basil admonishes Henry, “Don’t
spoil him. Don’t try to influence him. Your influence would be bad. The world is
wide, and has many marvelous people in it. Don’t take away from me the one person
who gives to my art whatever charm it possesses: my life as an artist depends on
him.”17 Basil’s “charming” artistry, in other words, relies itself on the charm of
another, Dorian. (Lord Henry later says to Dorian, “Basil, my dear boy, puts
everything that is charming in him into his work.”18) Lord Henry’s influence on
Dorian becomes the final component. He tells Dorian when they finally meet, “‘There
is no such thing as a good influence, Mr. Gray. All influence is immoral—immoral
from the scientific point of view.’”19 Yet Basil is proved right in his early warning,
which goes unheeded. Henry holds immediate influence upon Dorian, who finds
Henry’s influence “bewildering,” “fresh,” and the cause of a “vibrating and throbbing
to curious pulses.”20 Dorian imagines Henry’s presence as having touched a “secret
chord” within Dorian, which “seemed to him to really have come from himself.”21
Dorian’s revelatory experience is vaguely autoerotic, brought on by the transmission
of unspoken, secret knowledge that Lord Henry realizes may be similar to his own
revelation at sixteen years old, after reading “a book which had revealed to him much
he had not known before.”22 An essential component of this dangerous transmission is,
of course, charm, the thing that was initially a component of Dorian’s identity that
becomes, upon closer inspection, the doing of Lord Henry himself. Charm becomes
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less a substance of its own than a structure, a musical “secret chord” that sets charm
forth into sociality, an anxious force that continuously reverberates and roils, that
alters normative kinships and social links. If charm is originally an incantation, verse,
or song, it is in a pure etymological sense that Dorian feels himself musically
“incanted,” brought into a form of existence or liveliness by Henry’s influence in a
way he is brought out of such existence by Basil’s influence—namely, through the
macabrely deteriorating painting of Dorian. This is the novel’s alleged primal scene, a
moment of aesthetic-affective transmission via form.
Eugenie Brinkema elucidates how this phenomenon can be conceptualized. In
The Forms of the Affects, Brinkema looks to a Grimm brothers fairy tale about a boy
who cannot feel fear or horror. “I cannot feel my flesh creep!” he cries repeatedly, as
“affective knowledge resists him.”23 Later in life, the boy is finally able to feel that
very sensation when a bucket full of small fish is poured over him. For Brinkema, this
dramatizes what is decades later iterated by William James, the theory that emotion
works from the outside in. In other words, external stimuli produce emotion, instead of
the commonly-believed expressivist model where emotions move from the inside
outward in answer to stimuli. To reference James’s often-quoted example, one does
not run from an attacking bear because one is afraid, but one is afraid because one
runs from an attacking bear. The Grimm tale literalizes this model of affect. “[P]ut
another way,” Brinkema offers, “the ending appears to suggest that a wet, cold
shudder is an adequate affective form of textual interpretation.”24 In Gilles Deleuze’s
formulation, it is a relation that “force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect
of self on self.”25 To take this formulation seriously, and to understand that James’s
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notion of affect renders it as exteriority, is to consider affect as a visible phenomenon
(such as “creeping flesh” or goosebumps on the skin, and the widening of the pupils
when one is afraid), or at least, a phenomenon based on the language or structuring of
what constitutes appearances. The “power” of affect—as Deleuze, James, and
Brinkema suggest—is its work as force upon itself. It is, thereby, a force upon the
body, and the body’s relation to other bodies—the social relation.
The proximity of charm to both occultist or spiritualist discourse and
aestheticism, together with new forms of sociality or kinship driven by aestheticaffective forces, renders legible the perceived dangers of “charm” and the anxieties it
produced over transmissible, influential contagion. This contagion is, as Nordau
indicates, assessed as an “outbreak,” or breaking out of systems of social order. As
Dorian Gray maintains his youth while Basil Hallworth’s portrait of Dorian
deteriorates, Dorian holds a “strange and dangerous charm,” one that catches him
between the desirability of his wealth and charm: “Society, civilized society at least, is
never very ready to believe anything to the detriment of those who are both rich and
charming… For the canons of good society are, or should be, the same as the canons
of art. Form is absolutely essential to it. It should have the dignity of a ceremony, as
well as its unreality, and should combine the insincere character of a romantic play,
with the wit and beauty that make such plays charming. Is insincerity such a terrible
thing? I think not. It is merely a method by which we can multiply our personalities.”26
Like the Telegraph’s criticism of Wilde’s cultivated personality, Dorian, too, bridges
the social and the aesthetic. This passage advocates for the “canons of good society”
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as the same as the “canons of art,” with an unreality and insincerity that points toward
the artistic creation of it.
In “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” Wilde expresses this very view on the
relation between art objects and their audiences. Individual artists, he notes, have been
thus successful:
creating in their audiences… the temperament to which Art appeals. And what
is that temperament? It is the temperament of receptivity. That is all. If a man
approaches a work of art with any desire to exercise authority over it and the
artist, he approaches it with such a spirit that he cannot receive any artistic
impression from it at all. The work of art is to dominate the spectator: the
spectator is not to dominate the work of art. The spectator is to be receptive.
He is to be the violin on which the master is to play. And the more completely
he can suppress his own silly views, his own foolish prejudices, his own
absurd ideas of what Art should be, or should not be, the more likely he is to
understand and appreciate the work of art in question.27
Receptivity to form, to become able to receive incantatory forces or become subject to
such aural forces (“to be the violin on which the master is to play”), becomes the core
of Wilde’s “radical” socialism. Charm, thereby, is an integral affective-aesthetic force
upon bodies that brings bodies into kinned relations outside of biological, economic,
or other organizational models.
Wilde is effectively voicing the project of the New Critics, decades prior to
I.A. Richards and Cleanth Brooks. Indeed, a world in which no governmental
authority holds the reins over art is precisely the kind of “socialism” Wilde advocates.
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To achieve such independence, Wilde proposes a new Individualism, one that is
“unselfish and unaffected,” an unselfishness that “let[s] other people’s lives alone, not
interfering with them.”28 This Individualism would also cultivate sympathy in a wider
context. Not merely sympathy for the poor or for those in pain, but “with the entirety
of life,” “with life’s joy and beauty and energy and health and freedom.” 29 This kind
of sympathy is “more difficult,” Wilde acknowledges, because it “requires more
unselfishness. Anybody can sympathize with the sufferings of a friend, but it requires
a very fine nature – it requires, in fact, the nature of a true Individualist – to
sympathize with a friend’s success.” 30 What Wilde proposes, in other words, is a new
sociality, one that—once removed from the political and aligned with the aesthetic—
permits new, ethical modes of interaction with one another. It is a new individualism,
a transformed sociality, founded on the aesthetic.
An early scene in Portrait tracks these influential affective relations, ones that
are founded upon, and structured by, aesthetic experience. The aesthetic sources of
these affective relations are not relegated to those objects easily considered art objects,
such as Dorian’s much-discussed yellow book. It carries into social experience. When
Henry and Dorian are at dinner with Mr. Erskine and Agatha, Henry suddenly takes
off on a philosophical flight of fancy on the ability to make mistakes in youth: “He
played with the idea, and grew willful; tossed it into the air and transformed it; let it
escape and recaptured it; made it iridescent with fancy, and winged it with paradox.”31
As Henry speaks, he notices:
the eyes of Dorian Gray were fixed on him, and the consciousness that
amongst his audience there was one whose temperament he wished to

50

fascinate, seemed to give his wit keenness, and to lend colour to his
imagination. He was brilliant, fantastic, irresponsible. He charmed his listeners
out of themselves, and they followed his pipe laughing. Dorian Gray never
took his gaze off him, but sat like one under a spell, smiles chasing each other
over his lips, and wonder growing grave in his darkening eyes.32
Henry performs the social relation on affective-aesthetic terms. He gives his ideas the
force of movement (it is “winged,” “tossed,” and “transformed”) and color (it is
“iridescent,” and literally “color[ed]” by the imagination). The “spell” he produces
that “charm[s]” his listeners out of themselves is conducted via musical metaphor. The
“pipe” Henry’s listeners follow seems initially to suggest what could be a smoking
pipe dangling from his lips. Yet, it more rightly references the musical Pied Piper,
whose multicolored coat of lore (the “pied”) is doubled by the narration’s reported
“iridescence” and “color” of Henry’s wit.
This moment of intense social affective-aesthetic influence, in which listeners
are carried away by Henry’s social mien, stands in contrast to a scene I find of
undertheorized importance to Dorian Gray, and from which I will build out to
connected scenes both before and after. The critical scene involves Sibyl Vane as
subject of conversation, Dorian’s doomed love object. When offstage, Sibyl’s
performance of a lovestruck girl is as successful as Lord Henry’s musings in the scene
prior, though to different ends. Sibyl, in contrast to Henry, is pre-staged, lending a
meta-awareness of the context of the performance as a performance. Dorian first tells
Lord Henry of his love for Sibyl, Dorian describes Sibyl as transfixing, but his
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reported interaction with her was backstage, not onstage. She is “unconscious of her
power,” Dorian reports to Henry.
Sibyl Vane is of course aptly named as already an enticing, prophetic illusion.
Defending his love for her when Lord Henry disapproves, Dorian declares why he
finds Sibyl attractive: “she is divine beyond all living things. When she acts you will
forget everything. These common, rough people, with their coarse faces and brutal
gestures, become quite different when she is on the stage. They sit silently and watch
her. They weep and laugh as she wills them to do. She makes them as responsive as a
violin. She spiritualizes them, and one feels that they are of the same flesh and blood
as one’s self.”33 Dorian and Lord Henry are described as becoming will-less on their
own, subject to Sibyl’s “divinity,” which “spiritualizes” them. When Sibyl appears
onstage, Dorian’s description of her powers comes true through charm: “Motionless,
and as one in a dream, sat Dorian Gray, gazing at [Sibyl]. Lord Henry peered through
his glasses, murmuring, ‘Charming! charming!’” 34 Yet, the illusion dissipates. While
Sibyl “looked charming as she came out into the moonlight” as Shakespeare’s Juliet,
all charm is quickly lost when she begins to speak. The “staginess of her acting was
unbearable, and grew worse as she went on. Her gestures became absurdly
artificial.”35 This is a form that does not speak, but that moves, acts, and appears.
Dorian tells Henry that Sibyl said to him, “‘You look more like a prince. I
must call you Prince Charming.’”36 Charm here seems unaffected, natural. Yet, it is a
casting strategy. Sibyl assigns the role to Dorian of “Prince Charming,” which,
unbeknownst to Sibyl, forms her in the Prince’s love interest, Snow White. In her
relationship to the Prince/Dorian, Sibyl therefore creates a form of social connectivity
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beyond linear temporality of past, present, and future. In casting Dorian as her Prince,
she both previews her own later death (much like Snow White “sleeps” in a false
death), as well as arranges an aesthetic lineage of her onstage roles as Shakespeare’s
Juliet and Imogen, and as Snow White. Collapsing the three figures in herself is a feat
only made possible by charm’s work in the persona of Prince Charming, a figure who
is able to resuscitate the socially dead.
These fictional figures’ doubled deaths—three in the aesthetic realm from
Juliet, Imogen, and Snow White, one in the novel’s “real” realm, from Sibyl—
themselves double Dorian and his portrait’s own connectivity. This calls attention to
the ease with which we dismiss Dorian and his double as one real, and one false.
When Dorian says that she is Imogen that evening, then tomorrow, Juliet, Lord Henry
retorts, “When is she Sibyl Vane?” 37 There is no direct answer, because—like
Dorian—Sibyl is never a “true,” singular “self.” Dorian instead responds, “She is all
the great heroines of the world in one. She is more than an individual.”38 In other
words, she is not a void, but a blur, a form. She is a new kind of individual that is not a
haeccetic singularity, but an indistinction. Charm blurs, fogs, and obscures, while
seeming to reveal. The affective-aesthetic of charm is thereby at the center of a new
sociality, enabled by Sibyl in this under-read scene, and later confirmed by Dorian’s
doubleness. In affective aesthetic relations, a new sociality is thereby made possible
when new forms of individuality are allowed to emerge.39 This blurs the boundary
between those modes of self-identification or self-distinction that are within the “real”
(the sociopolitical, and confirmed by the juridical) and within the “false” (the
aesthetic).
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Sibyl’s scene is itself a doubling of Dorian’s “primal scene” near the start of
the novel, when Dorian’s portrait is created. Dorian arguably only “begins” at the
painting’s creation, much like Sibyl’s transfixing presence. Upon seeing the painting,
Dorian simultaneously identifies with it and fails to recognize himself in it: “Is it the
real Dorian?’ cried the original of the portrait, strolling across to him. ‘Am I really like
that?’”40 Dorian sees himself in a painting as though he were seeing his reflection in a
mirror, through the eyes of another/an other. Moments later, Lord Henry bemusedly
asks Basil to identify the referent when Basil speaks of Dorian, “[W]hich Dorian? The
one who is pouring out tea for us, or the one in the picture?” 41 Both Lord Henry and
Dorian here seek Basil’s confirmation as to who Dorian is. Basil as observer/creator
here makes him the primary “witness” of the doubling, and the only one who may
distinguish the two. The “old” Dorian has no relation to the “new” Dorian, outside of
the narration’s linking language.
The scene featuring Sibyl is also a preview to the end of the narrative. After he
meets with Lord Henry to discuss Basil’s death, Dorian finally decides he must be
free—he will “kill” the painting after years of moral immunity. He looks at the
painting, horrified to see that the blood that had appeared on the painted Dorian’s hand
“seemed brighter, and more like blood newly spilt.”42 He first declares it “an unjust
mirror, this mirror of his soul that he was looking at.”43 Mirrors in nineteenth-century
literature tended to be conventional images of beauty, playing with Medieval accounts
of pride and vanitas, or Hamlet’s claim to hold a mirror up to nature. By both
revealing and concealing, the mirror itself is a visual trick in that it may distort
assumptions of external appearances and internal truths. Mirrors can exploit spatial
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and moral transgressions and reversals, as in William Makepeace Thackeray’s Vanity
Fair (1848), Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass (1871), or Mary Elizabeth
Coleridge’s poem, “The Other Side of a Mirror” (1896). This is, of course, the
“mirror” of representational play, the very magic or “charm” that conjures perverse
doubles through textual or aesthetic representation. Dorian radically misreads the
painting as in direct correspondence to his moral reality, thereby flattening the ability
of art to be anything but a separate “other” that nonetheless exists within him, outside
of the painting. The painting exists, in other words, in direct correlation to the real,
rather than in a more slippery, perverse relationship. Mirrors, like art, appear to
present reality or truth, whether external or internal. But this is the trick of both the
mirror and the art—both labor at curating this sense of direct reflection while relying
on the murky craft of conjuring. Believing that the painting is therefore evidence of
the real, Dorian characterizes the painting only as incontrovertible proof of the real’s
existence. It is “evidence… The picture itself,--that was evidence”44 of Basil’s murder.
“It had been like a conscience to him,” he realizes, “Yes, it had been conscience. He
would destroy it.”45 With the same knife that he used to kill Basil, Dorian slashes the
canvas, and dies. Or so we think – events in the room are not reported. The narration
moves from describing Dorian “ripping the thing right up from top to bottom” directly
to the next paragraph: “There was a cry heard, and a crash.”46 The sudden break in
what we see is echoed by the sudden shift to passive tense. A cry and a crash were
heard. When the servants who do the hearing in this sentence rush toward the room,
they see “lying on the floor […,] a dead man in evening dress, with a knife in his
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heart. […] It was not till they had examined the ring that they recognized who it
was.”47
This scene indicates, I think, that Wilde wants to remind us that art—like the
novel we are reading—does not help us see the real, by shifting our gaze away and
into uncertainty. At the moment of death, our gaze is forcibly turned away from the
dead body and the painting (to rest on the working class “subalterns,” in recall of
Dorian’s parentage). Dorian and his portrait are not doubles precisely, or that at least,
we will never know certainly what their relation was. It cannot be an “unjust mirror,”
as Dorian calls it before slashing the painting. Mirrors are seen to reflect, not refract. It
is also unclear how Dorian dies – while it is surmised that the old man on the floor is
equivalent to the man in the painting, the aged, “true” Dorian, the body itself is not
slashed but stabbed, with “a knife in his heart.”48 Because of these discrepancies, the
two figures (one “real” Dorian, the other the “false” painting) are undoubtedly related.
But just as Dorian has difficulty determining what the portrait is and means just before
slashing it, resting on one conclusion and then another they are related in dynamic
fashion, Dorian and the painted image are not a static one-to-one representation. They
are paradoxically distinct snags in the notion of individuality. Dorian is not individual,
nor static—the painting’s “magic” or charm renders the Dorians as not two
individuals, or one representation of another, but as related versions. Wilde
purposefully denies us the final knowledge of who may be the “original” and the
“copy,” since this is not meant to be the question at all. This is suggested both right
after the painting comes into being in the novel’s early chapters, and here again, when
the painting “dies” (we may think of Henry’s question of Basil, as to which is the real
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Dorian, and also Henry’s question of Sibyl, of when she is really Sibyl). The aestheticaffective relation, then, is not of the real to the represented, but something far more
complex. Both the “real” and the represented Dorian were Dorian, because he—like
Sibyl—demonstrates a form of individuality that slashes accepted forms of individual
subjecthood. The original ending of Dorian Gray evinces this further. The final lines
read: “Lying on the floor was a dead body, withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of
visage with a knife in its heart.”49 What is often presumed to be the “real” Dorian—the
body that remains—is not a “he” but an “it.” Wilde has presented an alternate
subjecthood not premised on sociopolitical singularity, but the incantatory diversity of
aesthetic experience.
By tracking these varied influences of “charmed” relations, what Wilde
achieves in the novel becomes clear. The work postulates a sociality through modes of
kinship conceived in aesthetics—through relations of form, bodies, and feeling—rather
than in normatively-organized relations as perceived through biologically-driven links
of persons (including heredity, familial structures, and sexuality). Such a
“spiritualized” transformation echoes Dorian’s questions after Sibyl’s suicide, when
he notices Basil’s portrait of him has changed to reflect a cruel smirk. “Might there not
be some curious scientific reason for it all?”, he wonders, before considering:
If thought could exercise its influence upon a living organism, might not
thought exercise an influence upon dead and inorganic things? Nay, without
thought or unconscious desire, might not things external to ourselves vibrate in
unison with our moods and passions, atom calling to atom in secret love or
strange affinity?50
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Dorian’s musing on notions of the dead and living, of some “secret,” “strange,” or
magical vibratory connections lend a sense of an illicit connective desire to charm’s
ability as force of aesthetic-affective relation. Such a relation, Dorian seems to
indicate, is without “thought” or consciousness, but is nonetheless a desire for
connectivity that transgresses normalized boundaries of space, time, and matter.

The Social Relation
The kinds of invisible ties that Wilde’s aesthetic kinships propose through
charm seem to be destabilizing. This is primarily because they risk amorality, as
morality was linked to the rise of the individual subject as inherently able to move
beyond basic Kantian desires to use logic and reason rather than aesthetic feeling to
guide social relationalities. To fail to do so is to run the risk of becoming susceptible
to Wilde’s cult of influence, or worse, becoming Wilde. That which is invisible or
unknowable, unable to be logically determined, appeared in the nineteenth century as
intrinsically primitive and base. French physician and early sociologist Gustave Le
Bon lends context for Dorian’s proposed social relation. Le Bon notes in The Crowd:
A Study of the Popular Mind (1895) that sociality is defined by a new entity of the age,
the “psychological crowd.” This notion relies on three key processes that Le Bon sets
forth: anonymity, contagion, and suggestibility. Le Bon’s work, in conjunction with
Freud’s analyses of crowd mentalities, does significant work to destabilize notions of
post-Enlightenment reason and rationality, and Le Bon attempts to account for this
incongruity. What makes crowd scenarios so unpredictable, Le Bon effectively asks,
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and so at odds with what is known about the individual, and the individual’s morals,
ethics, and individual psychology?
As Le Bon notes in his work’s preface, the realm of philosophic principle is
not always the realm of the real: “The study of social phenomena cannot be separated
from that of the peoples among whom they have come into existence. From the
philosophic point of view these phenomena may have an absolute value; in practice
they only have a relative value. It is necessary, in consequence, when studying a social
phenomenon, to consider it successively under two very different aspects. It will then
be seen that the teachings of pure reason are very often contrary to those of practical
reason. […] In certain cases there is more truth in the unreal than in the real.” 51 Le
Bon goes so far as to say that because of the complexity of social forces, “It seems,
too, that behind the visible facts are hidden at times thousands of invisible causes.”
Crowds, it should be noted, are themselves ascribed to the “new age” of the nineteenth
century, yet remain conflicting representations of modernity. Despite their brief
flashes of revolutionary instincts, they are “instinctively hostile to changes and
progress.”52 Le Bon spends his work’s early chapters explaining the peculiar nature of
modern crowd scenes, which are, he notes, a threat to governmental and political
power. “Little adapted to reasoning, crowds, on the contrary, are quick to act… The
divine right of the masses is about to replace the divine right of kings.” 53 Crowds are
“barbarian,” and “powerful for destruction,” 54 and are antithetical to the movement of
civilization. Le Bon is clear to point out that the actions of crowds are not always so
inferior, destructive, and revolutionary. They may be equally heroic as they are
destructive.55 In all cases, however, there exists in crowd sentiment an exaggeration or
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disingenuousness. Crowds “do not admit doubt or uncertainty, and always go to
extremes—Their sentiments always excessive.”56 There is something primal or
primitive in their workings: “Like a savage, it is not prepared to admit that anything
can come between its desire and the realization of its desire… The notion of
impossibility disappears for the individual in a crowd.”57 These responses are,
naturally, able to indicate essences of racial divisions. “For instance,” Le Bon muses,
“the difference between a Latin and an Anglo-Saxon crowd is striking.”58 More
importantly, the anxiety held about crowds is less a disruption of political power or
governmental overthrow than it is about regressivism, and primitivism, the dread of a
return to the non-modern. Le Bon writes, “Crowds are everywhere distinguished by
feminine characteristics.”59 Their excessive emotionality renders them akin to the
excessive emotionality of “inferior forms,” which Le Bon lists as “women, savages,
and children.”60 It is this contagion of lesser forms, of any stoppage to postEnlightenment progress and reason, that is the greatest concern for Le Bon, and for
many other crowd theories. What this means, in effect, is an insistence on divisions
and on individuality in the modern age, a movement that in the late nineteenth century
propels the industry of personality and individuation in the decades to follow during
the modernist period (see chapter four).
Le Bon’s model of crowd mentality involves an individual who comes “under
the influence of suggestion,” wherein an idea “enter[s] the brain” and “transform[s]
itself into an act.”61 “A crowd,” Le Bon explains, “scarcely distinguishes between the
subjective and the objective. It accepts as real the images evoked in its mind,” despite
these images’ distance from “observed fact.”62 This model of feeling and
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suggestibility implies an exterior stimulus transforms an interior response, a notion
that flies against William James’s non-expressivist model, though Le Bon’s
explanation of this connection actually suggests a destabilizing of the boundary
between the exterior and interior. The threat of the crowd is a threat of a new sociality
and thereby a new individuality, in which the body’s boundaries are far more fluid
than previously believed. This is in some ways an echo of American theories of
transcendental consciousness, from Ralph Waldo Emerson to Margaret Fuller, some
four decades earlier (and, which continues to emerge in contemporary theory as new
materialism or posthumanism from figures including Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, and
Donna Haraway). Charm, in fact, upholds the formality of affect in Wilde’s writing.
Instead of being immediate indication of some interior “secret” that is withheld, charm
is actually a formal exteriority that is produced by aesthetic experience and by the
narration itself. Lord Henry, for one, our narration reports, “had the charm of being
very dangerous.”63 Charm itself does not produce danger, the text suggests; danger
preexists charm.
While Le Bon attributes the crowd mentality’s invisible causes to “an
immense, unconscious working,” 64 which he finds one of the “secrets of their
strength” as a “force still unknown,”65 we can see that such invisible forces have
echoes in Wilde’s examination of the forces of affective workings when the domain of
aesthetics is in view. Brinkema writes of affect, form, and bodies: “to assert that
treating affect as a form ignores the body is to refuse to question what forms and
bodies might mean to each other, what form might cause us to rethink about bodies,
that form might deform matter or our theory of skin in productive ways—or whether,
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indeed, the body itself is a kind of form.”66 In other words, Brinkema insists that “we
have not yet asked enough of form; that we do not know what forms are capable of;
that in the strident pulling apart of form and affect, it hitherto has been undetermined
what the body can do to form and even what form can do to a body.”67 I undertake an
answer to this through Wilde’s affective-aesthetics of charm. Charm is a beginning to
asking more of both form and bodies. It uniquely captures the ability of the body
together with its most basic of biological or scientific realities (DNA, chromosomes,
cellular regeneration) as fundamentally studies in ambiguous, transfixing, and alluring
blanks.
Affect’s ability to force, as social contagion, or as Le Bon’s invisible
something behind the visible, is the center of charm. Charm renounces its roots in
vocality (chant, song) in favor of visual sleight of hand, a visuality that seems to allow
Cartesian triumphs of the visual as knowable but in fact enforces Le Bon’s and
Freud’s notions of the peculiar, unstable responsivity between the visible and
invisible, the body’s exterior and its interior. Indeed, Wilde dramatizes this very
contention as his Picture of Dorian Gray insists on the visual reference to the painting
of Dorian, when we glance at it and its deterioration, and relies heavily on imagery of
eyes and vision as components of the artist’s works and the “catching” receptivity
toward this work. It also insists that the painting’s visual appearance has direct relation
to the painting’s hidden content. It is no coincidence that we never quite see Dorian
“kill” the painting. We infer that he slashes the painting, and this magically transfers
to occur on the body of Dorian himself instead of the painting. But we never truly
know, because we never truly see. We only hear Dorian’s screams, and find ourselves
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following the exterior action around Dorian’s house, suddenly denied full access to
continued narration of the scene we were just in. With Dorian’s double in his painting,
the spell of form is broken with a cry that we do not see.

Charm as Methodology
A consequence of assessing charm’s denigration through the end of the
nineteenth century to name an anxiety over new forms of aesthetically-driven sociality
is that charm can now become its own mode of inquiry into marginalized or
minoritized forces and figures. Because charm renders visible the structures or forms
of social valuation, I’d like to close this chapter by demonstrating how Wilde’s
affective-aesthetic formalism in charm can open methods to newly see these structures
of value. To do so, I turn to concerns of Dorian Gray’s “darkness.”
Wilde’s novel presents an aesthetic-affective transmission that results in an
uncanny doubling. This bizarre transmission through charmed influence therefore
exposes the structures on which normative kinship relies, and throws the requirements
for normative transmission and identity formation into relief, namely, colonialist
power and domination over “darkness.” The novel is structured on whiteness as its
central axis, a whiteness that entails the operation of the doubles of “rose-white”68
Dorian and the “dark” painting of Dorian. The premise of the novel asks us to believe
in the painting’s “magic” ability to morph in some correspondence to a “reality”
outside of the painting. This “outside,” meanwhile, that is “real,” is Dorian’s highly
internalized set of moral principles and devolving ethical compass—itself already a
conflicting, incongruous, ambivalent force that violates the “realist” narrative
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representation. The division of one figure as free of sin, while the other becomes
darkly menacing; its doubled aesthetic aims of pure aestheticism and its social tinge of
corruption. Wilde’s preface, added several months before the publication of the second
version of the novel, indicates via epigrams that paradoxes of darkness and light in
aesthetic forms is central to aesthetic pursuits and textual enjoyment: “The nineteenth
century dislike of Realism is the rage of Caliban seeing his own face in a glass. The
nineteenth century dislike of Romanticism is the rage of Caliban not seeing his own
face in the glass.”69 The notion is itself an obvious double of Dorian’s declaration that
the painting is an “unjust mirror.”
Inescapably, an additional undercurrent to Wilde’s dark aesthetics is colonialist
racialization, a specific kind of “darkness” upon which white masculinity depends, as
Wilde makes clear. As the perceived fantasy of white masculinity emerged due to
global exchange and shifts in Britain’s empire, Wilde’s charm glosses racialized
others as critical component of what modernity would be, while the white
heteronormative futurity found such a proposal socially undesirable, and unviable. I
find this racializedness embedded in Wilde’s “dark” aesthetics, the “dark magic” that
Wilde declared would place him alongside the figure of Rais. This darkness, a literary
Gothic or chiaroscuro, seeps into both Dorian Gray, and functions beyond mere
aesthetic representation or “mirror” of a social or individual moral darkness and
depravity.
Wilde’s famous tale of art turned life has been subject of numerous studies
tracing its lineage from Walter Pater’s use of darkness in aesthetics. These are highly
formal roots. Jean Paul Riquelme, for one, notes Dorian is Wilde’s projection of the
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“dark implications of Pater’s attitudes and formulations in a mythic Gothic narrative
of destruction and self-destruction.”70 Dorian’s descent into amorality through
hedonistic pursuit after artist Basil Hallward paints his portrait – doubles or
reproduces him – is a “dark enlightenment” of a literary equivalent to chiaroscuro.71
Riquelme points out the novel concerns “a dark and darkening recognition that
transforms Dorian’s life by actualizing a potential that was already there in his family,
a potential that is one truth about British society.”72 This is a mutually constitutive
pairing. Riquelme’s emphasis on the painting itself as comment on and challenge to
the realism and aestheticism of Pater also situates the reader’s experience in the
aesthetic experience of the painting: “The collaborative act of creating the painting
brings into being something apparently new, original, and masterful that turns out to
be not only beautiful but also atavistic and terrifyingly at odds with the public values
of the society that applauds its beautiful appearance… [an act that] parallels and
engages with our own act of reading.”73
What Riquelme indicates here is significant beyond an assessment of Wilde’s
use of Pater’s aesthetic theory—that a “beautiful appearance” or form can have social
consequence, and affects us as readers. Riquelme, like many others who have
addressed Dorian Gray’s implications for late nineteenth-century aesthetics, muses
freely on the “darkness” of the novel’s Gothic character, the darkness of its moral
chiaroscuro. What such an interpretation misses is that this darkness is highly raciallydefined. To read the “dark magic” of the novel as racially coded is to grant new lease
on Wilde’s play with familial lineage: white heteronormative individuality and
perpetuity. Dorian’s lineage as already corrupt, but that the reading of Dorian is not
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merely participatory or constructive, but an act of contagious complicity. The Gothic
“conjuring” that Dorian participates in is the racialized animation of normative
identity; by refocusing on charm, the novel can be seen to initiate an embedded
animation of racialized difference, the structures of which are readily apparent through
affective-aesthetic form.
We can see this first through Dorian Gray’s supposedly corrupt lineage as
product of a forbidden marriage between lower and upper classes. This information
arrives secondhand when Lord Henry investigates Dorian’s mysterious background
early in the novel. Lord Henry seeks information about Dorian’s aristocratic family
history lies from his wealthy uncle’s knowledge. A bachelor who himself appears
curiously outside of heteronormative reproduction, and of no societally generative
“use,” Henry’s uncle is a “genial if somewhat rough-mannered old bachelor, whom
the outside world called selfish because it derived no particular benefit from him.”74
The “truth” of Dorian Gray’s family lies in a vague reference in the novel’s third
chapter. Lord Henry asks his uncle, Lord Fermor, about Dorian’s heritage. He
discovers Dorian’s mother Margaret Devereaux had married “a penniless young
fellow, a mere nobody, sir, a subaltern in a foot regiment, or something of that kind” 75
without financial resources, against her father’s will. Her father, Lord Kelso, then
arranged the subaltern’s death in a duel, and Riquelme notes “Dorian’s decision to
store the portrait in the room set up for him by his grandfather to keep him out of the
way after his mother’s death suggests that the portrait’s meaning emerges in part from
the family’s history.”76 Undeniably, the portrait does indeed compile its meaning as
familial history. However, the language used to describe Dorian’s father is striking.
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Dorian’s father is never given a name, instead, is given three descriptors by Lord
Fermor that seem to repeat roughly the same information. He was “a young fellow,” a
“mere nobody,” and a military “subaltern.” Yet, Dorian’s father described as a
“fellow” actually monies him, given the etymology of “fellow” as literally one who
lays down money in a joint enterprise. Such suggestion is in friction with his
description as “penniless.” More inconsistencies arise, as well. The “mere” of the
“mere nobody” suggests purity, clarity, and brilliance. And, as a subaltern, rank and
class collide with the term’s later associations with racial and colonial exploitation.
Finally, Fermor’s assertion that he can “remember the whole thing as if it happened
yesterday,”77 providing details of the man’s arranged murder by Lord Kelso, as well as
his detailed gossip in the pages that follow, are inconsistent with his dismissive line
that the man was “something of that kind.” Corruption and disturbance are already at
work in the heteronormative social bond, wracked by the burdens of that social bond –
money, politics, war, and racial divisions.
It is notable, too, that the conversation between Henry and his uncle turns
promptly from Dorian’s rumored background to femininity and “charm.” Abruptly
after the knowledge is disseminated, the “charming” nature of American girls is
discussed – women who are, Henry insists, popular marriage prospects, as an
American woman “behaves as if she was beautiful. Most American women do. It is
the secret of their charm.”78 Just as whiteness relies upon colonialist racialization of
dark “others” (colonial subjects), the proximity of such darkness with the subject of
charming women suggests that women’s charm is embedded within this whiteness and
darkness. Moreover, Henry notes that American women behave “as if” they were
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beautiful, a beauty that is the “secret” of their charm. They are not unlike Dorian, then,
who exists as inversion of their open secret of beauty. Dorian’s familial “darkness,”
therefore, may not necessarily be moralistic. It is not sourced from the forbidden
marriage of Dorian’s parents that seems to set Dorian up for his later hedonistic
“darkness,” but rather, contains a myriad of other socially transformative threads. It is,
in other words, codedly racialized, its own eugenics of sorts. As such, it also speaks to
an alternative mode of individuality, if we may understand reproduction as copying or
doubling.79 Again, this speaks to Sibyl’s “slash” or wound to individuality’s
relationship to the affective-aesthetic, and Dorian’s own slash, made literal in his
demise at the novel’s end.
The critique in the Telegraph, which opened the start of this chapter, claims
Wilde had been long trying “to establish a cult in our midst,” a cult of influence that
would subvert the nation’s youth. 80 Wilde and his charmed circle, in “linking a certain
real sense of beauty with profligate tastes and profane mockery, have undoubtedly
exercised a visible influence upon the generation cursed by their presence.” 81 In other
words, this critique (among many) effectively supports social order as aesthetic theory,
echoing aesthetic theory’s insistence on the ideal relation of form and matter. Wilde’s
mien was seen as threat of the put-on or formative artificial and excessive emotionality
that jeopardizes civil order. Yet, this threat cannot be assessed as strictly the threat of
“deviant” sexuality, as his sentence for gross indecency would suggest. Rather, it is
the threat of an uncontrolled, formless influence that violates accepted notions of
aesthetic relation and moves between or among persons and only registers as a
receptivity or stimuli. This force, I argue, is therefore an innovation of Wilde’s
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particular modernism. Wilde’s sense of form relies on charm as uniquely modern
aesthetic theory as influence. At once formless and taking on aesthetic forms, charm
names the invisible patterns of influence that point to the social order’s tacit reliance
on a disavowed aesthetics. Cognizant of this, Wilde in his literary works begins to restitch sociality through explicit aesthetic kinds of kinship.
What can we ultimately make of charm as minoritizing mode, one that is
recovered on early modernism’s margins to become central (though still castigated)
affective-aesthetic of modernity? For one, Wilde’s use of charm and the charm
circulating around his persona at the time of his trials sets the map for queer theory
and criticism, about one hundred years afterward. Cultural historians and other
scholars have long perpetuated the notion that Wilde (and indeed, his image at his
1895 trial) effectively constructed the figure of the marginalized queer subject in
public imagination. Jeffrey Weeks’s influential notion from 1977 that Wilde “created
a public image for the homosexual, and a terrifying moral tale of the dangers that
trailed closely behind deviant behavior” 82 rendered the modern homosexual figure as
effeminate and non-normative. Other scholars contend with this notion, such as Joseph
Bristow, arguing that the trial was far less a “sex trial” that established a Foucauldian
category of modern sexuality than a curious patchwork of the nineteenth century legal
system. Bristow’s work emphasizes that the trial hinged upon the “manipulative use of
admissible evidence from undependable witnesses” (who were, in fact, paid by the
prosecution to testify, and never were themselves subject to criminal proceedings
despite their alleged participation in both blackmail and sexual acts) 83 and now exists
as contradictory tales from court documents and sensationalized newspaper reports.
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Other work in queer theory that hinges upon minoritization is less cultural than
textual. Kevin Ohi, for example, theorizes a “queerness of style” in literary texts,
specifically in Henry James’s works. It is an aesthetic form, composed of “a queerness
that, not circumscribed by whatever sexualities or identities might be represented by
the texts, makes for what is most challenging about recent queer accounts of culture: a
radical antisociality that seeks to unyoke sexuality from the communities and
identities—gay or straight—that would tame it.”84 In other words, Ohi’s sense of a
queer style does not base itself on “received forms of meaning, representation, and
identity.”85 Lee Edelman, Val Rohy, and others perceive queer transmission – of
knowledge, sex, materiality, and so on – as necessarily already needing to be
successful transmissions, Ohi proposes queer transmission lying in moments of
interrupted transmissions. The very concept of “thwarted transmission” as
thematization of queer transmission means that “far from exceptional events in the
history of literature and far from mere regrettable accidents to which any artifact of
human cognition is subject,” “imaginings of thwarted transmission figure the literary
tradition as such.”86 Thwarted transmission “is both a locus of queer eroticism and a
way of rethinking literary and cultural transmission.”87 Heather Love’s Feeling
Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (2007) directly addresses notions of
queerness as associated with loss, tragedy, shame, and other forms of negativity.
Queerness holds an inherent contradiction as “both abject and exalted,” a
“stigmatizing mark as well as a form of romantic exceptionalism.”88 Resultantly, Love
reads a variety of late nineteenth and early twentieth century texts from figures include
Walter Pater, Willa Cather, and Radclyffe Hall as registering authors’ “painful
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negotiation of the coming of modern homosexuality,” marking an “archive of feeling”
that establishes an account of “the corporeal and psychic costs of homophobia.” 89 In
other words, Love proposes that these texts may offer a described experience of living
with a “‘disqualified’ identity, which at times can simply mean living with injury—not
fixing it.”90 To attend to modernity’s backward figures is to attend to the aesthetic
strategies of modernity’s others.
This means, effectively, that not only does Wilde establish a form of kinship
through charm, one structured upon aesthetic relations, but also that charm gains
traction as a distinctly modernist registration of value. Specifically, it attends to the
value placed on particular kinds of lives. If Wilde and others had to be considered (or,
to consider themselves) minoritized or marginalized, then modernity begins with a
perceived social and aesthetic loss. Wilde’s and others’ projects had to be conceived
as failures in order to preserve the forward-moving engines of modernity’s heightened
individuality, an individuality that had room for only one kind of individual—a white,
male, and heterosexual, a singular subjecthood—at the expense of other forms of
individuality, and moreover, alternative forms of sociality, as Wilde posits. Charm’s
insistence on influence and proximity speaks to white British masculinity’s difficulties
with “others,” a difficulty that charm uniquely is able to name as registration of loss, a
nostalgia for the (white male) grandeur of the previous era and a concern for the
future, a concern that often lacks a critical vocabulary. Wilde provides this vocabulary
through aestheticism. While a source of melancholia for some in the face of the new
century, Wilde’s work suggests charm’s destabilization of social identity categories as
a radical potentiality. This is at its core the basis of modernist projects in taking up
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with the Enlightenment’s ideals of social progress, a progress that aesthetics—when
taken for art’s sake—jeopardizes.
As this chapter’s foray into Gothic darkness and racialization begins to
suggest, there are ethical stakes to charm’s presence in literary modernism. The next
chapter asks these questions of charm within a particularly gendered context—how
charm brings into being the feminine or feminized, gendered body in early twentieth
century literature as mass culture gained momentum in commodifying the processes of
individualization.
1
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CHAPTER 3

DESIGNING WOMEN: MODERNIST MASS CULTURE AND THE FORMATION
OF THE FEMALE BODY

In the early 1920s, a New Jersey department store called Bamberger’s
launched its own glossy American fashion magazine, published in-house and aimed at
suburban women. Simply titled Charm, the magazine aimed to be more than a simple
catalogue for the store’s items. It was forthrightly an eclectic lifestyle magazine–
writing and art from avant-garde figures Mina Loy and Jean Rhys graced its pages
alongside articles on the professions from feminist journalist Brenda Ueland (a June
1924 article asked, “Is It Possible for a Woman to Be a Wife and Mother and Still
Make a Good Living?”). It also featured profiles of women artists by modernist little
magazines editor Florence Gilliam (“Paris Women in the Arts” in March 1925), and
Djuna Barnes provided satirical travel pieces for multiple issues on Americans abroad
under the pseudonym Lydia Steptoe.1 Such varied subjects appearing alongside
features on the latest fashion trends made Charm “the most ambitious effort of any
American retail establishment to identify with its clientele through the publication of a
general-interest magazine.”2 Charm effectively sold an image of modern femininity—
reflecting women’s evolving identities in the marketplace as modern, progressive
workers interested in the political, artistic, and literary as well as homemakers
interested in home design and fashion. 3
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Though Charm was ultimately short-lived, shutting down production by 1929, 4
the magazine is notable for its bold use of charm as catch-all for the modernist
“woman” in its multifold aims, echoing the everyday allures of consumerist
tastemaking as America and Britain adapted to sociopolitical shifts after WWI,
including the push toward new roles (and wardrobes) for women. Dominant social
discourses resultantly alternated between fetishizing and devaluing “femininity.” As
Jane Garrity argues, this makes modernist women’s “presentation of the self…
conditioned by an awareness of the body’s visibility, a visibility that is predicated
upon a masculine aesthetic in which women are objectified.”5
I begin this chapter with Charm to introduce the very notion of “charm” as part
of white, middle- to upper-class women’s domain in the modernist era. Charm is used
to refer to female attractiveness, a blank descriptor of a woman who presents as
enticing or alluring in a generally non-erotic way.6 Both a physical object (such as a
lucky token) and the state of a subject (to be charming, to be charmed), charm
typically denotes a pleasant interest or delight in something. But more than a noun
referencing an object or adjective referencing a person, “charm” also references
language itself—it is a word or phrase with magical properties for healing, protection,
or otherwise controlling one’s surroundings, dating from Medieval incantations and
healing verses. It shifts uneasily through a range of grammatical contortions—one can
“be charming” oneself and charm someone else, and one can also “be charmed” by
someone or something else—the ability to manipulate, to make one’s surrounds
malleable. Charm the word is as malleable and enigmatic as its denotation suggests. It
is precisely these qualities—charm’s high linguistic value, its gloss as an ability to
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manipulate the self, and its complex aesthetic and affective dance from subject to
object and back again—that render charm a rich point of inquiry into women’s selfmaking during the era.
The odd links between the making of the modern “woman” can be examined
further with the visual aesthetic of Charm magazine’s covers. In its irrepressible urge
for the “modern,” Charm managed to draw famous artists for its cover images,
including Pablo Picasso in April 1928, and the New Yorker illustrator Constantin
Alajalov for a March 1929 cover. A cover that ran a few years prior in August 1925,
however, is most intriguing. The image is a rendering of a woman clad in a bathing
suit, balancing a red ball midair, and standing in concentric circles of water (see fig.
1).7 Designed by Peruvian caricaturist Julio Málaga Grenet, the image is boldly
graphic, relying on minimalist lines and shapes with high-contrast colors, much in the
style of Vogue as well as other department store magazines of the era, such as
Wanamaker’s. The bold black, red, yellow, and grey horizontal stripes of the bathing
suit on Charm’s starkly white-skinned cover girl oppose the color and shape of the
radiating blue and white rings of water surrounding her. The image is suggestive in a
few ways. Structurally, it is a study in contrasts – horizontal stripes blur into the
circular waves of the water around the submerged woman; the woman’s opaque,
delicate feet suggest ballet (an idea strengthened by her arms’ upward pose) though
the ball she holds implies a less-dainty female athleticism. Thematically, the image
indicates something else entirely.
The woman’s delicate S-shape rising from the water and the red ball balanced
close to her upward-turned nose are comical suggestions of a trained seal. Even the
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Figure 1. Charm: the magazine of New Jersey home interests. August 1925. Newark, N.J.: L.
Bamberger & Co. Publishing Company, 1924-32.

colors of the image suggest circus advertisements common to the early twentieth
century: yellows, blues, and reds. The woman is a trained spectacle, a performing
animal. Her showmanship of a beguilingly delicate, yet athletic, femininity is
bolstered by the ringed waves surrounding her torso. These concentric circles (along
with a slightly lighter-toned bathing suit under the water line) visually replicate the
tiers of a larger hoop-style skirt, itself an unmodern relic of the previous century. We
are signaled toward an “underneath,” so to speak—underwater is a risqué peek underskirt. But such an erotic look loses its allure in plain sight. We see exactly what we
expect to see on the surface, a surface that does not mask an underneath. Grenet,
expert caricaturist who would in the same era illustrate similarly self-conscious
79

advertisements for soap and women’s hosiery in McCall’s magazine, manages an
image that plays with puzzles of bodily transparency, surfaces, and depths. The
caricature does not showcase a fashionable woman’s body made comic, but rather, our
own ability to see bodies made estranged. The image is paradoxical, certainly
representing Charm’s doubled motives as both fashion-forward commercial vehicle
and savvy literary magazine, but likewise, the oddity of charm as bearer of such
deceptions.
This suggests to me that in making modern “women,” the modernist era’s mass
market clashed with more fluid notions of femininity and with the potentiality of the
body itself. Reading charm’s role in women’s writing during the era illuminates the
problem of white woman as bodily form. Charm magazine’s bathing suit cover, with
“woman” at its conceptual and visual center, dramatizes charm’s sleight of hand, its
unapologetic conceit of deception that I find a rich puzzle of femininity’s visuality,
embodiment, and desire during the early twentieth century. To “charm” the body, such
as through the literalization of this process, charm school, entails a conditioning or
hailing through social, discursive, and institutional regimes. The goal of these
practices is to produce desirable female-identified or effeminate subjects whose bodies
are susceptible, masked, and marketable in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. These conditioned bodies tend to be unsuitable subjects for feminist theory,
as they seem to only participate in Foucauldian regimes of biopower. Yet, I argue that
charm denotes a superficiality or refusal of depth in female embodiment that
interrupts, while also acknowledges, the physiological marks inscribed upon sociallywritten bodies.
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Interrupting Bodies in Theory
Women’s bodies in feminist theory have been construed variously, though
most clearly, as sites of sexual difference. Such sexual difference is an arm of theories
of subjectivity formation, as taken up by theorists such as Luce Irigaray, Hélène
Cixous and Julia Kristeva. Examinations of the dichotomy of sexual difference, of
man/woman, grew to critical examinations of its spillover into other formational logics
of Western thought (phallogocentrism), including nature/ culture, subject/object, and
surface/depth. By the 1990s, however, this type of focus on sexual difference became
increasingly less scrutable as a lived body, even as these theories held an emphasis on
corporeal aspects of womanhood including childbirth, sexual experience,
menstruation, or lactation. Elizabeth Grosz, Dorothy Roberts, Jennifer Nash, and
Susan Bordo intervened in the bodilessness of poststructuralism by returning a
material “real” to questions of bodily habitation and sexual difference. Materiality,
write the editors of Material Feminisms, Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, has been
“volatile site” for feminist theory, “so volatile, in fact, that the guiding rule of
procedure for most contemporary feminisms requires one to distance oneself as much
as possible from the tainted realm of materiality by taking refuge within culture,
discourse, and language.”8 There is, for example, a materialization to Grosz’s
“volatile” body that overturns poststructuralism’s emphasis on the anti-dermal
discursive and ideological. In contemporary theory, Donna Haraway, Karen Barad,
and Sara Ahmed work through bodies as constitutive of larger ecologies, or as
primarily of emotional responsivity, including attention to racialization and other
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modes of difference. This includes such emphases as “gut feminism,” feminist new
materialisms that renounce the primacy of the human body, and posthumanism or
digital feminisms.
Yet, few if any of these theoretical developments to feminist theories of the
body attend to the smooth cultivation of surface. Even Anne Cheng’s study of the
body in modernism, Second Skin, calls attention to the smoothness of modernist skin
as primary characteristic: “The discourse of the ‘pure’ modern surface thus produces a
nexus of metonymic meanings—purity, cleanliness, simplicity, anonymity,
masculinity, civilization, technology, intellectual abstractism—that are set off against
notions of excessive adornment, inarticulate sensuality, femininity, backwardness.” 9
This is the “dream of undistracted surface” 10 in modernity, she notes. But even while
locating smoothness as a primary objective for modernists (and therefore, not without
its own paradoxes, as Adolf Loos’s architecture—with sleek exteriors belying lushly
decorated interiors—demonstrates), smoothness remains intact. Josephine Baker’s
“second skin” during her nude and semi-nude performances, likewise, is a worn
nakedness, “like a sheath.”11 There is no interruption to the surface itself, only, a slip
of one surface for another, what is under, what is over, and what is integrally
connected. (Affect theory in many contemporary iterations often retains the same
problem.) The problem of skin, then, of whether skin is container of the body, is a
problem of modern aesthetics, she notes: “that is, the heuristic and critical problem of
distinguishing decoration as surplus from what is ‘proper’ to the thing,” 12 a notion that
would hold wide implications for raced bodies. Charm’s slip of subject and object, of
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what is seen as extant about the body and particularly, the female body, interrupts this
tacit acceptance of the body’s smoothness in theory.
Charm denotes a superficiality or refusal of depth in female embodiment that
interrupts, yet nonetheless acknowledges, the physiological marks inscribed upon
socially written bodies.13 Such theories of the body can be found in the early
experimental poetry of Gertrude Stein, and are refracted in the materials of mass
culture including pamphlets and self-help books. This pushes Cheng’s notion of
surface and ornamentation further, and likewise, brings together seemingly disparate
threads of feminist theories of the body—that the body is at once discursive and
fleshly material, human and posthuman cyborg. Stein’s avant-garde poetry and prose
showcase a range of ironic explorations of women’s visual charm through fashion –
from the erotic allure of ladies’ undergarments, to presenting a woman’s body as
blazon of handkerchiefs or petticoats – and uses language to interrupt cognitive
processes of aesthetic and lingual appreciation. I find that these charmed bodies are
not what they seem by being exactly as they seem. There is both a seam and a
seemingness to women’s bodies, a fissure or stitch that exposes their construction as
based on the play of appearances (or that which seems) that uniquely emerges through
modernist literary examination. Recalling the roots of “seem” from the Old Norse,
“fitting” (soemr, soema), attention to charm’s seems/seams render the line between
women’s fashion industry, of mannequins, commerciality, and clothes on the one hand
and divisions of naturalness and unnaturalness, of how a body appears on the other.
Examining this thread allows us to see how a body relates to language in modernity,
and how the desire to see the body then “magicks in” its own appearance.
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Gertrude Stein and Mass Women’s Culture
Charm in Gertrude Stein’s Tender Buttons (published first in 1914, then
reissued in a larger printing in Eugene Jolas’s transition in 1928), is an aesthetic
explicitly acknowledged as critical to her poetics. Writing as her partner, Alice, Stein
reports in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933): “[Tender Buttons] was a very
charming little book and Gertrude Stein was enormously pleased.” 14 An arrangement
of small poems, set in small type, and devoted to small objects, Tender Buttons is even
physically inseparable from its own charm – in its first edition, the book was just
seven inches tall and five inches wide. 15 Tender Buttons takes as its poetic subjects
those objects that echo its diminutive size. Divided into sections that suggest domestic
spaces and things, “Objects,” “Food,” and “Rooms,” the collection takes on small
parts of wholes such as windows in rooms, the red interior of a roast, umbrellas,
glasses, or coats. It is undeniably an odd little book. Presumably, the poems are “set”
in an ostensibly bourgeois domestic space, comprised of dresses, umbrellas, roast beef,
books, and cocoa. While these objects tend both toward the feminine and masculine,
they are largely neutral. Absent from all the poems are any human actants—no one is
doing the domestic labor of cooking the roast beef, or shopping for the dresses, or
reading the books. Because of this, Juliana Spahr writes, “It is tempting to say that
Tender Buttons says something feminist, something queer, something opposed to
those big modernist epics such as T.S. Eliot’s ‘The Waste Land’ or Ezra Pound’s
Cantos.”16 But Tender Buttons incessantly confounds. Critics such as Marjorie Perloff
locate a “synecdochic riddling poetry” in the work. Writes Mena Mitrano, it has an
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“intensely intransigent and uncompromising linguistic surface,” 17 and James Mellow
describes Tender Buttons’s literary experimentation as Stein transforming the English
language into a “‘foreign’ language of her own.” 18 This language labors in a way that
can in effect be described as incantatory. The poems bring something into being—they
introduce forces and potentialities of materiality and language when not at “work.” In
short, with their incantatory nature, replete with meter and rhythmic repetition, they
charm.
Critics have long pinpointed the literary quality of charm in the work
explicitly. Gertrude Stein’s good friend and sometime-patron Mabel Dodge, for one,
wrote in Arts and Decoration one of the first praises of Stein’s writing in America,
celebrating Stein’s writing for its “charming” qualities (as we’ve seen in the
introduction). What happens when Stein alters words as small as prepositions is the
opening of an “excessive” or large element of aesthetic experience. As example, I
quote “NOTHING ELEGANT” in full:
A charm a single charm is doubtful. If the red is rose and there is a gate
surrounding it, if inside is let in and there places change then certainly
something is upright. It is earnest. 19
Here, Stein’s syntax presents a familiar logical sequence based on syllogism: if “the
red is rose,” with a gate around it, and “if inside is let in,” then “certainly something is
upright.” But in this simple logic problem, there is no logic. Red we can understand as
“rose,” or a “rose red,” but how can this premise be based on the condition that a gate
surround a color? Similarly, how can an “inside” be “let in,” if this presumes that
“inside” is really an outside? There is no “certainly,” though Stein tells us so, and even
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more certainly, there is no logical “then.” And what is the referent for the “it” that “is
earnest”? One’s reason does – and must – sleep, temporarily in reading poems like
these. Stein’s work begins to explain how the “nothing” can be “something […]
upright.”
The “surface” quality of Stein’s difficult writing defies conventional attempts
at understanding, and effectively interrupts cognitive expectation. The charm of
Tender Buttons serves to problematize bodily response as juxtaposed with cognition in
response to aesthetic works. In other words, Stein allows us to see what we are seeing
(our desires) when we think we see the body. In the section, Rooms, Stein muses on
desire, which she calls “craving,” as caught between cognition and seeming: “Why is
there more craving than there is in a mountain. This does not seem strange to one, it
does not seem strange to an echo and more surely is in there not being a habit.” 20
Desire or craving, Stein indicates, is a figure of mountainlike immensity. To grasp the
vastness of one’s desire, the poem proposes that one must behave like an echo, a
sonorous force that uses surfaces (valleys or mountainsides) to grasp depth. By finding
the edges of the void, or what “seems,” an echo’s pattern can reveal the shape of the
mountain’s terrain. The echo’s interplay between surface that indicates depth, of what
seems and what is, renders the shape of one’s desire. As Stein’s “NOTHING
ELEGANT” suggests, the seemingly empty nothing of desire, then, becomes the shape
of “something.” This is, I find, is very like the shape of the body.
Bodies as established through repeated habits are immediately commercially
apparent if we examine the profusion of early twentieth-century charm schools and
women’s advice manuals in Britain and America. Bodies entailed a conditioning or
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hailing through social, discursive, and institutional regimes. Tim Armstrong considers
the body’s relationship to these regimes as a defining force in modernism. At the start
of the nineteenth century, Armstrong says, the body was believed a whole unit, a
“machine in which the self lived.” 21 The end of the century, however, saw the body
turn to pieces as “a more contingent mechanism, incorporating evolutionary survivals,
and with … perceptual, neurological, and performative apparat[i].”22 This twentiethcentury conceptualization imagined the body in fragments, responding to the
conditions in which it existed. Simultaneously, it was a body envisioned as unprepared
for these conditions, ill-adapted to the multifarious demands of modern life. The
lacking body necessitated compensatory technologies, practices, or other remedies to
achieve “wholeness.” Capitalism took advantage of this fragmentation to sell the
“fantasy of the complete body,” leading bodies to be seen as “projects” to be
developed by the self, with correct habits cultivated, and proper care given. 23 Here
arises the goal of producing desirable female-identified or effeminate subjects whose
bodies are susceptible, masked surfaces, but also, these bodies are ultimately
interrupted by attempting smooth surfaces reliant on seeming, and therefore, seams.
The aptly titled The Magic Key to Charm, by socialite Eileen Ascroft,
promised American women of the 1920s and 1930s that, “No woman, however
beautiful or clever she may be, can live her life to the full unless she learns the secret
of charm. And every woman, no matter who she is, […] can be charming. Because
charm lies already in her soul. She has only to learn how to set it free and express it to
others.”24 Ascroft promises readers: “We are going to study together how to bring out
the very best in you”25 to “develop the charm that is in you, spiritually from within and
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practically from without.”26 This “best” is achieved in a three-pronged approach:
“First, mentally, by directing your thoughts and actions into beautiful channels and
filling your mind and brain so full of charming constructive thoughts that there will be
no room for ugly, destructive ones. Secondly, by practical advice about how to use
clothes and make-up to emphasize your personality. […] And thirdly we are going to
study your attitude to others together and learn how to find friendship and love.”27
Most important of all, however, “there is no mystery about charm,” 28 since every
woman already has it—or rather, the white bourgeois woman has it. Ascroft incants
the realm of the white bourgeoisie through a Steinian range of domestic objects she
references throughout. She recommends: “A vase of flowers, a delicately-scented
talcum powder, your powder in a lovely colored bowl instead of its box, your perfume
in a colored scent spray to match—all these little things bring charm into your
surroundings.”29 The whiteness is made even more explicit in one of the early
chapters, as she demands her readers erotically enjoy their whiteness: “Look at the
beauty of that body God has given you. […] Look at the rhythmic curve of your
shoulders, the exquisite soft whiteness of your breasts.”30 The self-help guide by
Ascroft—one of many similar advice manuals and conduct books published at the turn
of the twentieth century—is unintended confirmation of the slip of surfaces, charm’s
mystery and mastery. Ascroft’s premise is already a logic of illogic: if every woman
has charm, and there is no “mystery” about it, then it is not “secret,” but instead an
open secret that paradoxically leaves its heart on its sleeve. Charm makes no deceit
about its own mechanisms, and yet, mass culture perpetuates a refusal to envision
women’s charm as having such openness.
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Charm’s open deceit takes crafting and attention to detail—and as such, it
carries the logic of formalist performance. Eugenie Brinkema’s theorization of the
formal dimensions of emotion can help us here. Brinkema mentions a psychoanalytic
session described by Freud’s contemporary, Pierre Janet. A “sick” girl comes to Janet
and “wants to confide the secret of her turmoil,” yet, during the session, the girl finds
she cannot do so as she begins to sob. “But does she sob because she cannot say
anything?... Or does she sob precisely in order not to say anything?,”31 Janet asks.
That the girl sobs “not as loud profession but in order to remain silent,” Brinkema
observes, “[…] theorizes emotion as organized behavior, means aiming at an end. But
what that emotion-behavior aims at is precisely deception, delay, and an evasion of
difficulty.”32 In other words, what occurs in the scenario is already on the surface. It
needs not be “read” for a depth of meaning—if it were, we may surmise that the girl’s
sobs are because of the weight of her turmoil, or that her inability to speak is produced
by her psychological turmoil. Emotions, however, could be “not windows into the
soul; rather, they are ‘a particular subterfuge, a special trick, each one of them being a
different means of eluding a difficulty.’”33 The truth of emotions is that they are
masks.34 We may alter this phrasing to note a related conclusion: the truth of charm is
that the seams are clear—charm reveals masks. It now becomes clear what Ascroft’s
open “secret” is—that white bourgeois femininity is not innate but made, fashioned
into a body desired to be seen as white, natural, and neutral. The open secret of charm
is that it suggests that this white bourgeois femininity available to all women including
women of color, and especially black women as part of the era’s concern for race
progress. But charm also introduces a snag to this availability, as it simultaneously
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stages the question—why is this mask desirable? As Stein concludes the poem from
Rooms quoted above, the “why” is there: “Why is there so much useless suffering.
Why is there.”35
With an emphasis on thoughtless, habitual acts without centers, Stein’s use of
charm is in line with the premise of Ascroft’s and other conduct manuals. Charm
reveals its curious hold as her writing combats the expressivist relation of depth and
surface by refusing readers’ cognition. The first iteration of “A BOX” (a later poem in
Tender Buttons holds the same title) does precisely this. The poem reads:
Out of kindness comes redness and out of rudeness comes rapid same question,
out of an eye comes research, out of selection comes painful cattle. So then the
order is that a white way of being round is something suggesting a pin and is it
disappointing, it is not, it is so rudimentary to be analysed and see a fine
substance strangely, it is so earnest to have a green point not to red but to point
again.36
There is an intriguing emphasis on superficiality here as Stein directs attention to
surface readings and surface similarities: kindness, redness, and rudeness are visually
similar in their suffixes, but carry disparate signifieds. Yet their juxtaposition asks us
to see what may be “red” about “kind,” for example. We are “not to red [read]” but “to
point again.” The “order” is “a white way of being.”
Stein’s repetition through detail – and its superficiality – is evident in the many
poems in Tender Buttons that take garments as their focus, an already surfacedependent subject that insists upon coverage and “mere” exteriors. Specifically, her
focus on everyday and often women’s garments echoes Naomi Schor’s and Sianne
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Ngai’s interest in the embodied feminization (and, thereby, racialization) of small,
everyday affects or aesthetics.37 “A PETTICOAT” includes a line about a “rosy
charm” in the garment that’s overtly feminized, textualized (“ink”), and eroticized: “A
light white, a disgrace, an ink spot, a rosy charm.”38 Given four simple (and largely
monosyllabic) characteristics that appear to be contradictory or, at the least, not
necessarily given toward a compatible single image, the petticoat boasts the same
“rosy charm” that echoes in “NOTHING ELEGANT.” Moreover, it ties negative
emotionality (the “disgrace” of what seems to be the red of menstrual blood) with
positive (the spot’s “rosy charm”) as the two objective observations (“a light white”
and “an ink spot”) are given corresponding interpretations or meanings.
While many critics have addressed the poem’s feminist appeal – it contests
male fetishism, as the blood “ruins” the fantasy of the petticoat’s virginal innocence,
for example39 – I emphasize the poem’s own reading of itself that dramatizes a
nonreading of detail, the prick of white, naturalized bodies. The poem plays on
demands of secrecy (about the disgrace of menstruation, or the taboo of addressing
women’s undergarments at all) and disclosure; or, in other words, demands awareness
of our own cognition through Salvador Dali’s “prick” of the particular. Aligning
images of blood on white undergarments with ink on a white page not only anticipates
écriture féminine theorized by Hélène Cixous and French third-wave theorists, but
invites a myriad of other interpretations that request of the poem a depth and largesse
of interpretive cognition that, perhaps, charm cheekily lures us toward as it tempts us
toward its truth-bearing function. The poem’s reasoning, however, is continually
threatened by falsification and misprision – how exactly do the second and fourth
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evaluations modify the first and third observations? Do these four parts actually
correspond in some pattern of logic, or are we seduced by difference through these
paired doubles, and the repetition of Stein’s image of feminine bodily “rosiness” and
“charm”? The poem also suggests alternative alignments—that the disgrace is not
menstrual blood on white garments, but it is “inky” blackness, opposed to the rosy
charm of whiteness. This reading runs anti-dichotomously, as ABBA, rather than
ABAB. The suggestion of the female body here is then a body theorized in an
alternative alignment to phallogocentric oppositions. Instead of a running list of
privileged and deprivileged binaries (like nature/culture, body/mind, emotion/reason,
and so on) it is within enclosure—the BB within AA. Such a realignment also orients
itself with inversion, a gloss on queer or lesbian eroticism. In other words, the
alignment has an immediacy that repeats, that “magicks” something in, within the
mask of the privileged term.
The charm of Stein’s works, as observed by Mabel Dodge, for example,
ostensibly demotes what her poetic or aesthetic projects actually are, yet more
characteristically denotes a very Steinian superficiality, a diminution, a bathetic
anticlimax that asks us to question precisely what Gilles Deleuze diagnoses of the
modern condition – we seek this game of difference, and delude ourselves into depth
of thought about an “endlessly extractable” set of differences. 40 Stein’s poetic state of
charmedness incants us into experiencing our own modes of logic, and confronts us
with a quotidian confrontation with a self, a female body, as yielding nothing but
nondisclosure.
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This formalist performance echoes modernist anxieties over bodies, faces,
gender, and emptiness. Glamour, as we’ve learned, the ultimate ideal of modernist
fashion and lifestyle, flirts with “the suspicion of nothing behind it all,” an absence
that is “something […] seductive, powerful, and often simply gorgeous.” 41 The
biographer in Virginia Woolf’s Orlando (1928) avers, “Clothes are but a symbol of
something hid deep beneath.”42 While Judith Brown, Jessica Burstein, and others have
argued for such an absence of a “beneath” as a sustained modernist attraction to
nihilism, coldness, detachment, and negativity, I find that this is not the case in Stein.43
Rather, Stein’s work jeopardizes the easy idea of a surface and a depth. In Second
Skin, Cheng argues that modernism’s fascination with surface and skin (animal prints,
furs, architectural “skins,” and racialized black skin) must be considered under the
assumption that visibility encodes upon what is seen how we are to see it. Cheng
writes that the trouble of seeing is the trouble of differentiating subjectivity from
objectivity, transparency and opacity. Modernism, Cheng finds, operates upon the
complications that result when disavowals “repeatedly avow themselves,” patterns of
avowed disavowals that “are embodied within the very figuration of the modern
object.” When examining modernist objects, “[W]e are looking not at hidden depths or
longings but the material traces of a desire that is written on the skin/surface again and
again, like striated lines.”44

Charmed Bodies as Women’s Labor
Michel Foucault offers a history of bodies in The History of Sexuality (1978),
arguing that bodies have long been products of social and juridical conditioning
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around power. Bodies that register as bodies, which retain the “right to life,” as
Foucault argues, are entwined with the relatively modern idea of “biopower.” Put
simply, biopower is the subjugation of bodies and control of populations through
networks of power relations that, by the seventeenth century – unlike previous
centuries – were not sourced from a single sovereign, but through smaller strategies of
power that are non-authoritarian, strategies that are forces of quotidian normalization,
dominance, and subordination. The new distribution of power shifted from exercising
juridical control over legal subjects— over whom the ultimate punishment was
wielded, death—to individuated mastery of living beings or the right to life. Available
forms of selfhood or individuality then were constituted by biopower, as that which
“brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made
knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.” 45 Foucault explains:
there is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by
interiorizing to the point that he [sic] is his [sic] own overseer, each individual thus
exercising this surveillance over, and against himself [sic].46

Understanding biopower’s emphasis on one’s involuntary regulation of one’s
existence and pleasures allows us to see charm as revealing itself in the social and
ideological operations of the twentieth century. Such a conception of bodies and
bodily control appears in line with twentieth-century concerns over bodily regulation,
habit, and appearance. A booming self-help industry, enabled by the buying power of
an eager middle class in America and Britain, counseled citizens on various methods
of bodily habit that required bodies’ biology and physiology to be conditioned to
achieve proper behavior, eliminate wastefulness, or other aims, through acts of sheer
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will, and of course, the help of commodities. These methods were popularized in the
early twentieth century as part of what Suzanne Raitt locates as a desire for efficiency,
an efficiency that was “a kind of moral crusade and efficient itself [was] a form of
ethical superiority.”47 Failure to do so indicated not only moral ineptitude, but an inner
primitive, or in some cases, a vulnerability to the “African within” white men. 48
Bodily practices moved fluidly from business and industry to one’s own corpus in
daily life. Taylorism, a theory of labor systems management created by Fred W.
Taylor in 1911, advocated for workers’ jobs to be converted to individual, timed,
essential motions to enhance worker productivity. Once provided the proper training,
and incentives to reward efficient labor, workers’ productivity would soar to
machinelike levels. 49
These practices were aimed largely at male workers, not at women. Though
New Women—who could be of middle social classes—were frequently employed as
nannies or caretakers, tutors and teachers, work in factory settings or that involved the
kind of physical labor often associated with early twentieth century industry remained
in the realm of lower-class women. Capitalism and capitalist labor had to reach
moneyed women and alter notions of embodiment as docile subject formation through
other means. Outward appearances of the body and especially the face skewed toward
the plastic and the “put-on” in the early 1900s, and was part of a larger movement
toward bodily habits, control, and self-betterment.
In gendered parallel to Taylorist machinations of the body, the face and body –
generally, both men’s and women’s, but far more often the latter – became the primary
focus of middle and upper class women’s labor. These features were considered
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alterable and therefore subject to the pursuit of habitually controlled perfection.
Through controlled alterations, common wisdom went, the body was eventually able
to be “mastered.” The era’s crazes for body and facial exercises, we find they
emphasize the ability to reconfigure an inferior woman’s body (and thus, recuperate an
autonomous, disembodied self) through regular movements. Unlike similar gymnastic
drills that required metaphysical attunement as celebrated by other practitioners
including Delsart, German doctor Bess Mensendieck’s immensely popular functional
movement exercises were solely based on the body. 50 Mensendieck advocated a
rationalized physical culture system inspired by avant-garde dance in Weimar
Germany and interwar America.51 The resultant “relaxed, flexible, and individualized
body” aligns itself with the “un-corseted and lounging avant-garde elite, the athletic
New Woman.”52 Should one fail to properly enact bodily discipline, poet and avantgardist Mina Loy warns in her 1919 pamphlet, Auto-Facial-Construction, one would
risk an interruption to beauty caused by a subpar muscle:
One distorted muscle causes a fundamental disharmony in self-expression, for
no matter how well gowned or groomed men or women may be, how
exquisitely the complexion is cared for, or how beautiful the expression of the
eyes, if the original form of the face (intrinsic symbol of personality) has been
effaced in muscular transformation, they have lost the power to communicate
their true personalities to others and all expression of sentiment is veiled in
pathos.53
While the female body is seen here to be malleable to accommodate shifting social
requirements for the “feminine,” what strikes me is the implicit argument Loy makes
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as to the plasticity of femininity. The form of the face can be “effaced”—one has the
ability to alter the expression of one’s “true” personality. In other words, one can
falsify oneself. The body is no longer a solid, staid, knowable object, but a mutable,
responsive entity prepared to alter itself depending on valuation of its exterior.
The kind of embodiment Loy’s work recalls is not Foucauldian somatic control
so much as the theories of Joan Riviere, psychoanalytic theorist who followed Freud
and Melanie Klein’s work. Riviere suggests in “Womanliness as a Masquerade”
(1929) that “womanliness” amongst successful professional or intellectual women is
actually masked aggression. A woman’s exterior, then, suggests something other than
the direct interior-to-exterior expressivity of Loy’s “true personality.” There is
something to the act of perception and the feminine body here that charm exposes.
When charm is the ultimate objective, charm reveals the labor implicit in the
recognition of (and desire of) gendered bodies. The “seam” or interruption that charm
renders to the smoothness of bodies in theory is that charm reveals the means of
production, exposing its reliance on language or discourse and the material
simultaneously. This is also part of the “catch.” Riviere finds that some women—
those who “while mainly heterosexual in their development, plainly display strong
features of the other sex”—are visually demonstrating a deeper deception. The
femininity of these women, Riviere explains, is actually a fraudulent one – it is not
“genuine,” but a “mask” designed to avert anxiety or fear of retribution arising from
rivalry with men in the public sphere, particularly, in public speech acts.
“Womanliness” as a mask serves “both to hide the possession of masculinity and to
avert the reprisals expected if she was found to possess it,”54 a subversion and
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deflection of imagined power. For Riviere, such feelings are shields not for sexuality
(one’s homosexuality in a heterosexual realm, for instance, or an asexuality) but for
anger. Seeing shields or masks is integral to seeing charm, as an awareness of charm’s
seams or seeming is itself a component of charm’s social construction. A focus on
charm allows women to see the body that ideology desires, and to newly perceive the
ways the body is made by those desires.
In Judith Butler’s discussion of Riviere’s work in Gender Trouble, Butler is
quick to point out Riviere’s assumptions within such a theorization: “Clearly, Riviere
begins with set notions about what it is to display characteristics of one’s sex, and how
it is that those plain characteristics are understood to express or reflect an ostensible
sexual orientation. This perception or observation not only assumes a correlation
among characteristics, desires, and ‘orientation,’ but creates that unity through the
perceptual act itself.”55 Notably, Riviere elides the difference between “womanliness”
and its fashioned mask, arguing that there is no separation between surface and what is
supposedly underneath: “The reader may now ask how I define womanliness or where
I draw the line between genuine womanliness and the ‘masquerade.’ My suggestion is
not, however, that there is any such difference; whether radical or superficial, they are
the same thing.”56 If the mask is genuine and indicative of false womanhood, then
womanhood is itself superficial. But, if she deems “womanliness” a “masquerade,”
does “masquerade” not already imply that there indeed remains a depth? Or, in
Butler’s formulation, “What is masked by masquerade?” 57 While Butler uses this
question to arrive at a critique of Lacanian divisions of gender and the construction of
the law that guarantees failure in such divisions, we may repurpose the question to
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address what is the mask of the masquerade. Is the mask a superficial persona from
which embodied “charm” emanates as mere play of surfaces and disguise? Or does
this mask in itself bring something into being?

Reading Charm, Reading Bodies in Modernism
If modernism can be described as a venture both of texts and interpretation,
then modernism’s bodies can be envisioned as like these texts and interpretations.
Elizabeth Grosz explains of bodies as form and content, surface and depth: “The
surface of the body, the skin, […] provides the ground for the articulation of orifices,
erotogenic rims, cuts on the body’s surface, loci of exchange between the inside and
the outside, points of conversion of the outside into the body, and of the inside out of
the body.”58 Bodies as exhibiting an inside (content) and outside (form) which can be
scrutinized, rationalized, and made sensible—modernist bodies seem to be exercises in
interpretation. Charm, however, throws a wrench in this process. If criticism insists
upon scrutiny, charm refuses scrutiny—indeed, charm dissolves under scrutiny. If the
role of the reader or observer in modernism is to “familiarize the seemingly
unfamiliar,”59 to make James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, or Wyndham Lewis’s Tarr
“make sense,” then charm is the most anti-modern of modernist projects as it
defamiliarizes the familiar—the body. It is therefore the most modern, if we are to
trace what Slavoj Žižek writes of modernism: that “the pleasure of the modernist
interpretation consists in the effect of recognition which ‘gentrifies’ the disquieting
uncanniness of its objects.”60 In other words, charm teaches us that as we read
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modernism, we must attentively read modernism’s interruptions to interpretation, and
our desires for interpretation.
As Clarissa observes in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925), in modernity,
one can no longer say that one is “this” or “that,” a unique singularity. Charm is
necessarily existent in an in-between, a dynamic interplay that cannot avoid how we
are taught to see bodies as reliant on surface/depth, internal/external. To see charm is
to see how female embodiment functions as a mode of calling into singularity, a
distinction that is a perennial puzzle of our desire for surfaces. We ultimately “see”
our own desires of seeing the body—and find an illusion of valuation made to please
capitalist desires. Stein and the texts of mass body culture demonstrate how charm is a
key component of this puzzle, a puzzle that renders a larger modernist network of
modes of “embodiment” and thinking the body, particularly for women, in the early
twentieth century. Charm uniquely tells us what other studies have been unable to
fully address within modernism—how language alongside perceptual processes and
commercial materialism come together to perpetuate the idea of a modernist female
body. The body conditioned toward and as hailed by charm actually changes our grasp
on contemporary debates in theories of the female body by emphasizing surfaces,
visuality, and styled individuality. We will never know the body–and particularly, the
body as gendered–until we grasp the ways in which we “magic in” a body that holds
critical lure for us in each theorization. Suggesting the hanging of clothes or trying on
fashions, Gertrude Stein puts this process of magicking another way in Rooms: “A
whole center and a border make hanging a way of dressing.” 61 Exposing its
machinations, Stein’s treatment of charm when placed in conversation with the era’s
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self-help texts reveals modernist bodies to be instructive masquerades, ways of
dressing up desire into endless models.
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CHAPTER 4

LOLLY WILLOWES AND CHARM AS REVOLUTIONARY FEMINIST
THINKING
“Feminism Will Give—Men More Fun, Women Greater Scope, Children Better Parents, Life More
Charm.” –Edna Kenton, Delineator July 19141

Written by British historian, musician, and writer Sylvia Townsend Warner,
Lolly Willowes, Or, the Loving Huntsman (1926) has long been considered a work of
whimsical fantasy with key connections to its social and historical moment. In
conversation with both the years following the Great War and the early twentieth
century women’s movement, Lolly Willowes follows Laura Willowes, disparagingly
called the title name “Lolly” by her family, raised as the only daughter of three
children in the “conservative” Willowes family. The family “kept to old-fashioned
ways”2 (3) at their estate in rural Dorset, Lady Place, resting in physical and political
comfort from generations of wealth (their domain includes beds and chairs that
“insensibly persuaded them into respect for the good sense of their forebears” 3 [10]).
Laura’s childhood and early adolescence is peaceful, and Laura is her father Everard’s
favorite. Everard dies as Laura reaches her late twenties, however, and as a single
woman without independent means, Laura must give up life at Lady Place to move in
with her brother Henry and sister-in-law, Caroline, in London. She lives with her
family for decades in a dissatisfied life as “old Aunt Lolly, so useful and obliging and
negligible”4 (150), until the age of forty-seven, when on a whim, she decides to use
her meager savings to move to a rural village in the Chilterns called Great Mop. Once
there, Laura soon realizes Great Mop’s residents are actually a secretive society of
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witches who enjoy the perverse pleasures of a solitary life. By the end of the novel,
Laura meets Satan on a desolate hillside, and launches into a tirade on women’s
limited position in society before peaceably accepting her new vocation.
The fantasy element of the novel dominated much of the discourse surrounding
Lolly Willowes upon its publication. For her part, Warner seems not to have entirely
discouraged this, playing up interviewers’ speculation that she herself was a witch by
flippantly suggesting that fellow modern witches should use vacuums for brooms.
Later, Warner would disappoint Virginia Woolf when Warner declared to her that she
knew so much about witches because Warner was one herself, during Woolf and
Warner’s first (and what would be only) meeting. 5 Yet, privately, Warner felt her
novel was not quite understood. Writing to lifelong friend and fellow Dorset writer,
David Garnett, she noted wistfully: “Other people who have seen Lolly have told me
that it was charming, that it was distinguished, and my mother said it was almost as
good as Galsworthy. And my heart sank lower and lower; I felt as though I had tried to
make a sword, only to be told what a pretty pattern there was on the blade. But you
have sent me a drop of blood.” A critical component of this misreading, in Warner’s
words, is its charm – a description as off the mark as a comparison to John
Galsworthy. As her biographer Clare Harman puts it, the novel’s focus on the
“struggl[e] for privacy, not power, is still not a very common view of the feminist
ideal and the retiring nature of the heroine, Lolly, perhaps persuaded readers that it
was not a very serious one, either.” 6
Scholars in recent years have given the novel more serious attention, with more
frequent attunement to the novel’s critique of the limitations placed on women in early
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twentieth-century British society.7 Gillian Beer unites the two emphases on feminism
and fantasy to note that Lolly Willowes is, for feminists, “total fantasy gratification.” 8
Warner’s novel, however, is more complex than either simple fantasy, or unified
political treatise or allegory read in the way Beer suggests, as a portrait of a feminist
utopia, particularly for single women.9 As Jacqueline Shin cautions, while an
“assessment of the novel’s revolutionary potential is not inaccurate, … it flattens
Warner’s sly, slippery, and perverse text by forcing it into the genre of the
manifesto.”10 Noreen O’Connor likewise calls the novel “not easily organized into
either traditional pre-war narrative forms or the alienated individuality we have come
to expect from modernist works.” 11 Such readings, in other words, ignore its narrative
complexities and often fail to account for the significance of the fantasy elements as
not feminism made whimsically coded but foregrounded and foundational to Warner’s
feminist imagining. Charm, I argue in this chapter, helps us see how the unique
feminist fantasy of Lolly Willowes operates as experimental exercise in sensation and
belief, specifically through its cultivation of literary tone or, as I will call it here, its
charmed atmosphere.

Warner’s Revolutionary Feminism
In the twentieth century’s early decades, Perry Anderson says, “the prospect of
revolution was … more proximate and tangible than it had ever been.” 12 Before
turning to the novel, I’d like to set out context for the kind of feminism in which
Warner’s novel is situated, and the role of charm within this revolutionary spirit.
Writer and literary critic Edna Kenton saw feminism as many other women of the
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early twentieth century did—as a radically new, fittingly modern notion. Writing in
the American women’s magazine The Delineator in 1914, Kenton deems feminism
“something so new that it isn’t in the dictionaries yet.”13 A uniquely modern
phenomenon, feminism’s relationship to modernism was a complex, paradoxical one.
“Femininity” as a category seemed to be the “other” of modernism, carrying with it
undesirable associations with Victorian gentility and sentimentality. Historian Lucy
Delap writes:
Over the first ten years of the twentieth century, feminism came to occupy a
similar space to the idea of the ‘new woman’ of the 1890s, signifying a radical,
subversive grouping closely associated with the avant-garde and radical
movements that flourished before World War One. It connoted rupture, and
was emblematic of the aggressively new century that was so widely understood
as a millennial turning-point.14
The feminist avant-garde or, as Edwardians often termed it, “vanguard,” this circle
drew upon a much older thread of political radicalism dating from the mid-nineteenth
century. It indicated “a discourse or social imaginary within feminism, rather than a
movement.”15 Physical spaces that opened up to women in the early twentieth century
were significant—such as the tea shops represented in Dorothy Richardson’s
Pilgrimage (1915-38), or restaurants and clubs moved through by the aptly named
Doris Kilman in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925). Yet, significant engines of
feminist thought lay in “textual space,” meaning “the shared discourses circulating
within feminist periodicals and essays, rather than any kind of tightly drawn circle or
site.”16 Feminism, in other words, held critical ties to the reading of feminist texts. As
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Delap puts it, “to be a feminist was very centrally a reading experience.”17 It is within
this form of feminism, which is at once avant-garde and highly literary, that I trace
Warner’s literary expression of feminism in Britain in the 1920s as distinct tonal
atmosphere, fundamentally composed by charm.
Charm was already embedded in discourses of feminism in the first decades of
the twentieth century. It appeared to be a quality closely associated with femininity
that modernity attempted to distance itself from, yet paradoxically, became avantgarde emblem of the kind of radical shift in lived experience and aesthetic
representation sought after by modernists. It also delineated separations within
feminist groupings, as charm was never itself associated with the pervasive suffrage
movement. Foundationally tied to aesthetic and affective forces, charm became a
unique, slippery force of form that relied on the construction of atmosphere or tonality
to bring support and promise to the movement. This kind of support was not enjoyed
by the suffragists, despite the movement’s relative successes for legal and social
reform. Suffragists, who decidedly lacked charm, were depicted as both unfeminine
and, conversely, too feminine by the British mass media and vocal anti-suffrage
groups. In a double bind, suffragists were skewered for their “masculine” desires to
enter the political landscape assumed to be the realm of men, as well as criticized for
their campaigns showing “the biologically determined flaws of their sex” such as
hysteria or lack of intellectual capacity, “thus proving their inability to participate
usefully in Parliamentary politics.” 18 Charm smoothed the edges of such criticisms,
and kept out of the headlines, favoring the promise of the literary as force of avantgarde feminist thought. As a 1914 note on the status of French women in The Times of
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London commented, feminism was fresh and modern, a “charmingly feminine
thing.”19 In its “lighter moods,” an anonymous Paris correspondent observes,
feminism “is as graceful a gesture as it was in the days of the historic ‘salons,’” full of
“fine feeling and dainty courage.” 20 As this comment shows, charm is uniquely able to
slip less attractive notions under detractors’ noses while ostensibly upholding the
norms of femininity and gender roles. And, I argue, it is this “trojan horse” quality of
tastefully normative blankness that drove feminism’s ability to imagine another form
of social relations through the peculiar means of speculative or magical, charmed
thinking.

Lolly and Feminist Fantasy as Charmed Thinking
The novel immediately draws attention to will and susceptibility through
narrative technique. Lolly opens with a punning meditation on “will.” The novel’s first
line declares Laura Willowes’s fate upon her father’s death – to “live in London with
her elder brother and his family” 21 (5). Laura’s sister-in-law, Caroline phones Laura
immediately to declare, “‘Of course […] you will come to us’”22 (5). Laura’s response
reads doubly: “‘But it will upset all your plans. It will give you so much trouble. Are
you sure you really want me?’”23 (5). Laura’s equivocations indicate her actual will is
not to live with Caroline. Yet, another will insists she do so—her father Everard’s
physical will, left upon his death, which dispenses with both the family assets and
Laura (who, for her part, “was ready to be disposed of as they should think best” 24
[10]). Symbolically, this also names the will of the patriarchy, that a single, odd
woman nearing thirty, with no marriage prospects is of no use to society at large.
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Beyond these significations of will, the notion of will in the opening sentences of the
novel introduces with it a sense of uncertain trajectory, conjuring a literary tone that
itself jeopardizes our ability to read the novel conclusively. The narration’s sly
slipperiness quickly seems to accrue its own “wills” and intents.
As is characteristic of contemporaneous fantasy novels, Lolly Willowes relies
upon the construction of an otherworldliness, a realm of possibility beyond the
present. Warner’s novel is unique in that this otherworldliness – the kind of
slipperiness indicated by the novel’s opening – is both alluringly magical and blankly
quotidian. By this I do not mean to suggest that Warner elevates Laura’s domestic,
rural everyday life to the transcendent or spiritual,25 nor do I mean to suggest that the
novel’s fantasy renders an unreachable utopia. Rather, the novel’s ordinariness is a
critical source of its very realist feminist thinking, created by the affective and
aesthetic solicitation of response through tonality or atmosphere. Specifically, while
ordinariness seems to connote a legibility, the quotidian fantasy realm of the novel
actually crafts in its readers is one of confoundment, a cognitive dissonance or
productive stupor produced when the novel evokes the naturalness of reason while
compounding it with an immersive charmed delight in the feminist-inflected
fantastical. This is where one’s “will” fails to correspond to one’s sensation or belief
in the novel.
Lolly Willowes practices sequences of sly deceits and sleights of hand,
sequences that present a tonal atmosphere that is itself a form of avant-garde feminist
thinking that can only be described as charming. The world of London and of Great
Mop are at turns both earthly and unearthly in Lolly Willowes—at the greengrocer’s in
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London, Laura imagines the greengrocer’s mother bottling fruits: “the sliced pears in
syrup, the glistening red plums, the greengages.”26 An image strikes her: “A solitary
old woman picking fruit in a darkening orchard, rubbing her rough fingertips over the
smooth-skinned plums,”27 and suddenly, “She forgot the winter air outside, the people
going by on wet pavements. She forgot that she was in London, she forgot the whole
of her London life. She seemed to be standing alone in a darkening orchard, her feet in
the grass, her arms stretched up to the pattern of leaves and fruit.”28 The strength of
Laura’s imagination becomes clear in moments such as these, as it appears to blur the
boundaries between fantasy and reality. The blurring is rendered complete when Laura
actually foresees her later encounter with Satan during this early moment in London.
She is roused from her fantasy when the shop owner asks her what she wanted. “He
wore a gardener’s apron,” the narration notes, “and his hands were brown and dry as if
he had been handling earth.”29 Sure enough, in a perverse play on Eden, when we
meet Satan later in the novel, he is “a slouching and prowling” gardener “carrying a
flag basket and a pair of shears” 30 as he emerges from a shed enclosure.
Because of its quotidian, “realist” nature, the novel’s magical or fantasy
elements twist the familiar adage that seeing is believing. Unknowingly, events
transpire in the novel that sweep over the reader, who is immersed in the novel’s
charm but attuned and susceptible. Events of the novel have to be believed to be seen.
For example, while Laura believes acutely in her conversion, from a critical distance,
it seems much less certain. While in the kitchen at her new home in Great Mop, Laura
suddenly “felt something move by her foot. She glanced down and saw a small
kitten,”31 which promptly claws her until she bleeds. Then, “not for a moment did she
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doubt. But so deadly, so complete was the certainty that it seemed to paralyze her
powers of understanding… She continued to stare at the kitten, scarcely knowing what
it was that she knew… She, Laura Willowes, in England, in the year 1922, had entered
into a compact with the Devil.”32 This conversion occurs without much thought or
agency from Laura herself. While she alleges she “scarcely [knew] what she knew,”
she nonetheless retains a significant amount of conviction: “All knew, all could bear
witness.”33
Laura believes that she has become a witch, and the kitten is “her familiar
spirit, [one] that already had greeted its mistress, and sucked her blood.”34 Yet, the
scene could be read in a fundamentally less “magical” fashion—a stray kitten has
found its way into her lodging, and in the sudden presence of a stranger, scratches at
her. Warner’s narration emphasizes “doubt,” “knowing,” and “certainty” when Laura
is not very intellectually sure of anything in particular in the novel. Laura “knew
herself to be unpractical, unmethodical, lacking in initiative” 35; her own “freckles on
her nose mocked her with the receptivity of her skin compared to the dullness of her
senses”36; and “She had no thoughts; her mind was swept as clean and empty as the
heavens.”37 “‘I don’t think I do think,’”38 she later confesses.
What the insistence on rational certainty in this conversion scene indicates is
that there is something at work in the novel to which we as readers must be receptive
or attuned. This presence requires our own complicity or belief to be influenced or
subsumed by it – otherwise, we read a novel about a woman who we presume has
constructed her own feminist fantasy realm inside of a realist narrative, in the style of
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper” (1892), for instance. The novel
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thereby charms. It not only represents a magically-inflected feminist realm of
possibility, but also enacts such a charm upon its readers through careful cultivation of
tone.
Warner herself helps to explain how her novel operates upon the reader
through tone, especially as this tone suggests the supernatural through feeling of
giving over one’s sense of reason or will. In early 1925, Warner corresponded for the
first time with Harold Prentice, the man who would become both her close friend and
longtime editor at Chatto & Windus. Upon reading her “story about a witch,” the work
that would become Lolly Willowes, Prentice enthusiastically accepted the novel for
publication. In a letter from March of that year, however, while discussing with
Warner edits on the manuscript, Prentice asks if the ending – where the tale’s female
protagonist delivers to Satan a lengthy tirade about women who, despite their “vivid
imaginations,” are forced into “dull lives,” “so dependent upon others” 39 – is meant to
encourage the reader to sympathize with the devil, effectively asking whether Satan
was a feminist ally. Warner answers, “I am very grateful for your analysis of your
unease, especially for the two words ‘forensic’ and ‘humanistic.’ I think they give me
the clue as to […] what is wrong.”40 She then elaborates on her vision for Satan:
[T]here must be nothing humanistic in Satan’s sympathetic attitude. At the
moment I have an idea for making him play the flute at some point in the
conversation.

I have always identified the Satan of the witch-cult with [P]an. (Warlocks seem
to have worshipped a quite different Satan, with a definite religious
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significance: a power of evil). I believe I am right in saying that there has
never been a religion founded on Pan. He has been acknowledged only: [sic]
and under two aspects: the unaccountable terror that lies in wait in solitary
places; and a simple out-door festivity. This mixture of fear and Bank Holiday
on Hampstead Heath is very closely reproduced in the witch-cult.41
Warner answers Prentice’s concerns by indicating that her Satan is not a religious evil.
Instead, Warner notes anthropologically, he is associated with the pagan god Pan
(whose name forms part of the word, panic, thereby associating Pan’s irrational
frivolity with fear). He is outside of humanity, a “terror” and a “festivity,” a
comingling of “fear” and “Bank Holiday.” Satan’s potential as a feminist, in other
words, suggests Warner’s notion that feminist thought is itself a panic. The world as
envisioned by the women’s movement was both a terror and a festivity, a challenge to
the normative and a celebration of such a possibility. Satan is less important here than
what he suggests, as manifestation of magical presence in the novel. This presence is
caught between form and feeling, between the structure of the text and the reader’s
cognitive and affective work. In this betweenness lies charm. The purpose, ultimately,
of this play with readerly susceptibility, for a novel to do work upon its reader and
confound one’s sense of reason or will, is to practice a feminist imagining. As Lolly
Willowes demonstrates, charm slyly operates as a mystical, magical quality bearing an
altered approach to new visions of the possible—specifically, as a fantasy rendered
legible through the literary.

Charm as Tonality
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To restate, as a complexly quotidian fantasy, Lolly Willowes narratively
performs the magic it represents upon readers as it coaxes readers to unknowingly
immerse themselves, to become susceptible to something through the use of charm. In
so doing, the novel showcases modernist charm as literary operative, and attention to
its effects makes charm’s literariness—its emphasis on words and formal structure—
more apparent.
When I note Warner’s literary tone as establishing a charmed atmosphere, I
mean to indicate that charm draws equally upon two separate notions. The first is the
notion of literary tone, which itself creates an affective atmosphere or something that
is somehow unshakably attached to an artwork. Sianne Ngai’s definition of literary
tone as less an attitude as “adumbrated by the New Critics,” than a “hyper-relational
concept of feeling that encompasses attitude: a literary text’s affective bearing,
orientation, or ‘set toward’ its audience and world.” 42 It is “an affective relay between
subject and object in which feeling paradoxically produces a ‘beyondness’ rather than
a nearness or immediacy.”43 As this “beyondness,” tone has a mysterious, distancing
aura that rings of the fantastic or magical. Interpreting Walter Benjamin’s notion of
aura, Theodor Adorno links tone to “the atmosphere of an artwork, that whereby the
nexus of the artwork’s elements points beyond this nexus and allows each individual
element to point beyond itself.”44
This brings us to the second related notion of atmosphere, which Adorno
suggests is an indexical, yet unspecified kind of tone. Stemming from the Greek
atmos, meaning vapor, and sphaira (ball, sphere), atmosphere suggests a surrounding
sense of elements, climate, or environment as well as the outer envelope surrounding
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various terrestrial and celestial bodies or forces (electrical atmosphere, gaseous
envelope surrounding planets).45 In relation to tone, it suggests a closed dimensional
space of the encounter of an artwork in combination with the realm the artwork
suggests. Referenced later by Ngai, Mikel Dufrenne describes the aesthetic encounter
as having a singular “affective quality” or, to use Dufrenne’s term, “atmosphere.” For
Dufrenne, the atmosphere initiated within an aesthetic encounter is part of the unity or
sphere of the artwork together with its reception. This unity can then be read as
ideology or worldview. While Dufrenne writes, “The unity of an atmosphere is thus
the unity of a Weltanschauung; its coherence is the coherence of a characteristic or
quality.”46 I would depart from Dufrenne to note that such a continuous, unified, and
solid worldview risks totalizing the whole of aesthetic experience into an ideological
metalanguage of infinite explanation. What I emphasize from this is that in Warner’s
novel, and throughout my argument here, there is something absolutely unknowable,
incomprehensible, mystically mysterious and unpredictable to this atmosphere that is
nonetheless fundamental aspect of its “set toward” the world, and a critical component
of this unknowable something is the observer or reader’s own ability to be susceptible
to the artwork. Ngai begins to note something similar when she says that in “giv[ing]
[artworks] their unity,” atmosphere suggests that “affective qualities are revealed or
‘read’ by our own feelings (sentiments), but are not identical to them,”47 or, I would
add, reducible or predictable as these feelings. To encounter the tone or enter the
atmosphere of an artwork is therefore an interreliance of the artwork’s form and
feeling and the reader or observer’s form and feeling. This new sphere is not as
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Dufrenne says reflective or constitutive of an ideological worldview, but rather, is
under Warner’s charming hand the creation of a radical new.
It is not happenstance, either, that tone and its connection to atmosphere is
critical to Warner’s novel successfully charming its reader into the realm of the
quotidian fantastical, which, as I emphasize throughout, renders a feminist “possible”
or world of radical revolutionary potentiality. Modernists like Warner were keenly
aware of the power of felt atmosphere, even and especially outside of aesthetic
encounters. In Virginia Woolf’s late work Three Guineas (1938), she states plainly
how one type of atmosphere—the ideology of patriarchy—affects its inhabitants. She
initially deems it the “odor” of the honorific, “Miss”: “‘Miss’ transmits sex; and sex
may carry with it an aroma. ‘Miss’ may carry with it the swish of petticoats, the
savour of scent or other odour perceptible to the nose on the further side of the
partition and obnoxious to it.”48 Woolf goes on to name the qualities of this “Missness” as the perceived danger of feminine charm, a danger that explains why women
do not hold professions or public offices: “What charms and consoles in the private
house may distract and exacerbate in the public office.”49 She then revises her
phrasing to indicate that what “Miss” connotes is part of an atmosphere:
Atmosphere plainly is a very mighty power. Atmosphere not only changes the
sizes and shapes of things; it affects solid bodies, like salaries, which might
have been thought impervious to atmosphere. An epic poem might be written
about atmosphere, or a novel in ten or fifteen volumes. But since this is only a
letter, and you are pressed for time, let us confine ourselves to the plain
statement that atmosphere is one of the most powerful, partly because it is one
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of the most impalpable, of the enemies with which the daughters of educated
men have to fight. 50
This passage suggests Woolf’s knowledge of atmosphere as a political force that
pervades the private and public sphere, one that is falsely presumed to be neutral.
Timothy Wientzen suggests that Woolf and other modernists are responding to the
notion of reflex (part of the era’s transatlantic craze for bodily conditioning such as
Fletcherism, or Taylorist workplace practices, described elsewhere in this project) as
point of contention between individual bodies or psyches and politics. He explains that
these crazes “raised questions regarding consent, individuality, and community in a
mass age. Indeed, because the science of reflex seemed to trouble the traditionally
democratic emphasis laid upon individual agency, anxieties about reflex found
especially fertile ground in modernist writing about fascism.”51 In what would later be
called “imagined communities,” in Benedict Anderson’s terminology, this kind of
atmosphere reliant upon a population to give over agency toward a larger shared
imaginary of “nation” is, to Woolf, potentially dangerous and subsuming.
Atmosphere in Three Guineas, then, is an ambivalent force. It is able to form
persons into rational agents and create cohesive modern collective life, and serve as
toxic ideological tool for enforcing collective decision-making and docility. What
Woolf deems the “disastrous unanimity”52 on the wartime homefront and that is
essential component of fascist rule is the key to Warner’s vision of a new possible.
Rather than the suppression of difference or individuality, Warner’s vision is very like
a thread of the feminist avant-garde that believed not in a utopian collective sameness,
but a realist vision of equitable diversity within communality.
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Atmosphere
Warner’s novel, published a decade prior to Woolf’s Three Guineas, shows
great interest in atmosphere. Not only is it formulated through the novel’s tone, but it
is also represented by Laura herself. When Laura becomes of marrying age, the
narration ironically laments her lack of charm, which turns away potential suitors:
“Abroad, and in company, she was not animated,” and at formal parties, “she found
there little reason for animation.”53 For her part: “Being without coquetry [Laura] did
not feel herself bound to feign a degree of entertainment which she had not
experienced, and the same deficiency made her insensible to the duty of every
marriageable young woman to be charming, whether her charm be directed towards
one special object, or, in default of that, universally distributed through a disinterested
love of humanity.”54 Laura insists that her failure to exhibit charm is her failure of
marriageable duty. Yet, of course, this lack is perverse—she does wield charm as the
novel goes on, in its originally magical, nonnormative form. She is already sensitive to
atmospheric attunement, or invisible forces that affect her just as much as she later is
able to affect her surrounds. Before she leaves London for Great Mop, Laura feels an
intensity, the presence of what the narration can only deem an indistinct “it” within the
natural world. After the family returns to London one autumn after spending a summer
in the country, forty-something Laura feels an ambiguous “disquiet,”55 an unease that
is irrelevant but integral: “had no relevance to her life. It arose out of the ground with
the smell of dead leaves.”56 Laura can only describe the feeling as a pronoun: “[S]he
was in for it. What It [sic] was exactly, she would have found hard to say.”57 For
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Warner, and for the novel, witchcraft and Pan/Satan/the title “Huntsman” is less a
solid idea or personage than something that lives in language as an “It”-ness, a
vaporous, contagious atmos. As such, Laura presents charm as literary tonality that
must be winkingly “caught” through affective openness and formal construction.
This winking, hidden feeling, felt by Laura as the magic of Satan’s realm of
witchcraft, but also by us as readers as we feel the narration slip slyly around us. And
this invisible atmosphere of something, an “it-ness” as the novel puts it, can be read
multiply if we insist on reading what Ngai deems the “affective relay” of the novel’s
charmed atmosphere as ideological or sociohistorical representation of the invisible
impact of or remnants of the first World War lurking at the novel’s edges, or of the
burgeoning feminist movement that moved invisibly to change the fabric of British
society and politics. I find that it is both of these things, but something more, too—as
an openness to speculation or imagining, charm is a feminist exploration of how
radically affective-aesthetic experience can restructure the possible.

Charmed Thinking
Charmed thinking is practiced by Laura roughly halfway through the novel.
After Satan disappears, when she muses on his character as “truly integral, a perpetual
flowering of power and cunning from an undivided will—[it] was enough to constitute
the charm and majesty of the Devil.”58 His mind, she reflects, “brooded immovably
over the landscape and over the natures of men, and unforgetting and unchoosing
mind,”59 and this becomes her revelation – it is not her witchcraft, her subservient
allegiance to Satan, or her predisposition toward the supernatural that has moved her
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out of the realm of heteronormative society, but her realization that she does not have
to “reflect” at all to be a subject.
She undergoes a changed engagement with the world, a banal shock of
epistemological change, that is curiously not her conversion to witchcraft, believed to
occur when her familiar, Vinegar, scratches her in her cottage. This change is actually
an encounter with a memory that even she cannot recall. Laura herself undergoes this
change in the Chilterns, a change that continues to tie her to witchcraft as well as a
feminist worldview. After the first few months of her new life at Great Mop, Laura
intends to find a field of blooming cowslips, as “she had promised them to herself” 60
when she first arrived. While neither Laura nor the narration says so, Laura’s interest
in medicinal and edible plantlife such as cowslips actually begins at Lady Place.
The magic of quotidian, unmarked recall of a previous memory is part of
charmed thinking—the blissful, naïve encounter with something that is very like an
engagement with the state of magical thinking associated in Freudian and Kleinian
psychoanalytic theory with infantile omnipotence. When the infant realizes its
terrifying needs are at the destruction of others (the parent), she is comforted by the
fact that this omnipotence is in check with limits of reality, according to Klein. For
Freud, this process of confrontation with the limits of the self and the external realm is
essential for forming civilization, as civilization cannot coexist with the individual’s
“uncorrected sense of omnipotence,” making the primary task of maturation the
internalization of social prohibition. As Eve Sedgwick writes, following this process:
It is not mainly ‘civilization’ that needs the individual to be different from the
way she spontaneously is. The individual herself needs to be different, insofar
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as her instinctive impulses conflict with one another even more drastically than
they conflict with the claims of her environment. Instead of the
undifferentiatedly blind, pleasure-seeking drives of the Freudian infant, which
encounter no check but the originally external ones of prohibition of lack, the
Kleinian infant experiences a greed whose aggressive and envious component
is already perceived as posing a terrible threat both to her desired objects and
to herself. The resulting primary anxiety is an affect so toxic that it probably
ought to be called, not anxiety, but dread. It is against this endogenous dread
that the primary defense mechanisms are first mobilized—the splitting, the
omnipotence, the violent projection and introjection. 61
Laura completes the maturation process Freud’s notion of civilization requires, only to
realize that the intensity of its prohibitions destroyed her. Moving toward reparation,
she shifts from this reality of civilization back into the powerful potential of magical
thinking. For Laura, this entire process begins and concludes with botany. “[S]weetgale, water purslane, cowslips, and the roots of succory” 62 composed a variety of
“washes and decoctions” that Laura composed for her family, including her father,
who consumed her herbal salads “at first in hope and trust, and afterwards with
flattering appetite.”63 Herbs and wild plants are significant to Laura’s formative sense
of herself in Part I of the novel as a young woman at Lady Place. She is able to use
these plants as a mode of controlling or influencing the world around her, as they had
been used for centuries in healing and ritual. Once, she is said to be examining
philosopher John Aubrey’s Miscellany (1696) during a family discussion about a
specific variety of mugwort, which her nanny (named Nannie) recommends after
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Laura’s first attempt at mugwort tea made her brothers Henry and James ill. The
fleeting mentions of herbal remedies and foraged plants here appear unremarkable,
since mugwort and similar plants are commonly used for brewing and rustic
winemaking, the Willowes family profession. Yet, by the time the fantastical enters
the novel in Parts II and III, this brief foray into plants makes Laura appear to have
been training for the kinds of potions a witch would be expected to create. Laura’s
examination of Aubrey’s Miscellany also gains significance. The Miscellany is best
known not as a brewer’s handbook, but as a folkloric document of “hermetick” or
supernatural and occultist practices. That this text is mentioned early in Lolly Willowes
seems a clear nudge toward the novel’s eventual direction as fantasy, further allowing
the “realist” aspects of the novel to bleed indistinctly and unremarked upon into the
fantasy elements.64
Laura never recalls the importance of her brewing past in later years, nor does
the narration remind us. In Part II, she walks into a meadow near her cottage at Great
Mop. There, she finds “it was bloomed over with cowslips, powdering the grass in
variable plenty, here scattered, there clustered, innumerable as the stars in the Milky
Way.”65 Struck by their unexpected blooming, she transforms:
She knelt down among them and laid her face close to their fragrance. The
weight of all her unhappy years seemed for a moment to weigh her bosom
down to the earth; she trembled, understanding for the first time how
miserable she had been; and in another moment she was released. It was all
gone, it could never be again, and never had been. Tears of thankfulness ran
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down her face. With every breath she drew, the scent of the cowslips flowed
in and absolved her.66
In this communion with cowslips, Laura changes. She is no longer preoccupied with
perceptions of her, including her family’s disapproval of her move to Great Mop, or
their continued, meddling attempts at controlling her happiness there during their
visits. Yet, she also did not forgive them: “She had not, in any case, a forgiving nature;
and the injury they had done to her” of demeaning her, limiting her, and rendering her
the subservient Aunt Lolly “was not done by them.”67 Laura connects her family to a
larger framework of systemic inequity and marginalization wrought by British
patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism. If she were to start forgiving, Laura muses,
“she must needs forgive Society, the Law, the Church, the History of Europe, the Old
Testament, great-great-aunt Salome and her prayerbook, the Bank of England,
Prostitution, the Architect of Apsley Terrace, and half a dozen other useful props of
civilization.”68
This moment shifts Laura’s supposed blankness and forgetfulness into an
epistemic change, rendered by her new encounters with the world in Great Mop. “All
she could do,” she concludes, “was to go on forgetting,”69 since forgiveness was
impossible. This charmed atmosphere of forgetting is the forgetting of the present state
of the realm, instead electing to imaginatively construct an alternative that “forgets”
the ills and harms of the real realm of Britain. This charmed state is literally brought
on by cowslips, a plant that brews Laura into an alternative (reparative) position. At
this moment, Laura has begun her “magical thinking.”
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The novel renders such thinking possible not only through Laura’s modeling of
it, but through the work of the novel’s formal structure itself. As this moment with
Laura dramatizes, the novel invests in magical thinking by planting sleights of hand
and wry winks that must be “caught” to be understood. Magical thinking is shown in
the novel to ambiguously create or bring about events. At Great Mop, Laura’s nephew
Titus grows tormented by a series of misfortunes while staying with her. Titus reports
the first occurrence to Laura: the milk set out “for his nightly Ovaltine” has suddenly
curdled “into a sort of unholy junket.”70 He attributes the substantive change to
“popular education, and the spread of science among dairy-farmers; in other words,
Mr. Dodbury had overdone the preservative.71 Laura dismisses his assessment: “I
don’t think it’s science,’ said Laura. ‘More likely to be the weather. It was very sultry
this afternoon.’”72 The milk’s changeover is an “unholy” transformation that makes
the ordinary (milk curdling, a common practice used to make cheeses or pudding) into
something extraordinarily imbued with meaning. Its shift from expected substance to
other substance occurs solely via weather or atmosphere. While Titus, being a man,
attempts to explain the change through science gone wrong in the hands of simpleton
farmers, Laura’s statement asserts the powerful influence of the atmosphere, the
invisibly affective. Later that night, she attributes the milk’s spoilage to her own
doing: “[S]he was a witch, the inheritrix of aged magic, spells rubbed smooth with
long handling, and the mistress of strange powers that got into Titus’s milk-jug.”73 She
recognizes her believed ability to use the atmosphere to invisibly change her
surrounds.
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Narrative sleights-of-text grow increasingly self-referential and increasingly
layered. We learn, for example, that Laura’s imaginative ability to control her
surroundings is also very like the ability for social expectations—themselves an
imagined control, of sorts—to inflict real damage. Laura’s devoted father, for instance,
in viewing Laura as his beloved daughter, thereby casts Laura in the role of young
woman who has little means or power of her own. She is, in effect, both figuratively
and literally wrought as a pet animal, as she herself is susceptible to being controlled
rather than herself having control. “A stuffed ermine which [Everard] had known as a
boy,” we learn in Part I, was Everard’s “ideal of an enchanted princess, so pure and
sleek was it, and so artfully poised the small neat head on the long throat.”74
Subsequently, both he and Laura’s mother begin calling Laura his “weasel” or “minx.”
The imagination and the realities of the sociopolitical realm therefore coalesce. One
afternoon, Everard returns home from killing a female fox during a hunting party, only
to report the fox made him think of his daughter, his own “pretty young vixen.”75 This
fleeting set of linked images is significant in a few ways. Not only does this hunting
party coyly link Laura’s father with the title’s “loving huntsman,” meaning that the
ostensibly loving father Everard is able to kill a figure of his daughter, it also links the
imagined with the real. Everard’s childish fantasy of an “enchanted princess” is
imbued with a sense of women as pet animals. This fantasy, however, is a very
uncanny echo of the reality of sociopolitical in the era. Finally, the stuffed animal the
young Everard holds as his ideal of femininity is not alive, but begs the kind of
primitivist, magical thinking common to childhood imagination and that is later taken
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up in the realist realm by Laura, whose magical thinking does transformative rather
than reifying work of imagining a feminist realm.
Everard’s odd ability to kill the figure of his daughter during the hunting party
is also even more dastardly suggestive of Everard representing a suffocating British
social structure than it seems. Everard, upon Laura’s birth, constructs for her a pretty
noose. After once “going up to London[…], he returned with a little string of pearls,
small and evenly matched, which exactly fitted the baby’s neck. Year by year, he
explained, the necklace could be extended until it encircled the neck of a grown-up
young woman at her first ball.”76 She recalls in the first pages of the novel a moment
when, as a child, “she had stained her pale cheeks” with crushed red geranium, and
“had bent over the greenhouse tank to see what she looked like. But the greenhouse
tank showed only a shadowy Laura, very dark and smooth like the lady in the old holy
painting that hung in the dining room and was called the Leonardo.”77 Laura appears
to herself as bloodless, having no blush of life on her cheeks, and is confronted with
an alternate, dark self reflected back at her, one that is inconsistent with the Laura she
believed herself to be. Jacqueline Shin identifies the painting Laura recalls here as
likely Leonardo da Vinci’s fifteenth-century Lady with an Ermine.78 Lauded as one of
the first paintings of psychological depth in portraiture, the painting shows a figure
reminiscent of Laura herself – she is a young woman with a calm but determined
expression, wearing simple clothing and holding a keenly alert ermine, the very
animal Everard Willowes associates with his daughter, and which is embedded in
Laura’s name itself as Laura Erminia Willowes. The portrait subject, too, wears a
necklace reminiscent of Laura’s own, a gift from her father; yet, the sitter’s necklace is
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not of white pearls, but of round, black beads that closely encircle her neck. The beads
could be of black amber, semi-precious stone such as agate or onyx, or even of scented
paste – the opposite of Laura’s precious white pearls. 79 And most importantly, the
Leonardo is a copy of a Leonardo. Even the lady in the portrait, then, is devoid of
aesthetic “life,” or what Walter Benjamin theorizes as the “aura” of an originary work
of art – perhaps an aid for us to discern added resonances to Lolly’s preferred name,
Laura, or, l’aura. Laura is already not quite what she sees in her reflection, but also,
not even “like the lady in the old holy painting” that she thinks her reflection recalls.
This layered memory is a slippery one, leaving us unsure which Laura is the original
(if the original even matters) and the slip of the aesthetic and affective to create an
interplay of forms.
If we pair this memory of the reflecting pool and the novel’s conclusion, we
may see more clearly how Warner’s novel represents the magic of feminist thinking
made possible through immersion into a charmed atmosphere. Laura encounters the
Devil one final time, and gives a lengthy speech on the ways women have been
mistreated for centuries, as he “smil[es] at her as if she were a pet lamb,”80 echoing
Everard’s penchant for Laura as his pet. Laura suddenly hears Satan say, “Dead!” 81
For a moment, the narration is unclear as to whether Satan has just commanded Laura
to die. For Laura, the “word dropped into her mind like a pebble thrown into a pond.
She had heard it so often, and now she heard it once more. The same waves of thought
circled outwards, waves of startled thought spreading out on all sides, rocking the
shadows of familiar things, blurring the steadfast pictures of trees and clouds, circling
outward one after the other, each wave more listless, more imperceptible than the last,
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until the pool was still again.”82 The early “reflecting pool” becomes middle-aged
Laura’s processing mechanism – not a rational patterned thought, but a pool of
pensiveness where Laura is at a remove from a “real.” What is disturbed in the pond is
not what is beneath the water, where the pebble sinks, but the reflection on the pond’s
surface, a relationality or ability to perceive that shifts. Laura, however, is ultimately
not dead in this scene, and the answer to the question Laura has not asked remains.
She rouses herself from her reverie of the resonant liquid image to note Satan is
gathering himself to go: “‘Is it time?’ asked Laura. He nodded, and smiled.”83
It remains unclear what the lingering command “Dead!” is meant to do in the
scene, and how that alters the ending of the novel. For one, Warner’s editor at Chatto
& Windus, Harold Prentice, remained uncertain how to read the exchange. Warner
reassures: “Indeed Lolly didn’t die. She is at this moment alive and much looking
forward to a ripe old age vis-à-vis with Satan. Immortals make the best companions
then. Think how reassuring to have a friend who won’t die or go deaf or marry the
cook…”84 It is fitting, too, that Laura herself is immortal. There simply is no history,
and no teleology. It is not a futurist utopian vision of what is to come through suffrage
and a variety of other sociopolitical and legal changes to the rights of women. These
changes, in the end, are still duties to the state that has yet to fully acknowledge
women as able to be liberated, equal, or even “forgetting and unchoosing,” as Satan
may be. Instead, it is a vision of the possible made so by magical thinking.

War and Feminist Atmospheres
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Lest such a feminist imaginary of a transformed world in which all participants
are united for a single communal cause seem unlikely or impossible, I would point out
that this project once occurred during Britain’s war efforts in World War I. Wartime
atmosphere on the homefront (as well as in the trenches) relied immeasurably on a
unified communality, a sense of atmosphere built upon felt belonging and structured
purpose that comprised exactly the kind of social revolution advocated by the feminist
avant-garde.
Most predominant and also most invisible at the time of Lolly Willowes was
the shadow of the first World War. As novels such as Mrs. Dalloway (1925) detail,
England busied itself with a sense of normalcy after the war, often forgetting the
remnants of war that mingled amidst them. The war has a similarly invisible, yet
pervasive force in Warner’s novel. When the war begins in 1914, Laura is left
wrapping parcels without “such excitements” 85 as deaths (suffered by her nephew-inlaw) or lorry-driving (a pleasure afforded her niece, Fancy). Yet, the war seems to
alter her. While her brother, Henry, and sister-in-law Caroline “had done with the
war,” Laura “had only shelved it, and that by an accident of consciousness.”86
Reflecting on niece Fancy’s new husband and children after the war, she thinks, “Here
is a new generation to call her Aunt Lolly and find her as indispensable as did the
last.”87 Nothing, indeed, has changed. And yet, Laura irrevocably has. It is perhaps the
growing oppression of such familiar “old times,” as Caroline deems them, that
suffocates Laura, leading her to abandon her family for solitary life in a rural town to
which she has never before travelled.
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Also critical to grasping how the atmosphere became central concern of
modernism is its manipulation during war through atmospheric terrorism (chemical
agents, such as chlorine gas, first used in Ypres, Belgium) confirms that terrorism as
an act is “not an isolated, one-sided attack; it denotes the willingness and readiness of
partners in conflict to operate in an expanded zone of warfare.”88 While those living
prior to the twentieth century could live unquestioning of their entry into a
surrounding atmosphere (stepping outside, for example), writes Peter Sloterdijk in
Terror from the Air (2002), anyone “who lives after this caesura and moves within a
culture zone in step with modernity is already bound, whether in rudimentary or
elaborated forms, to a formal concern for climate and atmospheric design.”89
Warner had seen firsthand this possibility of atmosphere, as modeled by the
demands of the wartime homefront. In 1914, at the age of twenty-one, Warner was
with her father, an assistant master at the Harrow School, and his Harrow colleagues
when she heard the news from Europe that Germany had declared war on Russia.
Warner recalled in her diary that she listened to her father digesting the news:
[Geoffrey Sturt] sat, his eyes burning, saying we must fight or France would be
lost … while my father and Philip Wood, almost as theoretical in knowledge of
war as he, sat by, grievedly consenting to the burden of the young men. 90
In the war’s first few months, Warner volunteered with an organization called War
Help, which originally aimed to coordinate fundraising for the Red Cross before it
became a housing assistance program, finding temporary lodging for Belgian refugees
who had fled to England. By 1915, Warner made further commitments to the war
effort. Having answered a notice in the paper for a program that “train[ed] women of
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the leisured class in munition-making to relieve the regular hands,” Warner worked
eight-hour shifts as a shell machinist with other “lady-workers” in a factory in Erith. 91
The group was deemed “the Miaows” by the factory’s regular workers, and the work
itself—base-facing, or paring down a steel shell-case to the correct length, as
measured by gauges and scales—was numbing to Warner, but also imbued with a
sense of powerful communality. She described her factory experience in an article for
Blackwood’s:
Through the open doors of the workshop came noise and light and warmth: it
looked as gay as a ballroom. Once inside it, the place wrapped me round like a
familiar garment. […] All the driving belts in the motion dazzle the eyes like a
mist, and looking across row after row of machines, the other side of the shop
seemed a mile away. Last of all one notices the workers, inconspicuous,
inconsiderable – mere human beings among these infallible Titans of iron and
belting.92
While the Blackwood’s editors emphasized to Warner that she “humanize” the
experience, thereby surely altering her original intentions with the article, the work is
striking nonetheless. The sensation of vision, sound, and feeling comes first in
Warner’s description, the affective components of the factory experience. Then, the
structure – the machine placement, the floor layout. Finally, Warner notes the workers,
who tellingly are the last to be noticed, as they are each subsumed by the larger whole
of the workplace. Warner’s work was difficult, and took her fifteen minutes per shell.
After a period of time, “it begins to flatten one into the essential dough: every shell
thieves a little of one’s pride of self.” 93 Taken together, Warner’s descriptions of her
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experiences demonstrate the ability for individuality to be lost within a larger
atmosphere of nationalism and work. The divide between one Miaow and another
becomes nonexistent as they all blur and reduce into a single, essential “dough-like”
form.
Warner’s early socialist and communist leanings are already evident here as
she notes the impact of such work on the least fortunate—the “regulars,” who Warner
sympathetically described as “bone-weary, working the long hours of necessity, living
in the vitiated air of the shop, where the noise eats them like a secret poison.” 94 If such
a painful, exploitative, and numbing experience could be willfully participated in by
Britain’s working class and upper classes alike, Warner may have thought, then the
real prospect of another sort of unity aimed at eliminating social stratification and
inequity under the guidance of a single imaginary, the feminist avant-garde, is also
possible. Specifically, it was made possible by the integral role of language and the
literary.

Doing Things with Words
While a cultural phenomenon such as feminine “charm” appears foreign or
mystical, consider in literary studies the significance granted to the powers of
language – consider the work of J.L. Austin, for example, on performative utterances
in How to Do Things with Words (1962). Such utterances are those that do not
describe or report, “constate anything at all,” “are not ‘true or false,’” and finally, are
those that for which the “uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an
action, which again would not normally be described as, or as ‘just,’ saying
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something.”95 Once we realize such utterances or sentences as doing and not “merely”
saying, “there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is
performing an act.”96 What is useful from Austin is less the ability to do with
language, than the force that is behind specific kinds of language – a poetics, of a sort.
When we consider the ways in which we read texts, we “divine” – a mystic encounter
of knowledge seeking, now secularized into hermeneutics. Divination or divinatio is
“a power traditionally required by those who wish to distinguish between variant
readings, and to purge corrupt texts,” notes Frank Kermode, while the “freedom to
divine [as somewhat inspired guesswork] has been restricted since the Renaissance,
and especially since the early eighteenth century, by the advance of what might be
called science.”97
Friedrich Schleiermacher, considered a founder of modern hermeneutics or the
“science of understanding texts,”98 used divinatio as a term for the “moment of
intuition which was necessary to his theory, and also, probably, to any commonsense
view of what it is we accomplish when we interpret a text.”99 I quote at length
Kermode’s description of this reading process:
We understand a whole by means of its parts, and the parts by means of the
whole. But this ‘circle’ seems to imply that we can understand nothing—the
whole is made up of parts we cannot understand until it exists, and we cannot
see the whole without understanding the parts. Something, therefore, must
happen, some intuition by which we break out of this situation—a leap, a
divination, he called it, whereby we are enabled to understand both part and
whole… [W]e may have to do rather more; there are works, especially modern
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books, which may frustrate such responses, or at least suggest a need for going
beyond them. And it is quite usual to attach more value to such complex
works, and to feel that our relating of part to part and parts to whole is the only
means by which anything like the sense of the whole can be achieved. In other
words, our power of divination is necessary to the whole operation—without it
there will be no sense, or not enough. 100
Many may see Kermode’s “divination” as outmoded theory. However, it links two
notions critical to my reading of Warner’s Lolly Willowes—first, the work of form (his
description of reading as involving relations of the “part to the whole” is clearly based
in formalist close reading), and second, the work of affect (divination’s interpretive
leap, a mechanism of or supplement to cognition). In other words, Kermode indicates
that form as well as something more than form is at work when we read, or have an
aesthetic response. This means that there is a gap to be filled, or an unknown that must
materialize, when one encounters a text. This gap or blank is the space of what I call a
charmed cognitive atmosphere. It is the text’s ability to make its reader believe
through the process of textual encounter with literary tone. Charm, in short, incants or
brings into being a kind of intermedial possibility of thought and being—a charmed
atmosphere. Lolly Willowes demonstrates such possibility as an explicit fantasy of
social equity. Charm reminds us of language’s mediated betweenness, where readings
are not declarative but exploratory. The space between form and feeling, like Ngai’s
notion of tone as orientation, or what I call a charmed atmosphere exists in Lolly
Willowes in such a way that the text manipulates our reading and what we believe of
the novel.
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What charm also does is reinsert the primacy of something other than
poststructuralism’s hermeneutics of suspicion, which rewards skepticism and disbelief
in insisting that texts fundamentally operate by “hiding” a truth of meaning. Charm is
an encounter, and a transformed engagement with the world that relies on play,
encourages sensory receptivity, and resists ready formulation. But if in case we may
be tempted to consider charm as a new ethical code that can be practiced to better our
selves, like a Foucauldian askesis, we must recall that charm resists such coding
entirely. In fact, charm dissipates, betrays, dissolves, and often disgusts when it is
something “put on” or practiced deliberately - it lays bare the means of its own
production. In charm, there exists a perverse form of freedom and play, the very
notions that Satan promises to Laura in Warner’s novel—the constraint of a form
exists in such a way that rather than suppressing freedoms or oppressing individuals
(such as women in Britain’s twentieth-century patriarchal, colonialist, and capitalist
society), it provides room for expression and possibility by ensuring livelihood, wellbeing, and artistry. 101 Just as a society that provides its citizens with healthcare thereby
does not constrain its citizens but liberates them by freeing them of concern for the
literal costs of their lives, Laura’s belief in her dominion by the “loving huntsman”
Satan as surrender to influencing as equally as she herself is influenced provides her
with greater capacity to live, and models the brief potential of charmed thinking in the
early decades of the twentieth century. In sum, Lolly Willowes utilizes the construction
of a charmed atmosphere, created by Warner’s distinctly crafted literary tone, to
demonstrate the possibility of magical thinking as a purposefully non-utopian,
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sociopolitical, and secular sense. It is, as Warner’s own Communist leftist leanings
would later detail, a realist promise of a transformed, equitable world.
In sum, I argue that Warner’s novel draws upon charm to create a feministinflected reimagined world that is both historically-driven and literarily-minded. Lolly
Willlowes does not simply offer literature as social critique; rather, it substantially
participates in the significant influence of print literature and reading culture that
bolstered the avant-garde feminist movement in Britain. Reading the novel this way
furthers what Warner would later go on to formally advocate as a Communist leftist,
in that it permits Warner to imagine “hope for progressive change without seeming
utopian,”102 as Maren Tova Linett writes of Warner’s later novel Summer Will Show.
As she does in Summer Will Show, Warner presents a complex, slippery, and nonstraightforward portrait of a realistic and not romantic aesthetically-driven political
project. Emancipation, Lucy Delap notes, “was located both internally, concerning
self-realization, and in society, in industrial and political reform.”103 Yet with such a
dual project, with an individualist core, built upon “anxieties about bureaucracy and
collectivization, in both British and American Edwardian society. A celebration of the
individual planted against ‘the machine’ can be traced in many spheres… The
machine, political or industrial, was a pervasive fear, responding to an increasingly
bureaucratic and executive-dominated state that seemed to be working against the
‘new individualism.’”104
This is the type of anxiousness that Woolf voices in her concern about the
flattening of individuality through atmosphere on the nationalist homefront. Such
anxiety over the rise of collectivism was less pervasive for Warner, who found in
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collectivism a more positive potential for a transformed social and political realm.
While the late nineteenth-century move in the economic market to form individual
businesses or firms into vast trusts and corporations was worrying, the move toward
national union and labor organizations, such as the formation of the American
Federation of Labor in 1886, or the Industrial Workers of the World in 1905, seemed
positive. Likewise, the intensity of interest in preserving individualism seemed not to
be aimed at egalitarian opportunity, a prevailing sentiment in the United States, which
associated individualism with a “hostility to aristocratic, arbitrary, or hierarchical
privilege.”105 Rather, individualism of this libertarian sort held no interest in actual
egalitarian outcomes, and often upheld what it was considered to overturn—namely,
material and social privilege determined on the basis of class, race or ethnicity, and
gender. Such individualism was not concerned with changing the constraints that
would prevent otherwise equal individuals to compete fairly in a capitalist
marketplace. Because this was the form of individualism that was most pervasive,
many avant-garde feminists often envisioned a world that was closer to the collective,
while still preserving the kinds of individuality that rendered a richly diverse society
aimed at personal fulfillment and collective equity.
As the following chapter will explain, however, this potential would ultimately be
short-lived. By the late 1920s, British and American capitalism, collapsing
colonialism, and progress in the women’s suffrage movement that coalesced in a
presumed threat to modernist white masculinity, effectively curtailing the paradox of
charm’s believability as fantasy. As the works of Edith Wharton and F. Scott
Fitzgerald will show, the era rendered charm less a supernatural fantasy than a
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commoditized realist quality, a magnetic appeal claimed by white masculinity as
marker of access to and control over capital.
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CHAPTER 5

‘AFFORDING TO FORGET’: AMERICAN CHARM, CAPITALISM, AND
IDENTITY
When a girl feels that she’s perfectly groomed and dressed, she can forget that part of her. That’s
charm. The more parts of yourself you can afford to forget the more charm you have…
– F. Scott Fitzgerald, “Bernice Bobs Her Hair” (1920)

As previous chapters have argued, charm in modernism is a language and
practice tied to fantasy, which are forces of form as structural, desirable “blanks.”
These blanks become legible value systems in modernist literature and culture, thereby
enabling new readings of critical modernist concerns. Part of these value systems
includes values placed on social cohesion or perpetuity, individual social identity, and
aesthetic values of vagueness or “fogginess.” Charm voices these fantasies of value by
presenting itself as a logic-less logic of attraction and revulsion, desire and discomfort,
power and disempowerment. In this chapter, I examine how “charm” survived from its
philological roots in the Middle Ages through the nineteenth century as distinctly
alluring quality, to then not dissipate or hide itself, but resurge in an era of avant-garde
aesthetic experimentation and sociopolitical upheaval, eventually transforming the
idea of the feminine into the stuff of impossible imagination. 1 By focusing on critical
history and material culture as well as my central literature, I show how charm makes
legible the mutually constitutive fictions of theoretical difference (gender and race or
ethnicity) and material actualities of capital.
I bring modernist concern for charm as structural bearer of values to the most
literal of values—capital. This theoretical axis, as engaged within the works of
American writers Edith Wharton and F. Scott Fitzgerald, finds that structures of power
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and domination within twentieth-century American capitalism are reliant on languages
of deception, duplicity, competition, and coercion—the language of charm. Charm’s
veiled threat of the feminine or foreign, its trigger of both desire and distaste, is linked
to personality and capital in American modernism in ways distinct from the focus on
largely British modernism in each of the prior chapters. While similar, American
“charm” sets itself apart from British senses of the term during the same era by
pointing less obliquely toward systems of emasculated value. British “charm,” while
also contending with gender, racial and ethnic uncertainties, and “foreignness” amidst
nationalist feeling (distinctly, “charm” as a catch-all for that which was French during
the early twentieth century vogue for Francophilia is particularly pervasive), tends to
read a perceived loss of white, traditional Englishness on the female or feminized
(queer, “othered”) body.2 Charm in Britain invariably is tied to class conflict and, in
turn, the boundaries of one’s own station. American charm, I argue, can only read this
loss through capital as mode of class climbing. The urgency of shifting toward the
transatlantic here is apparent when we consider charm’s legacy within capitalist
American systems, and the legacy of capitalism within American social and political
systems since the early twentieth century.
I locate literary engagements with charm through Wharton’s and Fitzgerald’s
explicit use of the term as part of a methodology of narrative deceit that becomes a
fictional form of social ascendancy through the acquisition of (or proximity to) capital
by effectively “faking it.” Faking it, while assumed to be an undesirable method of
socioeconomic climbing, is actually an accepted method through which to achieve
wealth, status, and power. As is echoed in the American adage, “fake it til you make
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it,” charm retains a knowing unknowingness—the pretense that one does not know
what one does, while recognizing the obvious overtness of these actions. As William
James notes in a lecture collected in On Vital Reserves: The Energies of Men (1911),
“From our acts and from our attitudes ceaseless inpouring currents of sensation come,
which help to determine from moment to moment what our inner states shall be: that is
a fundamental law of psychology.” 3 Feeling itself is uncontrollable, James suggests,
but because it indirectly follows action, regulating one’s actions may control one’s
feelings. If one feels despondent, he therefore advises, “to sit up cheerfully, to look
round cheerfully, and to act and speak as if cheerfulness were already there. […] So to
feel brave, act as if we were brace, use all our will to that end, and a courage-fit will
very likely replace the fit of fear.”4 Such predisposition to the conditioning of the body
as method to the personality is distinctly American to James. He goes on to describe
reading a story in a weekly paper in which the author, “after describing the beauty and
interest of the heroine’s personality, the author summed up her charms by saying that
to all who looked upon her an impression as of ‘bottled lightning’ was irresistibly
conveyed… Bottled lightning, in truth, is one of our American ideals.” 5
American charm in literary representation, then, is inextricable from
determinants of social identity including race and ethnicity, gender, and class, and is a
charm that has been saturated by the slickness of modernist mass culture. Charm
conceived as an alluring blank provides a continually mutable meta-model of the
mechanisms that create and maintain sociality and difference (and thereby, perpetuate
inequality and disrupt sociality) through categories of gender, race, ethnicity, and
national origin in America.
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Charm holds links to two related trends within the booming American
modernist mass marketplace. First, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as
workers’ unions were growing in power and uncertainties of unregulated competition
circulated, employers took a new tactic—concentration. To cope with competition,
corporations had one of two choices, to either buy the competition or merge with it. In
either scenario, the corporate units were forced to become larger, resulting in an
increased need for managers. American companies’ prowess at growing managerial
capacities by the early twentieth century led Alfred Chandler to argue that the
supremacy of American corporations was due to the “organizational capacities” of
American management. 6 Capitalism in the twentieth century, in other words, became
increasingly “managed.”
Secondly and relatedly, this notion of “management” then seeped into
something that itself could be sold to the public. Although advice books on etiquette,
household management, and other care duties setting forth methods to manage one’s
home or social habits were common in the nineteenth century, by the early twentieth,
an entire industry developed based on the management and maintenance not of a
household or business, but of something else—oneself. Called the cultivation of
“personality,” even T.S. Eliot acknowledged the modern demand on the individual
when he called for art that eliminated such personality in “Tradition and the Individual
Talent” (1919). The poet’s success is entirely based on depersonalization, Eliot’s essay
reasons, to ensure one’s relation “to the sense of tradition.” 7 But the “continual
extinction of personality,” the “escape from personality,” 8 requires first knowledge of
said personality. He (Eliot’s pronoun) must already be privileged to have personality,
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and even more privileged to know that he does: “[O]f course, only those who have
personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things.” 9
Rochelle Rives explains that during the era, “the idea of having a personality
requires the ability to stand out among others,” and thereby reflects a “spatial,
sociological notion of personal authority.” 10 The concept of “personality as related to
charm or charisma,” Rives continues, “reinforces the meaning of the term as a
function of one’s spatial authority and, further, one’s ability to influence others
through effervescence and magnetism.” 11 To conduct oneself as agential subject was
self-possession, the ability to own oneself. Identity, therefore, was bound to both
social notions of gender and a capitalist mass market, which located failures in
individuals and provided the goods (makeup, fashion, self-help manuals, physical
regimens, and more) to “fix” them. Those who could and could not own themselves in
such self-possession, and demonstrate the agency of acquiring a self, resultantly drove
further divisions separating Americans by race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, and
socioeconomic status.
This point allows us to continue to emphasize charm as within discourses of
self-making techniques in the modernist era. However, to return to the language of an
earlier chapter, charm interrupts this reading of modernist identity projects and
capitalism. While other habits and consumer goods aimed to bring out the
“authenticity” of the user or consumer, charm was always already false and
falsifiable. The ability to cultivate one’s own allure is itself alluring, in other words,
and yet ultimately detestable because, as this chapter aims to make clear, it lays bare
the means of production. Effectively, charm falls into the realm of personality
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marketing, as Rives notes, and yet remains at odds with it, since charm’s ready
evocation of capital makes too apparent the capitalist fuel that drives the modernist
self-help project. Charm is a thing that is both known and must be “forgotten” for it to
function in the same way that capitalism’s particular ability to divide and exploit is
both known, and must be forgotten.

Wharton and the Charm Offensive
Though she had ascended to literary popularity with such critically-respected
novels as House of Mirth (1905) and Ethan Frome (1911) and cemented her literary
achievements as the first woman to win the Pulitzer Prize, for The Age of Innocence
(1920), Wharton’s late career stagnated. Wharton’s works seemed, in “the eyes of the
younger generation” to be “quaintly behind the times, but for survivors of the pre-War
garden age she still has a nostalgic charm,” 12 Time noted in 1936. Such anachronism
lessened her appeal, an anachronism in which Wharton explicitly placed herself,
separating herself from modernism’s rapidly shifting literary and social norms. The
Age of Innocence, though published at the height of what many now consider the
modernist era, eschews the common modernist literary hallmarks of its time—
innovation, experiment, a sense of “the new.” When Virginia Woolf dismissed
Wharton as a writer who—because of her extended time abroad, did not exhibit a fully
“American” literary voice—in an essay for the August 1925 Saturday Review Wharton
wrote to a friend to insist that her novel was indeed “old-fashioned” because she “was
not trying to follow the new methods.” Isobel Archer, she says, “belongs to the day
when scruples existed,” unlike the “pornographic” work of James Joyce and the
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“exhibitionism” of Woolf. Part of Wharton’s distaste for the modern was tied to the
modern mass market. While her contemporaries and younger modernists published
widely with popular magazines and for the Hollywood screen, Wharton balked,
maintaining an intense dislike for such lowbrow vehicles. Wharton was further
displeased with the literary industry in America, itself, for being run so heavily by
men—a criticism she would have shared with Woolf. After WWI, Wharton found
herself “at the mercy of a newly energized mass market that might have catered to
women but was still almost exclusively powered by men,”13 notes Parley Ann Boswell
in Edith Wharton on Film. Feminine labor—in other words, women’s writing—was
often subject to male arbiters of taste and male “guardians” in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. The struggle of authority and control played out numerous
times between female writers and male literary gatekeepers. Djuna Barnes and T.S.
Eliot’s working relationship and Jean Rhys’s tumultuous mentorship (and romantic
relationship) with Ford Madox Ford exemplify this. Thus, as Wharton perceived, in
order to hold ground with high modernists, many women writers had to effectively
“brave association with the promiscuity and commerce of prostitution” 14 by publishing
under the guidance of male gate-keepers. Hence, the condemnation of sexualized
literary hawking, from Joyce’s “pornography” to Woolf’s “exhibitionism.”
Charm perhaps unsurprisingly emerges at this intersection of knowing
pretense—knowing the difficult stakes of publishing as a female writer amidst a
literary marketplace that requires a prostitutional self-promotion and demand on
output. By the early 1930s, Wharton finally caved to pressures. “I have held out firmly
till now against the wiles of Mr. Hearst,” she wrote in a letter to Sarah Orne Jewett of

149

the William Randolph Hearst enterprise’s attempts to lure her to write for their
publications. “I think you told me some time ago that in the case of the Cosmopolitan
Hearst did not intervene personally… I shall have to give them one of the stories.”15
One of “the stories” she refers to is a story that responds directly to the pressures of
mass culture. Titled “Charm Incorporated,” the story went on to be published in 1934
and earned Wharton both five thousand dollars and little critical acclaim. Wharton’s
discontent with the mass market and modernism’s pressures (particularly on women)
found footing in the story, a story that—while even Wharton scholar Parley Ann
Boswell calls “an unremarkable story in many ways”16—is actually a nuanced
examination of a particularly remarkable and ultimately, marketable force, charm.
Investment banker Jim Targatt uses “charm” as guerilla tactic in order to
restore a peaceful life at home, and to thrive in New York society. He masters the
tactic when he notices his Russian wife, Nadeja Kouradjine, possesses charm in
spades and uses it to her own advantage. Without telling his wife of his plan, Targatt
manipulates the rotating group of live-in family members-in-law (who, as they rapidly
grow in number, present a personal and a financial burden for Targatt) by craftily
marrying off various Kouradjines to marry wealthy men on Wall Street, or pairing
Kourdajines with his business associates as assistants and secretaries. He eventually
manages to achieve not only solitude, but also staggering wealth and status through his
widening social network. Targatt’s success sours, however, when he learns that his
achievements have actually been due to his wife Nadeja, who has long been at work
behind the scenes to ensure the success of Targatt’s plans while allowing Targatt to
believe the achievements were his own. Feeling emasculated, the story ends with a
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final blow to Targatt’s pride when an admiring Dutch artist attempts to seduce Nadeja.
Nadeja offers Targatt a bargain: Targatt must have children with her, or else she will
carry out the affair. Wharton leaves the conclusion ambiguous, as Targatt—who has
finally found fulfillment both in his wealth and his solitude—finds both options
equally disastrous.
To paraphrase Jean-Baptiste Clemence from Albert Camus’s The Fall (1956),
charm is apparently the ability to get what you want without ever needing to ask, the
story seems to claim. Early in the story, Targatt learns how to never ask. He watches
his in-laws closely for what he considers a strange, foreign allure – an allure that has
secured his brother-in-law Boris a film-star wife, Halma Hoboe. 17 Wharton’s story
therefore suggests charm is both foreign and volatile: the Kouradjines seem to have a
“gift like a tenor voice,” Targatt muses, “It was—what? Charm?”18 Horrified at the
thought of “charm,” Targatt finds the word “made his flesh creep with memories of
weary picnics and wearier dinners where, with pink food in fluted papers, the
discussion of ‘What is Charm?’ had formed the staple diet. ‘I’d run a mile from a
woman with charm; and so would most men,’”19 he thinks. Immediately, charm is
both effective—a “gift” even—and distasteful, associated with consumption of sickly
feminine domesticity. Targatt has a bodily reaction of disgust to the notion, which he
associates with social occasions like picnics and dinners and food dyed unnatural
shades. He is certain that he detests charm, but because he can identify it, he is thereby
immune. Yet, awareness eventually dawns that he himself has been victim: he has
fallen for Nadeja’s charms, charms that were useful in luring him into a marriage that
seemed to be a romantic attachment. It becomes increasingly clear to Targatt early in
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the story, however, that the match was a commercial transaction, a result of the
Kourdajines’s socioeconomic ambitions. In a short epiphany, Targatt realizes that with
no particular beauty, intelligence, or domestic skills, Nadeja had somehow managed to
manipulate him to marry her, and subsequently to do her bidding. During their
marriage thus far, Nadeja had ensured that her emotions came across as “so
exquisitely modulated” that they would “f[a]ll on Targatt like the gentle dew from
heaven, merely fostering in him a new growth of tenderness.”20
Jim finally realizes his situation early in the story. He fully grasps the family’s
goals when Nadeja’s sister Katinka insists on living unmarried with Targatt’s superior,
Mr. Bellamy, sure that such an arrangement will lead to marriage (it does). With his
“conventional world … in fragments at his feet,”21 Targatt realizes, “Who knew better
than he did that if you once had the Kouradjine habit you couldn’t be cured of it?”22
So presented with “his idea,”23 one that “he did not choose to communicate to any one
at present,”24 Targatt begins his own manipulations. Beginning a series of lavish social
events, always with “one or two charming young Kouradjines present,”25 Targatt
deploys charm to get his in-laws out of his life without explicitly telling them so, or
even that he desired for them to leave. Though “Wall Street was growing more and
more unsettled”26 and increasing numbers of Kouradjines pour into the Targatt
household with no marriage or job prospects, Targatt nonetheless remains calm. “It
must not be supposed,” Wharton’s narration makes clear, “that this rise in the fortunes
of the Kouradjines was of any direct benefit to Targatt. He had never expected that, or
even hoped it,” yet “substantial returns he did draw from his alliance with the
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Kouradjines; and it was the prospect of these that governed his conduct… And slowly
but surely he was beginning to reap his reward.”27
Charm is linked through this narration to Wall Street and financial reward.
Targatt’s “idea” effectively means he takes the Kouradjines as competition—
competition that he himself “incorporates” as his own business model. Marx notes in
Capital that such practices are the laws of capitalism. Capitalists are forced to obey the
“immanent laws” of competition, meaning, as David Harvey puts it, “No matter
whether they are good- or bad-hearted, capitalists are forced by competition to engage
in the same labor practices as their competitors.” 28 Thus, as soon as Targatt engages in
the same charming practice as his competitors, he profits. Because of his recent
marriage to a Kouradjine, Targatt’s superior, Mr. Bellamy, allows Targatt in on a
lucrative deal “usually reserved for the already wealthy.”29 The successes continue:
the new wife of another Kouradjine, a wealthy owner of a toothpaste company, offers
Targatt the chance to “buy a big block of Dazzle Tooth-Paste shares on exceptional
terms.”30 Buying in to Dazzle Tooth-Paste is a literal exposure of Targatt’s entry into
controlling the means of production (and already coded notions of eugenics, classbased cleanliness, and Hollywood celebrity). Most productively, through Boris’s new
young wife (post-divorce from Halma Hoboe), Targatt meets and dines with the great
Mr. Guggins of Guggins industries, who leaves Targatt with extensive knowledge “to
make some very useful reinvestments,” while Mrs. Guggins manages to “carr[y] off”
Nadeja’s sister Olga as her “social secretary.”31
Targatt’s newly realized project of charm is therefore already linked to the
capitalist mass market through plot and narration. Connections exist still further. The
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end of “Charm Incorporated” demonstrates the stakes of capitalist gains, and charm as
manipulative method. Targatt has just reached middle age, secure in his wealth and
finally, happily rid of his in-laws when famous portraitist Axel Svengaart arrives in
hopes of painting the beautiful Nadeja. But the story’s conclusion is less a satisfying
survey of Targatt’s achievements than a twist on who has finally charmed whom.
Targatt and his wife have a final match to be made in Nadeja’s final single, female
relative, her “lovely but difficult” 32 sister, Mouna, and plan to use Nadeja’s wiles to
convince Svengaart of Mouna’s marriageability by agreeing to allow Svengaart to
paint Nadeja. One evening while Nadeja is away on one of her visits to Svengaart for
her portrait, Targatt suddenly worries that there is something more to her visits than
sitting for a painting and singing Mouna’s praises. He becomes “surprisingly
uncomfortable, and he reflected that it was the first occasion in their married life when
he had suspected Nadeja of even the most innocent duplicity. And this, if it were true,
could hardly be regarded as wholly innocent…”33 Targatt confronts his wife when she
finally returns, asking whether Svengaart is interested in Moura, or in Nadeja. “‘Isn’t
it always the way of men? What they can’t get—’,”34 she begins her reply. Targatt is
overwhelmed with desperate jealousy, and the words he feels he should say (“‘You
must feel yourself free--.’ Five words, and so easy to speak! ‘Perfectly free—perfectly
free,’ a voice kept crying within him’ 35) never arrive. Instead, with “his face working
like a frightened child’s,”36 he asks Nadeja what she wanted to do, and that whatever it
is, he wanted it, too. Nadeja, with a “grave maternal” look, listens as he can only eke
out half-phrases before the two come to an understanding:
‘Even if,’ he continued, half choking, ‘you understand, Nad, even if—’
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She continued to look at him […]. ‘Is this true, what you are now
saying?’ she asked very low. Targatt nodded.
A little smile wavered over her lips. ‘Well darling, if only I could have
got Mouna safely married, I should have said: Don’t you think that now at last
we could afford to have a baby?’ 37
The understanding fails to be iterated, existing just beyond the reach of the narration at
the tale’s close. The question of the baby is the final word of the story, and dangles the
question: was Targatt truly at the helm of his own success, or was a Kouradjine again
holding ultimate control, with the final aim of producing children? The answer seems
clear, as Wharton’s play on charm’s “incorporation” becomes means of making
explicit the dangerous pull of charm in the context of capital, and particularly, capital
in the hands of non-white figures, including the immigrant Kouradjines. Nadeja has
won at the story’s end, by making clear her mission—to reproduce her family by
manipulating Targatt’s means. The question of who is controlling whom, and who is
achieving success, is ultimately at the heart of Wharton’s story, as it is at the heart of
modernism’s anxious white masculinity, a masculinity concerned about modes of
financial and social emasculation.
Wharton’s use of charm as complicit in distrust of non-white figures is
previewed when we begin meeting the Kouradjines. Nadeja’s brother Boris, for
instance, is cast as a Rudolph Valentino type. Wielding an ethnicity common to the
popular romance novels of the 1920s – Middle Eastern sheiks and dashing Spaniards –
Boris is only seventeen but “had the longest eyelashes of all” the Kouradjines,38 with a
desirability particular to such types: a “sexualized and greedy masculinity… darkly
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foreign, an immigrant who was ready to make his way in the New World by living off
women and their restless desires.”39 It is a taboo attraction, a desire steeped in racist
suspicion toward men of foreign origin, those who “were thought to be an insidious
threat to the nation” should they mix with white American socialites. Such mixing was
thought to produce children like the poor twins in Wharton’s The Children (1928), and
showcase what protagonist Boyne calls “the incurable simplicity of the corrupt.” 40
Jim Targatt has immense difficulty with ethnicity and immigration throughout
the story. This difficulty occasionally becomes quite literal. He and his wife, for
instance, dine at a Ukrainian restaurant early in the tale, a choice made “at Nadeja’s
instigation,” as she tends to seek “the most exotic that New York at the high tide of its
prosperity had to offer.”41 But Jim’s alimentary system finds such exoticism difficult
to digest by the evening’s close: “‘That sturgeon stewed in cream—’ he thought
wearily.”42 Charm is quite literally in-corporated as the title notes, forced into
embodiment, forced unpleasantly upon an unwilling and unassuming victim. Another
restaurant Targatt visits–dubbed “The Transcaucasian”–has equally ill effects. This
unease at the bodily “mixing” of white and non-white America is clear at the story’s
end, when Nadeja effectively forces her husband into having children. Jim Targatt
embodies the myths of white nationalism. The final scene makes Targatt a white
America, infantilized and choking out notions of freedom while at the mercy of the
manipulative, exploitative “other” who only seeks to use American wealth for
corruptive purposes, to grow (or “breed”) foreign interests.
Such anxiety was rife in early twentieth-century America. American science
supported the eugenics movement for the alleged health of the American population as
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strains of nativism grew rampant. Immigration laws shifted with the Immigration Act
of 1924, which cemented hierarchies of race, ethnicity, and nationality in its vision of
America. The law “served contemporary prejudices among white Protestant
Americans from northern European backgrounds and their desire to maintain social
and political dominance.”43 Immigrants from all Asian countries were banned, a
particular insult to Japan, which had previously enjoyed more open relationship with
America than other Asian countries.44 As Mae Ngai argues, cultural nationhood
became synonymous with racial nationhood—America was white, Western, and
Anglo. Echoing Wharton’s language of “incorporation,” immigration restrictionists of
the early twentieth century often complained about immigration as congesting the
American melting pot, which itself insists upon racial and ethnic homogeneity. By
World War I, restrictionists spoke of “racial indigestion,” and this notion furthered the
study of eugenics. 45
Gender trouble abutted anxieties over race and immigration as having impact
on American economy, and therefore, eugenic concerns about national identity were
also concerns about economic insecurity. Gender was not far separated from race and
ethnicity in this estimation. Hollywood film star Rudolph Valentino, for example, was
in continual struggle through his brief career to prove his masculinity, even taking up
boxing to prove his virility. Valentino’s appeal to American women became a coded
threat of foreign charm on American capitalism as itself a reproductive machine. An
anonymous writer commented on Valentino’s popularity after Rex Ingram’s The Four
Horsemen of the Apocalypse (1921) and most famously, The Sheik. Valentino, the
writer declared, was popular amongst a female audience because:
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The American woman is starving for romantic love… European men are far
better versed in the game of love and the art of love-making than American
men. They have, or take, more leisure. This is why a foreigner—especially a
Latin—appeals so strongly to American women; and why so many American
men lose out when competing with a European for a woman’s favor. 46
In the Chicago Tribune, a writer described Valentino as a “beautiful gardener’s boy,”
responsible for the feminization of “Homo Americanus” as he turned Hollywood into
“a national school of masculinity.” Valentino and other “Latin” or foreign stars were
“prime example of the feminization of American culture that men feared,” the
“woman-made” man.47 Valentino was frequently forced to fend off rumors. Tabloids
accused him of being physically incapable of consummating his brief marriage to Joan
Acker, who allegedly asked for a divorce mere days after their marriage. He was also
alleged to wear bracelets, a feminine accessory. While he did wear one, given to him
by his second wife Natacha Rambova, Valentino insisted the rest were wristwatches,
an unusual sight at the time as a relatively new, postwar replacement to
pocketwatches, inspired by wristwatches’ military use. Accusations of his femininity
reached his body, as well. “The domineering behavior of the Sheik and an emphasis
on Valentino’s muscular physicality,” Gaylyn Studlar says, “might have supported
circulating views on manliness rooted in a cult of the body, but American men
regarded Valentino as a foreign beauty rather than as an athlete,” 48 such as Douglas
Fairbanks.
Race and ethnicity in combination with gender trouble is just one half of the
equation, however, when considering the drift of American national identity in the
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early twentieth century. The other component is the challenge of the New Woman’s
femininity to a melancholic masculinity. I turn now to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s works to
elucidate charm as showcasing gender’s complicity in capitalist machinations.

Fitzgerald and Masculine Charm
The concern over men’s feminization and infantilization (juvenation) was
common in American modernism, and has been described as an unusual form of what
Greg Forter calls “literary melancholy”49 in Gender, Race, and Mourning in American
Modernism. The viability of white manhood was called into question amidst
widespread shifts in legibility and understandings of sex, gender, and racial difference
occurring from 1880 to 1920. Such a shift affected authors including F. Scott
Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, and Willa Cather, who Forter finds
responded to such a shift as a loss, and a loss grieved alongside melancholic
ambivalence and unconscious aggression. This is not only a literary sensibility
interested in gender, race, ethnicity, and social identity formation, but actually a
literary rumination on the product of the success of the capitalist labor market, ones
that tacitly based themselves on racial and gender divisions while masquerading as
labor valuation. White masculinity thus secured itself for the new century, to be
instead subject to gendered and racialized inspection as the burgeoning feminist
movement insisted on revaluation of gendered spheres, and as black Americans and
immigrants threatened the newly open labor market. This melancholy is clear in both
Wharton’s wry tale, and in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s works.
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When F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby was published in 1925, many
readers pointed out its unmistakable similarities to a novella published some two years
prior, Willa Cather’s “A Lost Lady” (1923). 50 The premises of each are fundamentally
alike – in each, an unreachable (and ostensibly undeserving) woman is the object of a
young man’s unrequited ardor. These critiques were not lost on Fitzgerald. While
asserting elsewhere that his “artistic conscience” was pure, Fitzgerald wrote to Cather
upon the publication of Gatsby, declaring himself “one of [her] greatest admirers,” and
wanting to “explain an instance of apparent plagiarism…” and perhaps “forgetting”
his knowledge of Cather’s earlier story. Cather generously dismissed the passing
resemblance, noting, “So many people have tried to say that same thing before either
you or I tried it.”51 That “same thing” is the impact of charm. Cather responded to
Fitzgerald’s letter and reassured him:
I suppose everybody who has ever been swept away by personal charm tries in
some way to express his [sic] wonder that the effect is so much greater than the
cause,—and in the end, we all fall back upon an old device and write about the
effect and not the lovely creature who produced it. After all, the only thing one
can tell about beauty, is just how hard one was hit by it. Isn’t that so? 52
Cather seems to indicate that the effect of charm is in excess of its substance, and
moreover, suggests a woman’s charm has violent impact – that one might be “hit by
it.”53 This same charm illuminates what lies at the heart of Gatsby, to be sure, but
more significantly, what Fitzgerald considered the driving force of his larger project,
“his ‘idea’ about a woman’s charm.”54
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Fitzgerald’s Daisy Buchanan and Cather’s Marian Forrester are both described
as dreamily alluring by male narrators. Marian’s allure is attributed to a sense of
promise, made somehow legible by her eyes:
Her eyes, when they laughed for a moment into one’s own, seemed to promise
a wild delight that he has not found in life. ‘I know where it is,’ they seemed to
say, ‘I could show you!’ 55
Daisy is similarly described:
Her face was sad and lovely with bright things in it, bright eyes and a bright
passionate mouth—but there was an excitement in her voice that men who had
cared for her found difficult to forget: a singing compulsion, a whispered
‘Listen,’ a promise that she had done gay, exciting things just a while since and
that there were gay, exciting things hovering in the next hour. 56
In both passages, a male observer is enticed by a near-indescribable feeling that each
woman uniquely generates: a “promise,” a “wild delight,” an “excitement,” a sense of
anticipation. Access points to this wild promise are each woman’s eyes, and more
curiously, their disembodied voices. Marian’s laughing eyes seem to speak, while the
“charm of her conversation was not so much in what she said, though she was often
witty, but in the quick recognition of her eyes, in the living quality of her voice
itself.”57 Daisy’s bright eyes and mouth pair together to create an unforgettable
“singing compulsion,” a siren song of vocal allure and visual attraction. Charm
appears to be present not in content, but in the stylistic qualities of each woman –
Marian’s speech did not matter so much as her manner of speech, while Daisy’s voice
is attractive in its sound of money.
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Fitzgerald’s and Cather’s unrelated but mutual interest in the forms of a young
woman’s allure link explicitly the dangerous “slip” of charm as bound to gender
through a vampish twentieth-century femininity that masquerades as girlish innocence.
This requires some historicizing. The modernist era was fascinated by—and concerned
by—such a transformation of femininity and masculinity. The nineteenth century was
characterized by essential divisions between men’s work and women’s domesticity.
Men’s cultural identities and maturation rested upon this work, which included
physical, intellectual, and moral education as part of their “autonomous self-making.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1837 notion of the American scholar and Horatio Alger’s
tales of self-made boys-turned-men (Ragged Dick was published in 1866), for
example, are iterations of these nineteenth century projects in manhood. By the early
twentieth century, however, this easy binary was in jeopardy. Professional labor was
no longer driving component of the cultural promise of man’s ability to become “one’s
own man.” Discourses of manhood as juxtaposed against boyhood were quickly
“thwarted by a monopoly capitalism that reduced men to dependents in large
bureaucratic structure” and resulted in “unmanly” dependence and disempowerment.58
Manhood and boyhood became masculinity pitted against femininity.
We see this allure and disgust at work in the figure of Fitzgerald’s Daisy
Buchanan. Her voice, Gatsby tells Nick Carraway toward the end of the novel, is “full
of money.”59 As we know at that point, Daisy, who has thrown herself into fashion
(she cries at Gatsby’s “beautiful shirts”) and uses her “new” money as recklessly as
she uses people. Nick suddenly realizes the truth in Gatsby’s assessment:
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That was it. I’d never understood it before. It was full of money—that was the
inexhaustible charm that rose and fell in it, the jingle of it, the cymbals’ song
of it…. High in a white palace the king’s daughter, the golden girl….60
Nick trails off in two sets of ellipses, as he has suddenly encountered the “real” of
Daisy’s allure—a romantic, false imaginary of “inexhaustible charm.” This
additionally dramatizes how charm becomes devalued as mere put-on “style” of self
rather than substance via Cather’s and Fitzgerald’s exchanges. Charm, as Gatsby
demonstrates, holds a siren song, while making itself clear as already deceitful,
manipulative, and mimicking. As it appears to cover modernist self-making, it instead
reveals the machinations of an American mass market, a market that requires
individuals to look away from the magic of capital and the connected means of
subjectivation, and moreover, to look away from the system at work upon them.
As Fitzgerald and Cather demonstrate, charm undeniably shaped the kinds of
social, political, and aesthetic understandings made possible in early twentieth-century
America. Charm thrived on duplicity and difference, and as an ostensibly slight,
fleeting aesthetic feeling of delight or magic (its etymology points us to incantare and
carmenere, or incantation, song—Fitzgerald’s description of Daisy’s voice as a
“cymbals’ song” recalls this origin) it gave rise to a uniquely American “forgetting” of
the magic of money, capitalism, and gendered and racialized labor in the modernist
era.
A lesser-known short story from Fitzgerald, “Magnetism,” was published a
few years after Gatsby in a 1928 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. In the story,
Hollywood film star George Hannaford is ostensibly the bearer of the title’s quality.
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Wielding the familiar hallmarks of a successful philanderer, George is handsome,
young, and famous. His smiles and greetings of “Hello, darling” cause multiple
women to swoon – his Mexican housekeeper Dolores falls off the front steps when
George arrives home (an event precipitated by Dolores’s thoughts, suddenly
“contemplat[ing] having a love affair with him” 61). Yet, the story’s title indicates not a
genial quality of George, we find, but that George is “victim” of such a quality. In the
throes of smoldering jealousy when he finds his glamour-seeking wife Kay in an
affair, George finds himself inevitably pulled toward a young actress of just eighteen,
Helen Avery, the latest in a string of what he considers to be platonic affairs. He
muses on her attractiveness: “Helen Avery’s voice and the dropping of her eyes when
she finished speaking, like a sort of exercise in control, fascinated him. He had felt
[…] that if they rushed towards each other there would be a romantic communion of
almost unbelievable intensity. It was this element of promise and possibility that had
haunted him for a fortnight.”62 Part of Helen’s allure is the promise of something,
much like Daisy Buchanan’s promises of “exciting things in the next hour.” 63 Coming
from the Latin promittere (pro- meaning “forward,” and mittere meaning “send”), the
concept of promise characterizes male characters’ attractions to Helen and Daisy.
These attractions are both out of the present time and future-focused, teleological
propulsion – the very means for an end. And, so, George is magnetically propelled
toward what we initially expect to be destruction; yet, despite being blackmailed and
serving as cause for a young woman’s attempted suicide, George sees no direct
punishment by the tale’s end. He and his wife, Kay emerge – like Tom and Daisy
Buchanan, figures who “smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back into
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their money or their vast carelessness, or whatever it was,”64 says Nick Carraway –
immune, aloof, confused, and careless.
“Magnetism” weaves a radical distrust and denigration of charm, while
simultaneously admiring it as capitalist force, and thereby belying its reliance on white
masculinity. Charm lurks throughout the story as something dangerous, desirable,
alluring, yet deadly for masculinity. The women who adore George and bolster his
movie-star ego also threaten to break him – his wife capriciously leaves him after a
party one night, suddenly declaring their marriage over, only to later return to say of
the moment lightly, “I was just mad at you; you ought to have known that.”65 An old
flirtation with a script girl, Margaret Donovan, comes back to haunt George when she
and her brother turn up one evening, blackmailing George for adultery with forged
love letters. George, of course, has forgotten the affair even happened until—in the
back of a taxi, looking aimlessly out the window at a “pink horror” of an apartment
building, “built to represent something, somewhere”—he remembers he “had once
called for Margaret Donovan here the night of a Mayfair dance.” 66 Even Dolores,
enraptured by George at the start of the tale, watches him leave the house in the story’s
final scene, “rubb[ing] her hands together in a gesture that might have expressed either
ecstasy or strangulation.”67
Margaret, in ultimately confessing the blackmail scheme was a hasty plot for
money from her ex-convict brother, makes clear what charm is. She desperately
declares her enduring love for George when he confronts her at her Santa Monica
apartment. “‘I’ve loved you for years,’” she tells him, “‘since the first day you came
West and walked into the old Realart Studio. You were so brave about people, George.
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Whoever it was, you walked right up to them and tore something aside as if it was in
your way and began to know them. […] You drew people right up close to you and
held them there, not able to move either way.’” 68 Margaret pinpoints George’s charm
as a “tearing something aside” between two people, that this parted curtain is a clarity
of connection. Even Dolores the housekeeper feels this. When George smiles at her at
the end of the story, the smile “faintly, fleetingly, t[ore] a veil from between them,
unconsciously promising her a possible admission to the thousand delights and
wonders that only he knew and could command.” 69 Yet, this sense of clarity and
connection is entirely at odds with what occurs in George’s life because of these
“connections” – such as the blackmail scheme, for example, or his wife Kay
threatening divorce. At hearing about his effects on Margaret, George grows
uncomfortable, dismissing her love as “entirely imaginary,” and insisting “‘I can’t
control—’” before Margaret interrupts him:
“No, I know. You can’t control charm. It’s simply got to be used. You’ve got
to keep your hand in if you have it, and go through life attaching people to you
that you don’t want. I don’t blame you.”70
Charm, according to Margaret, is uncontrollable and unavoidable. Yet, once again,
there is a paradox to Margaret’s assessment. There is a conflicting sense of agency in
Margaret’s phrasing. If it is unavoidable, it seems odd that you must “keep your hand
in” and “attach people to you.” But charm, when understood less a sociable quality
than a valuation or a move toward money, then the phrasing makes sense. Margaret’s
brother’s motives clarify further: charm must be used, specifically for money and
exploitation. If one has it, one must participate in it, and involve others. Such a quality

166

of “dirty” yet necessary, duplicitous attachment rings of the “charming” businessman
or investor, a closeness to capital that renders understandably necessary discomfiture.
Charm ought not to be coveted or trusted, Fitzgerald’s story seems to teach,
since charm always makes clear what it is hiding—the more devious, duplicitous, or
violent underlying motive of money. The narration’s highly limited point of view, full
of slick, clean sentences and carefully curated details, practices this very allure. The
story’s setup describes a locale that says less about the story to come than the
narration’s own biases, and its pleasures in delimitation: “The pleasant, ostentatious
boulevard was lined at prosperous intervals with New England Colonial houses—
without ship models in the hall. When the inhabitants moved out here the ship models
had at last been given to the children.” 71 The line opens the story, and deceives us. We
are not in New England, or anywhere near it – the story is, we’ll soon find, deeply
embedded in Hollywood and the film industry. The line glosses over the setting, in
multiple senses of the word. It smooths over specifics, while putting an artificial sheen
on something that has begun to deteriorate. A boulevard both “pleasant” and
“ostentatious” conveys a bias toward just such a glossy aesthetic, an odd appreciation
and castigation of excess. The now-missing ship models in the fall signify a kind of
fallenness too—though the story is set prior to the Depression, the boom times at this
boulevard seem to have already passed.
These houses’ existence at “prosperous intervals” indicate an old money and
old way of life that has been subsumed by what the next line will suggest to be the
next generation of hopefuls, outcasts, the working class, and immigrants are taking
hold in the area. The line that follows elaborates: “The next street was a complete
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exhibit of the Spanish-bungalow phase of West Coast architecture; while two streets
over, the cylindrical windows and round towers of 1897—melancholy antiques which
sheltered swamis, yogis, fortune tellers, dressmakers, dancing teachers, art academies
and chiropractors—looked down now upon brisk buses and trolley cars.” 72 We finally
find our locale, on the West Coast, but the characters that populate it are fanciful,
feminine, and deceptive. Swamis, yogis, and fortune-tellers are magically unreal,
Oriental “others”; dressmakers, dance teachers, and art academies are feminized
removals from any kind of “serious” professions; and lastly, chiropractors appear as
the most grave of snake-oil salesmen, dabbling falsely in the medical profession. By
the time we reach the end of the story, we feel doubly deceived – not only have we
been misled with odd descriptors throughout the story, as exist here in the story’s
opening lines, but the person who seems to represent this sly deception, George
Hannaford, has not received his deserts, meeting an end more like Tom Buchanan.
Unpunished and unwavering, he simply goes on.
Considering Fitzgerald’s “Magnetism” and the earlier Gatsby, we find
Fitzgerald presents a complex example of charm’s functionality as style – equally
personal and narrative. As we the readers fall for George, only to become disgusted by
him, we realize that everyone in the story – including the story itself – has been
charmingly deceitful. George’s vain wife Kay both does and does not leave her
marriage to have an affair, Dolores may or may not be contemplating violence,
Margaret emotionally entraps George at her apartment (“he turned away—still not
knowing that she was watching him and loving him until she thought her heart would
burst with it”73) only to then attempt suicide when he leaves, and the alluring Helen
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Avery declares her flirtations with George to be scripted, a mere testament to their
prowess at their craft: “‘Oh, we’re such actors, George—you and I […] It was a pity
we didn’t have a camera.’”74 We are betrayed, in other words, as the façade drops,
even though we knew it would. We forget; we are duped.

The Non-Duped
As Fitzgerald’s and Wharton’s works demonstrate, charm emerged as the name
of the “magnetism” of white male power that is promulgated through the twentieth
century’s new mass market. But this meteoric rise did not last. The rise and fall of
Swedish financier, Ivar Kreuger, serves as example. Called the “Match King,”
Kreuger negotiated large international monopolies throughout the 1920s to make
fortunes on a product he did not invent – the safety match. As he bought up other
companies, his success relied upon the perfection of his marketing schemes. Friends
and business partners alike described him as mesmerizing. One colleague noted:
There was an odd air of greatness about Ivar. I think he could get people to do
anything. They fell for him, they couldn’t resist his peculiar charm and
magnetism. Above all, there was a look about him that made a difference. I
saw J.P. Morgan’s eyes many times in New York. They were like fire coals.
But Ivar’s eyes were not like that. They had another quality. Though small and
narrow, they seemed capable, if he desired, of looking right through you. 75
This quiet, poised man seemed destined to become one of the century’s great
American success stories. Yet, the stock market crash hit Kreuger particularly hard, as
those who worked with him demanded payments that Kreuger could not supply.

169

Kreuger shocked the world when he shot himself in his Paris apartment on March 12,
1932, bankrupt after the Great Depression. The Economist mourned the loss: “His
death in Paris last Saturday by his own hand represents the veritably tragic wreck of a
career which in its sphere was unsurpassed by that of any individual in living
memory.” Yet, the same paper a few short weeks later reported that accountants
uncovered “deception and manipulation of accounts” in his empire. The Economist
and others were left “feeling bitterly humiliated” as $142 million in Italian bonds
“supposedly sold to him by Benito Mussolini’s government” were uncovered, and
Kreuger’s company owed more than Sweden’s national debt. 76 Kreuger became a man
of myth and mystery, a “confidence man” who managed to swindle international
finance on the back of the new global economy and its reliance on a financial (and
ultimately, interpersonal) credit system, a system that was burgeoning faster than rules
could maintain it.
“It is true that Mr. Kreuger was a charming man,” wrote modernist poet
Archibald Macleish in a lengthy profile of the man for Fortune magazine in 1933, just
a year after Kreuger’s death. “Everyone spoke beautifully of Mr. Kreuger—so
beautifully that [a dinner guest of Kreuger’s] never heard a man more beautifully
spoken of by everyone.” But Macleish – who himself would have a lengthy career as
modernist poet, and believed capitalism to be dead – finds “charm” cannot fully
explain the phenomenon of how “a match manufacturer from an unimportant
European city was able over nine years to dupe the international financiers of New
York and walk off with $250,000,000 of the country’s cash.” “Granted,” he notes, “the
charm was sufficient, even in Kreuger’s last weeks,” as Kreuger attempted to persuade
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a slew of New York businessmen including John McHugh and Samuel F. Pryor (of
Chase Bank) and Percy A. Rockefeller (nephew of John D. Rockefeller). Granted, too:
that the French had called him l’oiseleur, the bird charmer. Nevertheless Mr.
McHugh and Mr. Pryor and Mr. Rockefeller [et. al.] were not young partners.
And neither were they birds. Moreover charm as a solution of the mystery runs
into the obstinate and irrefutable fact that while it may explain the
acquiescence of the Americans it does not explain the actions of the Swede.
Commercial charm is the weapon of the vulgar swindler, the goldbrick man,
the faker who wants something for himself. But Kreuger, although he pumped
the better part of a quarter of a billion dollars out of America and into his own
companies and enterprises abroad, was contemptuous of money for its own
sake, lived, as one of his American banker friends put it, like a ‘cheap bank
clerk’ (which is to say, in the argot of the ’20’s [sic], like a man of
considerable but not spectacular wealth), and was chiefly remarkable for the
extravagance with which he gave money away to his friends, his
acquaintances, his competitors, and even to perfect strangers. To explain the
deception of the American financiers on the ground that they were taken in by
Kreuger’s charm is to imply that Kreuger was a mere swindler out for their
gold and with art enough to persuade them to relinquish it. But the implication
will not hold. It was something other than money that Kreuger wanted. And it
was something other than money that he persuaded his victims to give up. A
man, particularly the director of forty-nine corporations, does not permit
himself to be duped out of power by a nice smile and a set of even teeth. 77
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Macleish goes on to explain that the two easiest theories as to why Kreuger was able
to be so successful as the “Match King” are two sides of the same coin. One is that
somehow, businessmen, bankers, and others were so goodhearted that they simply did
not know any better. Yet, when met with critiques that the Kreuger company’s books
were so poorly done that anyone with any ability in simple mathematics could have
spotted inconsistencies in them, the theory switches to its opposite. Instead, such
businessmen – from investors to bankers to Kreuger’s own accountants and
bookkeepers – were not fooled by Kreuger’s “charm,” but rather, keen to make a
profit at any cost. “The truth is,” Macleish concludes, “that New York and the ’20’s
[sic] and Ivar Kreuger were made for one another as a patient is made for a disease as
a disease is made for a patient. The money markets of New York turned Ivar Kreuger
into a stock promoter and Ivar Kreuger as a stock promoter turned the New York
money markets inside out.” In other words:
Here then was a scene set for a swindler. Here was a city and a time in which
inadequate audits opened the basic corporate structure itself, the unit cell of
modern industry, to corruption and rendered the domestic holding company
with subsidiaries abroad practically investigation-proof… [T]he… great
Krueger mystery, the mystery of the dupes, is, to put it mildly, just as a
hinterland which demanded to be swindled would have been obliged to create
Wall Street had Wall Street not existed, so a Wall Street which demanded to be
fooled would have been obliged to invent an Ivar Kreuger had Ivar Kreuger not
been born.78
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Magnetically, Wall Street and Kreuger were drawn toward one another because they
were actually mutually constitutive, made for one another to thrive on, and, eventually
kill. When the charm of capital reveals its links to empty valuation, it forcibly ends
things—the market itself and Kreuger’s life, which Macleish seems to insist are one
and the same. The market always already demanded foolery, swindling, and fictive
figures to propel itself. In other words, Macleish’s formulation suggests that the
market did not crash because of the exceptional Kreuger and men like him. Rather,
Kreuger was exactly like any man with access to the means of production, and
Kreuger’s rise and fall exposed the American and global capitalist market for its
fictions of valuation, a real that deflated the “magic” allure at the center of capitalism.

Conclusion
Charm in American modernism registers what I have previously deemed
charm’s recognition of aesthetic loss or fallenness. Only in American modernism does
white nationalist masculinity’s relation to the labor market, commodity, and capital
take center stage as driving allure and detestable revelation of the mechanisms that
allow social categorization into gender, race or ethnicity, class, and nation. In this
way, it dramatically previews the intervention of critical race studies into Marxist
thought. An activist hermeneutic, racial capitalism finds its origins as theory in Cedric
Robinson’s Black Marxism: The Making of a Black Radical Tradition (1983). Black
Marxism served as corrective to Marx and Engels’s belief, stated in Capital, that
European bourgeois society would rationalize social relations. But Marx and Engels
failed to foresee that social relations would be pushed in racial directions, along with
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social ideology. Robinson explains: “As a material force… racialism would inevitably
permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term ‘racial
capitalism’ to refer… to the subsequent structure as a historical agency.” 79 Put simply,
capitalism was always already racialized, or, divisive within a social ideological
imaginary. Capitalism encourages certain kinds of human life to be valued over others,
as it requires relations based on balances of unequal labor: those with access to means
of production and workers without these means. These “uneven life chances that are
inescapably part of capitalist social relations,” then, are placed onto “fictions of
differing human capacities” – historically, racial difference. 80 Supporting divides
makes capitalism function, since the division between humans and their labor is
integral for the “magic” of the system to ensure its continuance. Divisions that both
Fitzgerald and Wharton point to on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, and even age
through the notion of “charm” as literary project therefore expose the economic and
sociopolitical underpinnings of American modernist aesthetic thought.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: CHARM’S NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MODERNIST STUDIES
In this dissertation, I examine what mobilized the simultaneous discourses of
charm and anti-charm rhetoric in modernist literature. Charm moves through late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Anglophone and American texts as a trojan
horse of sorts, ostensibly supporting normative ideologies of the social order while its
use imagines sociopolitical transformation. Charm does not foreclose non-normativity,
but rather, opens the non-normative to be able to slyly destabilize accepted forms of
sociality, individuality, and social bonds. I look to Oscar Wilde’s works to assess how
charm possesses an aesthetic magic that creates new social forms, bonding persons
across normative temporality and social stratification. Threads of charm as a
thoroughly modernist experimental project are then taken up by Gertrude Stein and
Sylvia Townsend Warner in the early decades of the twentieth-century, in whose
works I find a rendering of charm as force of social friction by revising approaches to
the feminine, to women’s bodies including those of women of color, and to women’s
lives. Finally, in the years leading up to WWII, this rebellious force becomes
subsumed by global capitalism, and re-latches to normativity; namely, to white
masculinity, which repossesses and subsumes the rebellious powers of charm to
become a purposeful slickness—the kind of slickness F. Scott Fitzgerald and Edith
Wharton suggest is the familiar, repellant and yet compelling oiliness of the salesman.
Throughout the years between 1890 and 1938, charm is alternately celebrated
and denigrated in modernist literature, as ideas of charm as effeminate, supernatural,
fleeting, and superficial are worked over at various turns as threatening and liberating.
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Charm’s presence in the era, I argue, not only helps to formulate a compelling
narrative of modernism deserving of critical attention, but also a force that wounds
accepted paradigms of modernist studies. As modernist studies attempts to move
toward questions of theoretical approach as well as scale (historical, geographic, and
even planetary), charm functions as example of what new approaches to modernism
based in mechanisms of feminization, marginalization, and difference can do.
Throughout this study, charm in modernist writers’ thought and works
functions as clear interruption to the ease of modernism as having specific temporal or
aesthetic boundaries. My study therefore joins with recent scholarship that attempts to
overturn such strict delineations, such as Rachel Teukolsky’s The Literate Eye:
Victorian Art Writing and Modernist Aesthetics (2009), or Jessica Feldman’s
Victorian Modernism: Pragmatism and the Varieties of Human Experience (2002).
This also includes recent work on modernist decadence. Following David Weir’s
Decadent Culture in the United States: Art and Literature Against the American
Grain, 1890-1926 (2007), new scholarship including Decadence in the Age of
Modernism (2019) examines modernist writers’ engagements with decadent principles
and aesthetics from Walter Pater and Algernon Swinburne. Charm’s emergence and
eventual ubiquity in early twentieth-century literature suggests not a radical break
from the past, but a deep thread of continuity. As such, charm flouts the narrative
perpetuated by modernist studies today which arose from modernists themselves: that
modernism was concerned with the new, in direct responsivity to a newly “modern”
twentieth-century life that was rapidly changing. To focus on charm in literary
modernism overturns such perceptions. Charm’s embeddedness in Medieval spiritual
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practice, sixteenth to seventeenth-century English traditions of witchcraft and folklore,
and ostensible emphasis on traditional (read: nineteenth-century) gender roles and
social politesse is at odds with modernism’s stated goals. Charm also lessens
modernism’s alleged attentions on the individual in favor of its engagement among
persons and groups as a social binder. Finally, as itself an affective-aesthetic category,
charm reinforces the ways in which form moves and works on us. Attention to
charm’s evolving powers in the early decades of the twentieth-century, then, is to
refocus our gaze on the era, its voices, and its textual forms.
Separately, too, this dissertation emphasizes the advance of key scholarship in
the growing subfield, feminist modernist studies. I envision charm as an example of a
new sort of methodological and conceptual recovery work in direct support of feminist
approaches to literary studies. Feminist modernist studies in particular aims at both
utilizing contemporary feminist approaches or knowledges to re-encounter modernist
texts and modernist thought, as well as drawing out modernism’s own approaches to
the women’s movement, to feminism, to women’s bodies, and concerns of
marginalization, minoritization, and oppression. The field answers the concern of
many scholars who have recently argued that the study of women’s writing in
modernism has passed its critical peak and entered into crisis. After the rise of New
Modernist Studies in the 1990s, feminist criticism experienced four radical and
resultant shifts that made the work of women’s writing more complex, notes Susan
Stanford Friedman. The move from national to transnational frameworks and the push
toward intersectionality of identity categories meant that the category of “women’s
writing” was far more complicated. The burgeoning of digital culture, moreover,
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meant that the traditional archival work of feminist recovery shifted to digital
initiatives performed by librarians and historical societies.
Jane Garrity argues in a recent article, “Modernist Women’s Writing: Beyond
the Threshold of Obsolescence?” (2014), that this has problematized critical projects,
since we have long since passed the age of a “universal feminism” or universal
concept of “women writers” as collective category. Many would say, Garrity notes,
that “feminist scholarship on women’s modernism and women’s modernity is clearly
at an impasse, but is this statement really true?” 1 Garrity concludes that “the fact
remains that the passionate interest in women’s writing that exploded in the 1970s is
no longer pervasive.”2 Toril Moi accounts for this shift as the direct result of 1990s
gender theory such as Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, works which marked the
increased difficulty of talking about anything relating to “women” without first
placing “women” in quotation marks, and prioritizing the social construction of gender
and its organizational functions.
Charmed Modernisms argues implicitly and explicitly that to believe feminist
“recovery work” is stalling, or to continue to uphold traditional narratives of modernist
projects, means that we have lost the ability to see other approaches of modernist
studies. These approaches must not be merely additive, since recovering and adding
still more female writers to the canon in itself often reifies what “female writers”
means—a catch-all category that often hides its carriage of privilege—that “woman”
is white, cisgender, upper-class, able-bodied, heterosexual, and so on—and flattens
potential difference. These approaches must also not continue to bolster the oftenaccepted notion that modernism was a project in rebellion, innovation, and the new.
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The work of re-texturizing what we consider to be modernism proper must continue in
ways other than feminist recovery of voices. We must also propose ways to hear those
voices, and understand how this plethora of figures alters what modernism as a
movement has been seen to be, and more importantly, how it is taught.
The stakes of accepting certain kinds of modernisms, then, have wide-ranging
effects that are not only what we read, but how we read. Accepting this kind of
modernism makes it difficult to assess what is on offer to modernist studies by Sylvia
Townsend Warner’s career in historical fiction and fantasy, for example. Putting
Warner or any writer outside of the white Anglophone world within both the fabric of
modernism’s varied narratives about itself and its contextual history presents
continued critical puzzles for us, reconnecting contemporary intellectual and social
concerns of secularization, disenchantment, and the disintegration of community to
their early twentieth-century explorations. 3 This is itself a legacy of modernism—that
modernist studies itself, like its object, must always redefine, reify, and remake itself,
setting boundaries and removing them, making declarations and overturning them.
This project’s work is important on a sociopolitical scale as well, one that
extends beyond the literary much as charm itself extends beyond its literary
expressions. Charm in literature opens forms of resistance and resilience. Following
the work of the modernist writers addressed in this project, I offer modernist work on
charm as an indication that re-stitching the social is possible. A radical new
communality was once iterated by modernists as varied as Oscar Wilde, Sylvia
Townsend Warner, and Gertrude Stein, who turned to charm as methodology of
finding renewed relations with others through social bonds in the face of political,
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economic, and social marginalization. These bonds were set based on creative,
imaginative relations rather than available existing ones, however nascent—this
includes capitalism’s labor relations, systems of social stratification, and political
identities. Moreover, these bonds insist not only on the cohesion of the marginalized
for survival, but that within this survival is a lived, creative and occasionally perverse
pleasure.
Jane Garrity, “Modernist Women’s Writing,” 15.
Garrity, ibid.
3
For this formulation, I paraphrase John T. Connor, “Hope Mirrlees and the Archive of
Modernism” Review Essay, Journal of Modern Literature 37.2 (Winter 2014), 177-182 at 180.
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